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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the challenges encountered by parties seeking to have 
arbitral awards recognised and enforced within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Specifically, this thesis critically assesses the impact of Shariah on the 
enforcement of international awards within the Kingdom and aims to suggest 
actionable reforms to further develop the Saudi arbitration framework, and build 
on the modernisation efforts initiated through the Saudi Arbitration Law and 
Enforcement Law, both issued in 2012.  
 
This study aims to examine issues around the treatment and enforcement of 
domestic and international awards under the Saudi legal system and dispute 
settlement machinery. Particular focus will be directed to the differences 
between the enforcement of domestic and foreign awards, and the challenges 
that arise therein. By way of critical analysis, this thesis explores the history and 
development of arbitration law and procedure in Saudi Arabia, focusing on the 
role of Shariah principles in contract construction and dispute resolution. By 
bringing Saudi arbitration procedures into greater alignment with international 
standards and practices, and curtailing the power of local courts, the New 
Arbitration Law has been widely welcomed as establishing a more hospitable 
arbitration environment for commercial actors, foreign and domestic. 
 
While the New Saudi Arbitration Regime aimed to bring much-needed certainty 
and predictability to Saudi-based commercial arbitration awards, the Saudi legal 
system is still in its infancy and struggling to balance its Shariah roots with 
secular practices. As this thesis explores, the Saudi model of contract 
construction and dispute resolution is not yet embedded in a settled or ‘gapless’ 
body of legal principles, in large part because of on-going contestation among 
Islamic scholars over the scope and meaning of Shariah principles. While the 
new law significantly curtails the review power of local courts, judicial authorities 
in Saudi Arabia continue to enjoy broad discretion to reopen a final non-
localised arbitral award issued elsewhere and to subject it to review on the 
merits. The grounds for annulment, revision or refusal to enforce include any 
agreement deemed to contravene Shariah law, Saudi public policy and prior 
Saudi court decrees, in addition to other public policy related defences. 
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In the final analysis, the proposed thesis will consider the potential impacts of 
Shariah on arbitral award enforcement proceedings initiated in Saudi Arabia. At 
the level of conceptual analysis, the proposed research reflects on the familiar 
tension between international regulations, which is principally achieved through 
harmonisation of applicable arbitral procedures and the domestic enforcement 
of applicable national (substantive) laws on arbitration. From these premises, 
the proposed thesis will critically evaluate the extent to which Saudi arbitration 
law has reconciled the modernising ambitions of an ‘commerce friendly’ 
arbitration regime and where progress is still needed to achieve efficient and 
effective award enforcement.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In a globalised age where commerce continues to grow and expand, both 
domestically and internationally, so too has the need for an effective means of 
resolving commercial disputes. Saudi Arabia has taken note that arbitration has 
become widely recognized by commercial contracting parties as one of the 
most popular modes of dispute resolution.1 In response to the increased use of 
this alternative form of dispute resolution, the Kingdom has undertaken to 
reform its domestic arbitration law and evaluated its position in light of prevailing 
international arbitral instruments, such as the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards. Saudi Arabia’s attempts to 
modernize its arbitration regime have focused on accommodating the 
commercial preference for arbitration and providing efficient means for obtaining 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 
 
It has become apparent that arbitration is well-suited for the commercial 
transaction environment and is able to adeptly handle disputes involving both 
foreign and domestic parties.2 In contrast to formal court-based litigation 
procedures, arbitration provides the parties with significant autonomy to make 
																																																						
1 For the purpose of this thesis, it would be helpful to interpret foreign investors and international 
commercial parties as international contracting parties because this thesis attempt to analysis the 
challenges confronted by both contracting parties, by nature, more arbitral orientated than business. 
2 There are several views and opinions on why international arbitration is a popular mode for resolving 
international commercial disputes among international contracting parties. For example, Born assessed 
‘international arbitration is worthy of attention because it operates within a framework of international 
legal rules and institutions which-with remarkable and enduring success-provide a fair, neutral, expert and 
efficient means of resolving difficult and contentious transnational problems. That framework enables 
private and public actors from diverse jurisdictions to cooperatively resolve deep-seated and complex 
international disputes in a neutral, durable and satisfactory manner’. GB Born, International Commercial 
Arbitration, Vol lI: International Arbitration Agreements (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International, 2014) 1; 
see also C Burhing-Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business (2nd end, Kluwer Law 
International, 2006) 31-33; L Daradkeh, ‘Commercial Arbitration under Investment Treaties and 
Contracts: Its Importance and Danger in the Arab World’ (2013) 27 A.R.Q. 393; PB Rutledge, Arbitration 
and the Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 2013); S Al-Ammari & AT Martin, ‘Arbitration in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (2014) 30(2) Arbitration International 387, 387-408; JDM Lew, LA Mistelis 
& SM Kroll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2003) 4, 
113; J Nakagawa, Transparency in International Trade and Investment Dispute Settlement (Routledge 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2013)16; R Hogan, ‘ADR: Adding Extra Value to Law' (2012) 78(3) Arbitration 
247, 247-55. 
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choices about who will preside over their dispute as arbitrators, what procedural 
rules will be used, what substantive governing law will apply, and where the 
seat of the arbitration proceedings will be located.3 However, arguably one of 
the most important factors that contributes to the success of arbitration are the 
procedures put in place to ensure the recognition4 and enforcement5 of arbitral 
awards.6 This is crucial in situations where a party to a domestic arbitration is 
attempting to hide assets in another country or an arbitration involving a foreign 
party that maintains the majority of its assets in its home country. In effect, 
arbitration proceedings carry little weight if the ultimate award is rendered 
unenforceable. Thus, it is imperative that there be a reliable and predictable 
means for enforcing such arbitral awards. 
 
During the process of attempting to enforce an arbitral award through the 
courts, and in particular the enforcement courts of Saudi Arabia, it has become 
apparent that the courts may differ from the approach of the arbitrators in 
																																																						
3 A Redfern et al, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004)1. 
See also, BL Bond, ‘Alternative Methods of Resolving Construction Disputes: Is Statutory Adjudication 
Really the Best Way?’ (2016) 82(3) Arbitration 239, 239-49; R Abu-Manneh, M Stefanini & J Holden, 
‘Is Arbitration Damaging the Common Law?’ (2016) 19(3) International Arbitration Law Review 65-69; 
J Alexander & L Frey, ‘New Expedited Arbitration Procedure Aims to Promote Arbitration Among 
Financial Service Providers with Quicker and Possibly Cheaper Arbitration Process’ (2016) 19(1) 
International Arbitration Law Review 1, 1-3; C Schrewer, ‘Calvo’s Grand Children: The Return of Local 
Remedies in Investment Arbitration’ (2005) 1 LAPE 1, 1-17. 
4 The term recognition in arbitration is when an arbitral tribunal/institution issue an award in an arbitral 
dispute. The winning party will seek a leave from the enforcing state’s court to recognise the arbitral 
award to allow enforcement against respondent. For example, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 
winning party will seek a leave before the Saudi local courts as stipulated in Article 53 of the Saudi 
Arbitration 2012, before enforcing the arbitral awards, irrespective of whether the awards is made in the 
same jurisdiction as the enforcement court or made abroad. This thesis will analysis the challenges 
confronted for international arbitral parties in the procedure for enforcement of international arbitral 
awards in Saudi Arabia. See H Kronke et al, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A 
Global Commentary on the New York Convention (Kluwer Law International, 2010). 
5 The term enforcement in arbitration is when an arbitral award has been recognized by the jurisdictional 
enforcing state’s court and the arbitral award can be subsequently enforced. However, in some enforcing 
states, the winning party must carry out a legal procedure before the jurisdiction’s courts to enforce the 
award. For example, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the winning party must make an application under 
Article 53 of the Enforcement Law 2012, before the Saudi Enforcement Circuit to enforce the recognised 
arbitral award. This will be further examined and analysed in this thesis to determine the reasons for these 
procedures and challenges confronted by arbitral parties during the enforcement process. See MB Holes, 
‘Enforcement of Annulled Arbitral Awards: Logical Fallacies and Fictional Systems’ (2013) 79(3) 
Arbitration 244-55; see also Kronke et al (n 4). 
6 For the purpose of this thesis, an international arbitral award includes an international commercial 
arbitral award and international investment arbitral award, as there is a difference in the arbitral 
procedures in rendering these arbitral awards. For example, when rendering international commercial 
arbitral awards, an arbitral tribunal would assess the arbitral parties’ rights and obligations as stipulated in 
the international commercial agreement or arbitral agreement between the contracting parties. See T 
Childs, ‘Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: Should a Party Be Allowed Multiple Bites at the 
Apple?’ (2015) 26 ARIA 269, 269-80; see also J Kirby, ‘What Is an Award Anyway?’ (2014) 31(4) 
Journal of International Arbitration 475, 475-484. 
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evaluating the public policy impacts of the awards. Provisions exist under both 
domestic and international arbitration laws addressing enforcement that permit 
an enforcing state’s court to refuse to recognise an arbitral award on the 
grounds that it violates that state’s public policy.7 Therefore, it is essential that 
both the parties and the arbitrators have an understanding of the arbitration 
laws and public policy considerations of the states in which any resulting award 
is likely to be enforced to ensure that the courts will not set aside the award on 
public policy grounds.8 For arbitral awards to be effectively enforced, the parties’ 
exercise of their autonomy must be done in a manner that is consistent with the 
states in which the arbitration will be located or any award is to be submitted for 
recognition and enforcement. Further, arbitrators must also be aware of these 
considerations and restrictions when rendering arbitral awards to ensure that 
the awards will be able to subsequently be enforced and benefit the prevailing 
parties. While public policy often has a specific set of connotations that can be 
used to guide compliance, the situation differs in Islamic states that have laws 
based on Shariah traditions and principles. In these states, for an award to be 
consistent with Islamic public policy, the award may not run afoul of Shariah 
principles.  
 
Considering the nuances created by Saudi Arabia’s subscription to a Shariah-
based legal system, this thesis offers a critical analysis of the enforceability of 
arbitral awards within Saudi Arabia. Understanding that investment takes 
																																																						
7 For example, Zhang assessed the refusal to recognise and enforce international arbitral awards on the 
grounds of a violation of China’s public policy. See S Zhang, ‘Validity of the Arbitration Agreement, Res 
Judicata Principle and China’s Public Policy: Commentary on the Chinese Courts’ Opinions on Wicor 
Holdings AG v Taizhoou Haopu Investment Co Ltd’ (2016) 19(5) International Arbitrational Law 
Review 144, 144-54; see also D Choi, ‘The Tension Between Validation and Implied Intent Approaches 
in Finding the Law for the Agreement to Arbitrate’ (2016) 19(5) International Arbitration Law Review 
121, 121-29; L Pitts, ‘The DIFC as a Conduit Jurisdiction for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Dubai’ 
(2016) 19(3) International Arbitration Law Review 30, 30-32; A Behrman & JB Pechincha, ‘Enforcement 
Abroad Where Award Set Aside at Seat’ (2016) 19(2) International Arbitration Law Review 11, 11-13. 
8 For example, Rosher assessed that dispute resolution clauses in a commercial contract often provide the 
contracting parties to attempt to resolve their disputes in arbitration before adjudicating in the courts. See 
P Rosher, ‘Adjudication in Construction Contracts’ (2016) 5 I.B.L.J 497, 497-510; see also Redfern et al 
(n 3) 1; EA Alsheikh, ‘Distinction Between the Concepts of Mediation, Conciliation, Sulh and Arbitration 
in Shariah Law’ (2011) 25 ARL 367; Rutledge (n 2) 1; Lew, Mistelis & Kroll (n 2) 18-19; F Blavi, ‘The 
Role of Public Policy in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2016) 82(1) Arbitration 2, 2-15; CP 
Ojiegbe, ‘Arbitral Tribunals Are Not Bound by the Principle of Mutual Trust: The CJEU (Grand 
Chamber) Decides in the Gazprom Case’ (2015) 18(4) International Arbitration Law Review 74, 74-79; 
BAF Al-Serhan, ‘Speedy Enforcement of Domestic Arbitral Awards: Analytical Study under the Emirate 
Civil Procedures Law’ (2015) 29(4) ALQ 378, 378-96; TJ Stipanowich & ZP Ulrich, ‘Arbitration in 
Evolution: Current Practices and Perspectives of Experienced Commercial Arbitrators’ (2014) 25 ARIA 
395, 395-479. 
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various forms, this thesis considers both domestic and foreign or international 
arbitrations in undertaking this analysis, including highlighting notable 
differences between the two processes where applicable. This study particularly 
seeks to evaluate the extent to which the Saudi government has been 
successful at encouraging foreign investment, following reforms to its arbitration 
framework. In taking up this issue, this study focuses on the impacts of the 
Saudi Arbitration Act 2012 and Enforcement Law 2012, analysing three key 
aspects of the regulatory framework on arbitration: the parties’ choice to submit 
disputes to arbitration, including evaluating their authority to enter into 
arbitration agreements; the parties’ choice of applicable law; and the potential 
for recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. As a corollary, this thesis will 
also consider the attitudes of the Saudi government toward the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards as a contracting state of the New York 
Convention of 1958 and how the Kingdom incorporated these principles into its 
domestic arbitration law reform. Finally, this thesis will offer recommendations 
on how to further reform the Saudi arbitration regime to enhance the legal 
certainty, fairness, and effective functioning of the existing legal framework, 
thereby addressing the various challenges confronted by contracting parties 
who seek to resolve commercial disputes by means of arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
1.2 Contribution of Thesis 
 
Saudi Arabia is one of the most rapidly growing countries in the Middle East9 
and is the largest producer and exporter of petroleum to international oil 
markets.10 Its activities in the oil and energy sector generates about half of the 
Saudi economies GDP.11 This economic growth has brought with it significant 
commercial contracts among both domestic parties and foreign investors.12 As 
mentioned above, savvy businesses recognise the benefits of arbitration and 
																																																						
9 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoys a monarchy ruling system, where the King is the head and 
supreme ruler of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is an Islamic State. Its religion is Islam and its constitution is 
the Holy Qur’an and Sunna’h of the Prophet Mohammad and its governance is based on Islamic (Shariah) 
law. It follows the teachings of the Hanbali School.  
10 See the official website of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 
<http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/169.htm> accessed 26 August 2014. 
11 Ibid. 
12 DG Victor, DR Hults & MC Thurber, Oil and Governance State-Owned Enterprises and the World 
Energy Supply (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 189. 
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are turning to it more frequently to resolve their arbitral disputes. While much 
attention has been given to the impact of Shariah law on arbitration proceedings 
and in the development of the domestic Saudi arbitration laws, little research 
has been done to explore the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
within the Kingdom under the reformed Saudi arbitration regime. These 
significant reforms were instituted to facilitate commercial arbitration within the 
Kingdom and attract more foreign investment and trade activities into Saudi 
Arabia.13 However, for such a regime to be effective, the resulting awards from 
arbitral proceedings must be enforceable within the Saudi courts.  
 
This study goes beyond simply examining how Shariah law impacts commercial 
contracts, but also the role that Shariah plays in defining the underlying public 
policy grounds on which the enforcement courts can refuse to recognise and 
enforce both domestic and foreign arbitral awards. This study addresses the 
normative issues of equating Saudi public policy with all aspects of Shariah law 
for enforcement purposes and the practical difficulties parties may face given 
that Shariah is subject to various interpretations by lawyers, scholars, 
arbitrators, and judges. This study further analyses the onus placed on all 
involved in arbitral proceedings to have the foresight to consider the potential 
countries for enforcement, and when that country is Saudi Arabia, the additional 
considerations that need to be kept in mind to ensure the enforceability of the 
arbitral award. Finally, this study provides practical recommendations that can 
be further studied and implemented to reduce the potential for an enforcement 
court refusing to recognise and enforce an arbitral award on public policy 
grounds. 
 
By considering this analysis and implementing these changes, the Saudi 
government can improve the Kingdom’s access to international capital markets, 
thereby attracting additional foreign direct investment and creating more 
																																																						
13 See, eg, MEJB Williamson, ‘Geographical Indications, Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: 
Obligations and Opportunities for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (2012) 26(1) ALQ 99, 99-119; see also 
A Shabana, Custom in Islamic Law and Legal Theory, The Development of the Concept of ‘Urf and ‘Adah 
in the Islamic Legal Tradition (Palgrave MacMillan, 2010). 
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commercial opportunities for Saudi businessmen.14 By creating a more 
predictable recognition and enforcement regime, Saudi Arabia can acquire the 
necessary confidence of both domestic and international contracting parties in 
the Kingdom’s legal, judicial, and arbitral systems when it comes to resolving 
business disputes.15 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
 
To situate this study within the existing relevant literature, the following provides 
a literature review broken down by primary topic areas. As there is little 
research that specifically addresses the issue of recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards under the new arbitration regime in Saud Arabia in light of 
Shariah’s public policy impacts, consideration is given to those studies that 
have provided a foundation of the relationship between Shariah and commercial 
arbitration upon which the current research can be built. This literature review 
first considers those sources that apply specifically to Shariah principles, then 
concludes by looking at the relevant arbitration literature. 
 
1.3.1 The Role of Shariah in Contract Law Construction and Theory 
 
In the above regard, it is frequently commented that international contracting 
parties lack a proper understanding of Shariah-governed Saudi law, given the 
distinct nature of Saudi substantive law as compared with other common and 
civil legal systems.16 A number of scholars such as Al-Baqme have exposed the 
significant difference between Shariah and Western laws.17 For instance, 
Shariah law is believed to be divine law,18 which cannot be changed. By way of 
																																																						
14 FM Al-Fadhel, ‘Legislative Comment: The New Saudi Arabian Arbitration Law’ (2016) 82(4) 
Arbitration 415, 415-26; see also P Cresswell, ‘The Future of Arbitration in the Changing World of 
Dispute Resolution’ (2013) 79(3) Arbitration 285, 285-94. 
15 Baamir outlines the importance of effective legislation to protect the Saudi financial system. AY 
Baamir, ‘Issues of Transparency and Disclosure in the Saudi Stock Market’ (2008) 22 ALQ 63-87.  
16 For example, Duderija outlines how the development of the canonical Hadith literature as law during 
the first four generations of Muslims. See A Dudeerija, ‘Evolution in the Canonical Sunni Hadith Body of 
Literature and the Concept of an Authentic Hadith During the Formative Period of Islamic Thought as 
based on Recent Western Scholarship’ (2009) 23 ALQ 389-415. 
17 AS Al Baqme, ‘Consumer Protection under Saudi Arabia Law’ (2014) 28 ALQ 171. 
18 Why does a Muslim believe the Holy Qur’an as Divine law? Several attempts have been made to 
explain this question. However, Watt remarks that the Holy Qur’an is the speech of the God Allah to his 
messenger, the Prophet Muhammad, and Muslims believes certain ideas, which have been preached by 
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contrast, Western laws are flexible and can be amended or modified.19 
Therefore, it is necessary to clarify how the Islamic jurisprudence has 
developed in Saudi Arabia and in the Islamic world more generally, as well as to 
examine its sources and issues around which there is interpretative dispute.20 
Islamic jurisprudence addresses two important points, the religious and Islamic 
Schools.21 
 
On the same subject, Lew outlines why there is no uniform interpretation of 
religious-based law, regardless of the nature of the legal system or its source of 
authority whether based on legislation or on immutable and interpretatively 
‘open’ religious principles.22 He further points out that the common law countries 
mainly rely on the skill of advocates to interpret the law in a case.23 Yet, in civil 
law countries, judges are vested with the power to interpret the law as applied 
to the facts in rendering a legal decision.24 It is here that we find a fundamental 
difference between Islamic and Western legal systems. For instance, Black et 
al. explains the key differences in the interpretative methods used in Islamic 
legal systems as compared with common and civil law systems.25 Drawing on 
the writings of Joseph Schacht, the aforementioned scholars contend that:  
 
Islamic law represents an extreme case of ‘jurists law’; it 
was created and developed by private specialists; legal 
science, and not the state, plays the part of a legislator, and 
																																																																																																																																																														
the Prophet Muhammad, also have a high degree of certainty. See WM Watt, Muhammad at Mecca 
(Oxford University of Press, 1953) 26. Berg outlines Sharia as the sources of divine law. H Berg, ‘The 
Divine Sources’, in P Peters & P Bearman, The Ashgate Research Companion to Islamic Law (Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2014) 27. Sandberg says, ‘Religious law may be defined as the study of the ‘internal’ 
laws or other regulatory instruments created by religious collectives themselves. It includes not only the 
rules found in sacred texts, but also the more practical rules developed by religious groups themselves’. 
See R Sandberg, Law & Religious (Cambridge University Press, 2011). El-Malik mentions the feature of 
Islam is that it is not only a religion or moral code but also a legal system. See WMH El-Malik, Minerals 
Investment Under the Shari’a Law (Graham & Trotman Ltd, 1993) 7. For a more thoughtful study on this 
matter, see AY Baamir, Shari’a Law in Commercial and Banking Arbitration, Law and Practice in Saudi 
Arabia (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010) 6; D Bramsen, ‘Divine Law and Human Understanding – The 
Idea of Shari’a in Saudi Arabia’, in J Nielsen & L. Christoffersen, Shari’a as Discourse (Ashgate, 2010). 
19 Al Baqme (n 17) 171. 
20 N Feldman, ‘The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Princeton University Press, 2008). 
21 See Alsheikh (n 8) 367-400.  
22 P Wautelet, T Kruger & G Coppens, The Practice of Arbitration Essays in Honour of Hans Van Houtte 
(Hart Publishing, 2012) 2. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
25 See A Black, H Esmaeili & N Hosen, Modern Perspectives on Islamic Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 2013) xi.  
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scholarly handbooks have the force of law. Islamic law is 
therefore neither common nor civil law, but is juristic law.26 
 
The above offers a backdrop against which one can understand the complex 
nature of the Saudi legal system. Most Western legal systems converge around 
common and international recognised law and customs of commercial contract 
law, many of which are reflected in the major international arbitration treaties.27 
 
More generally, Islamic contract law is far more prescriptive than modern 
theories of contract law and construction in the West.28 While Western theories 
of private law are founded upon the principles of party autonomy and freedom 
of contract, Islamic principles constrain the freedom of contractors by limiting 
the sorts of transactions and contractual exchanges to which individuals can 
enter into.29 In this regard, Foster has suggested that the Western model of law 
is based on theories of liberalism in which a distinction is maintained between 
public life and private sphere of religious beliefs.30 While scholars such as 
Foster have correctly identified that Islamic legal systems are at odds with 
liberal rule of law theories, this thesis argues that such accounts fail to offer a 
nuanced understanding of the role of Shariah law and Islamic Schools in 
commercial transactions.31 Absent a more careful assessment of the distinct 
and varying ways in which Islamic principles have been interpreted by scholarly 
authorities, and of their legitimate role and application in Saudi Arabia’s 
legislative and judicial processes, such accounts are unable to fully grasp and 
identify the challenges faced by international contracting parties.32 Rather, one 
can argue that the Islamic Hanafi School’s interpretation of Shariah is contrary 
to the received wisdom favourable to commerce, even if as some have argued, 
Saudi Arabia has embraced Western models of finance law precisely in order to 
																																																						
26 Ibid.  
27 See MM Iqbal, ‘Prohibition of Interest and Economic Rationality’ (2010) 24 ALQ 293-308. 
28 Al-Fadhel (n 14). 
29 TJ Stipanowich, ‘Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration: Challenges, 
Opportunities, Proposals’ (2014) 25(4) ARIA 297-394. 
30 NHD Foster, ‘Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations: Part 2: The Sharia and 
Western-style Business Organisations’ (2010) 11(2) EBOR 273-307; S Ab Rahman, ‘Guarantees in Early 
Islamic Financial System’ (2015) 29(3) ALQ 274-284. 
31 Foster (n 30) 273-307. 
32 Ibid. 
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become a more attractive venue for foreign investment.33 However, there 
remain challenges, as to the legitimate expectations of foreign contractors who 
do business in Saudi Arabia, specifically with respect to the lack of consistency 
and certainty in the interpretation of Shariah principles and the role of the courts 
in dispute resolution. As Foster emphasises:  
 
[S]cholarly work is still patchy and is particularly deficient, with a 
few notable exceptions, in foundational questions. We cannot yet, 
therefore, speak of any consensus view, or even a fully informed 
debate, concerning Islamic perspectives on the law of business 
associations in the modern world. We will need to wait and see 
how the field develops in the next few years.34  
 
While, Foster’s argument is persuasive, it is arguably too sweeping. More 
crucially, Western analysis of the Islamic legal system often fails to account for 
important differences in scholarly interpretations of Shariah on questions of 
arbitration and contract construction between the four major Islamic Schools.35 
Instead, emphasis is placed on the absence of effective legal and regulatory 
mechanisms aimed at protecting the rights of foreign contractors and the 
difficulties international and foreign commercial entities face in understanding 
and interpreting principles of Shariah in the context of international arbitration 
and dispute resolution.36 Situated against this background, this study will 
attempt to address ‘gaps’ in the extant literature, specifically by offering a 
detailed and critical investigation of the jurisprudential perspectives of the four 
main Islamic Schools in relation to commercial transactions. The purpose of this 
analysis of Islamic jurisprudence is to gain a deeper understanding of the many 
modern legal issues implicated by complex international commercial 
transactions and dispute settlement in an ever-globalising world.37  
 
																																																						
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Stipanowich (n 29) 297-394. 
37 See, eg, Al-Fadhel (n 14); see also ZS Al-Herbish, ‘Jurisdiction over Banking Disputes in Saudi 
Arabia’ (2011) 25 ALQ 221-228; H Ahamat & MHM Kamal, ‘Modern Application of Siyar (Islamic Law 
of Nations): Some Preliminary Observations’ (2011) 25 ALQ 423-39; A Nadar, ‘Islamic Finance and 
Dispute Resolution: Part 1’ (2009) 23 ALQ 1-29. 
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Further, as scholars such as Al-Sheikh have documented, a significant portion 
of the existing literature is based on the common assumption that the law of 
Shariah is unclear on the obligatory nature of arbitration for the contracting 
parties.38 These scholars have remarked on the efforts of all major Islamic 
schools to simplify the principles applicable to arbitration under Shariah.39 This 
means that more effort must be made to examine the role of Shariah in the 
Saudi arbitration framework. Thus, the current study will consider how the Saudi 
government can address these concerns toward the implementation of a more 
efficient arbitration regime. 
 
In view of the above, Al-Ammari and Martin attempted to identify the reasons 
why international contracting parties are confronted with difficulties when using 
Saudi arbitration,40 as governed by the Saudi Arbitration Act 2012 and 
Enforcement Law 2012.41 Importantly, this strand of scholarship offers a 
comparative analysis of the provisions of the old Saudi Arbitration Act 1983 with 
the current arbitration act, while highlighting the impact of Shariah on the new 
arbitration framework and enforcement law.42 Notably, Al-Ammari and Martin 
emphasise that despite the reforms, international commercial parties and 
foreign investors still confront challenges when seeking recognition and 
enforcement of their arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia.43 
 
The Saudi Arbitration Act 2012 is based on harmonised international arbitration 
procedures as embodied by the UNCITRAL Model Law.44 The UNCITRAL rules 
are widely regarded as a crystallisation and codification of Western (non-
Islamic) international law principles and arbitration procedures.45 Yet, it is 
difficult to ignore the peremptory status of Shariah in Saudi domestic law. One 
might assume that Shariah defences to recognition and enforcement would, in 
																																																						
38 Alsheikh (n 8) 367-400. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Al-Ammari & Martin (n 2) 387-408. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 The Kingdom adopted the methodology contained in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration when enacting the new Saudi Arbitration Act, 2012. See official website of 
UNCITRAL, <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html> accessed 21 August 2014. 
45 AK Aldohni, ‘The Emergence of Islamic Banking in the UK: A Comparative Study with Muslim 
Countries’ (2008) 22 ALQ 180-198. 
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principle, prevail over international law.46 What remains open to question is who 
decides what is or is not compliant with Shariah—national courts or international 
or delocalised arbitration bodies? A larger problem is the trend of inconsistent 
and arbitrary interpretations of Islamic religious opinions or ‘Fatwas’ or the 
invocation of public policy defences.47  
 
This thesis argues several challenges plague the recognition and enforcement 
of international arbitral awards in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, the 
choice of law is a vitally important issue in international arbitral process.48 This 
is because contracting parties and arbitrators usually rely on the choice of law 
for governing and interpretation of international arbitration agreement due to 
divergence in national law across the national legal systems of contracting 
parties; however, Shariah may supersede those choices in practice.49 
 
1.3.2 The Importance of Choice of Law in Arbitration 
 
As previously mentioned, many international commercial disputes that are 
referred to arbitration are determined by the arbitrators’ application of the 
chosen governing law.50 However, courts in different jurisdictions may have 
different perspectives on the applicable law to the international arbitral 
agreement and may well interpret the relevant points of law to reach different 
outcomes.51 As parties to international commercial agreements rely on 
consistency and predictability around legal outcomes, any risk that an arbitral 
award will not be upheld or enforced by local authorities, or that the underlying 
contract will be subject to review on the merits and even voided, is a 
disincentive to future investment in that country.52 
 
																																																						
46 Al-Fadhel (n 14). 
47 MM Billah, ‘The Prohibition of Riba and the Use of Hiyal by Islamic Banks to Overcome the 
Prohibition’ (2014) 28(4) ALQ 392-408. 
48 See Alsheikh (n 8) 367-400; see also A Garnuszek, ‘The Law Applicable to the Contractual Assignment 
of an Arbitration Agreement’ (2016) 82(4) Arbitration 348-55. 
49 See Alsheikh (n 8) 367-400; see also Garnuszek (n 48) 348-55; Abu-Manneh, Stefanini & Holden (n 3) 
65-69. 
50 See, eg, Redfern et al (n 3) 1; see also Alsheikh (n 8) 367; Rutledge (n 2) 1; Choi (n 7) 121-29. 
51 See, eg, HL Stovall, ‘Recent Revisions to Commercial Agency Law in the United Arab Emirates’ 
(2008) 22 ALQ 307-30. 
52 MO Farooq, ‘Qard Hasan, Wadi ah/Amanah and Bank Deposits: Applications and Misapplications of 
Some Concepts in Islamic Banking’ (2011) 25 ALQ 115-46. 
	21	
	
In this respect, the author of thesis will draw on Milhaupt and Pistor’s claims to 
argue that the Saudi government needs to embrace a more liberal approach to 
interpreting the provisions of Shariah.53 It is also argued that Saudi Arabia 
should simplify its legislation and enhance consistency in judicial processes 
toward promoting stable expectations of investors and other commercial actors 
in the formation of contracts and resolution of contractual disputes.54 Such 
measures will enable international contracting parties to have a better 
understanding of Saudi legislation. 
 
Before deciding whether to do business in a state, a commercial actor often will 
consider its ability to choose the law that will apply to a transaction agreement.55 
Following on from the argument above, Feldman has argued that: 
 
‘[L]aw is not the only manifestation of the conformity norm, but the 
creation of new laws is an effective way of signalling the 
government’s acquiescence to a particular aspect of Western 
influence’.56  
 
In fact, international contracting parties are more likely to trade, transact, and 
invest in countries in which a prospective law is applied consistently.57 More 
generally, as suggested above, international contracting parties will largely rely 
on the existence of stable and functioning dispute settlement machinery that is 
free from arbitrary state or judicial intervention.58 It is equally important for 
international contracting parties to understand the enforcing state’s arbitration 
legal framework before entering into agreements, including arbitration 
																																																						
53 Milhaupt and Pistor endorse for an effective legal regulation and governance is a sound growth in a 
country’s economy, is reduced to the following equation: ‘good law + good enforcement = good 
economic outcomes’. See CJ Milhaupt & K Pistor, Law and Capitalism (University of Chicago Press, 
2008) 5. 
54 See, eg, J Magnaye & A Reinisch, ‘Revisiting Res Judicata and Lis Pendens in Investor-State 
Arbitration’ (2016) 15(2) LAPE 264-86. 
55 See FA Acomb & NJ Jones, ‘The Insider Adversary in International Arbitration’ (2016) 27(1) ARIA 63-
74. 
56 EA Feldman, ‘The Culture of Legal Change: A Case Study of Tobacco control in Twenty-First Century 
Japan’ (2006) 27(3) Michigan Journal of International Law 743-44. 
57 See for example, Acomb & Jones (n 55) 63-74; see also, Farooq (n 52) 115-46; JH Dasteel, ‘Is It Time 
to Awaken the New York Convention’s Dormant General Reciprocity Clause?’ (2015) 26(4) ARIA 539-
52. 
58 MM Mbengue, ‘The Settlement of Trade Disputes is there a Monopoly for the WTO?’ (2016) 15(2) 
LAPE 207-48. 
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agreements.59 As suggested above, Redfern et al. posit that the enforcing 
state’s arbitration law plays a vital role in recognising and enforcing international 
commercial arbitral awards.60 It is little wonder then that foreign investors or 
commercial actors will be reluctant to do business in legal systems in which they 
are exposed to legal risks, including the unpredictable or arbitrary overturning or 
non-recognition of arbitral awards.61 In the Saudi legal system, however, this 
may be the inescapable consequence of vague and inconsistent interpretations 
of Shariah or indeed, politically-motivated invocations of public policy defences 
to non-enforcement.62 
 
1.3.3 Shariah Law in the Muslim World 
 
The remainder of the thesis will shift focus to emphasise the theories of law and 
contract in the Muslim63 world, such as that of Saudi Arabia. Peters and 
Bearman, for instance, offer an explanation on the nature and scope of the 
Shariah in the Muslim world.64 They argue that the nature of Shariah ‘gives rise 
to a different experience of law than that understood by subjects of a common-
law or civil-law system’.65 Scholars working in this area acknowledge the 
importance of legal culture and diversity, and argue that Shariah should be 
understood not merely as a mechanical set of rules or rule-making processes 
but as the expression of socio-cultural norms and traditions.66 However, 
scholars such as Peters and Bearman also emphasize the similarities between 
Islamic and Western legal traditions.67 Drawing on the writings of Yanagihashi, it 
is suggested that fundamental principles of private law, notably the principle of 
good faith and freedom of contract also have a firm basis in Shariah law.68 
																																																						
59 T. Mizushima, ‘The Role of the State after an Award is Rendered in Investor-State Arbitration’, in S. 
Lalani and R.P.RP Lazo (eds), ‘The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration’Arbitration, Vol. 3, 
(Brill Nijhoff, 2015,) 274-29292. 
60 A Redfern et al (n 3) 1-2. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Farooq (n 52) 115-46. 
63 Muslim means one who believes in the one God is Allah and submits his will to God. For a thoughtful 
study on Islam, see J Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia (2nd Second edition, Facts on File, 
2010) 32.  
64 Peters & Bearman (n 18) 2. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid.  
68 See H Yanagihashi, ‘Socio-Economic Justice’, in Peters & Bearman (n 18) 151. 
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Rather, the novelty or distinguishing feature of Shariah lies not in the ‘content’ of 
Islamic principles but in the disputed nature of their meaning and interpretation: 
 
[T]he texts of Qur’an and Sunna’h, however, are the raw materials 
of the Shariah and not immediately ready for use. They need 
interpretation and reasoning in order to formulate the rules that 
they were meant to convey.69  
 
As the above quote suggests, there is a lack of consensus over the meaning of 
Shariah principles.70 The tendency of religious authorities to apply ad hoc or 
inconsistent rulings, phenomena known as Fatwa shopping,71 is precisely the 
reason why commercial actors might be reluctant to invest in Saudi Arabia.72 
Not only do commercial actors fear that their contracts will be voided or 
annulled by local courts, or that a valid award overturned on related public 
policy grounds, they are also faced with disagreement between different Islamic 
School’s thought about the correct meaning and application of Shariah.73 
Furthermore, since there is no system of precedent in Shariah-based reasoning, 
different advisory boards may arrive at conflicting opinions about whether a 
particular aspect of an agreement is unlawful under Islamic law.74 This is 
problematic because a determination of the validity or legality of a contract or 
private act presupposes a sophisticated and scholarly understanding of the 
sources and purposes of Shariah law.75 It is useful here to point out that this 
study will examine some of the key issues and conflicts around the 
interpretation and application of Shariah law. 
 
																																																						
69 Peters & Bearman (n 18) 1. 
70 A Shaharuddin, ‘Defining Harmonization of Shariah Rulings in Islamic Finance’ (2016) 30(3) ALQ 
292-304; see also SA Aljloud, ‘Ijtihad and Ikhtilaf: Re-interpreting Islamic Principles in Contemporary 
Times’ (2014) 28(1) ALQ 85-98. 
71 UA Oseni, AUF Ahmad & MK Hassan, ‘The Legal implications of ‘Fatwa Shopping’ in the Islamic 
Finance Industry: Problems, Perceptions and Prospects’ (2016) 30(2) ALQ 107-137. 
72 See SS Razali, ‘The Dominance Entry of the Principles of Gharar in Electronic Contracts’ (2009) 23 
ALQ 207-16. 
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid.  
75 For example, Duderija shows the function and value of Hadith literature in Islamic thought to 
understand the Shariah. See A Duderija, ‘A Paradigm Shift in Assessing/Evaluating the Value and 
Significance of Hadith in Islamic Thought: From ‘ulumu-I-isnad/rijal to ‘usulu-l-Fiqh’ (2009) 23 ALQ 
195-206. 
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In this context, Siddiqui outlines the history of the literature of Islamic 
jurisprudence (Fiqh), and its modern development.76 She argues that logical 
reasoning will help to bring clarity to law.77 Siddiqui also points out that: 
 
[L]aw is not only illustrative of the legal norms of a culture but 
provides an insight into those very ideas and institutions which a 
civilization accepts and those which it rejects.78  
 
Siddiqui also concludes by offering her own findings as how to best to bring 
greater clarity in understanding and interpreting Shariah law.79 
 
Along similar lines, El-Malik outlines how the provisions of Shariah law have 
developed and began as the law of the state.80 Interestingly, he points 
widespread differences of opinion on Islamic legal issues of constitutional 
importance and the unlimited potential for ‘judge made’ law.81 These challenges 
expose the inherent pluralism of Islamic law-making and norm-creating 
processes.82 As El-Malik remarks ‘it is impossible to speak of Islamic law as a 
single system of law. There are as many expressions of Islamic law as there are 
states in the Muslim world’.83 The scholar Hoecke affirms this point: 
 
[A]n ahistorical approach considers the Shariah to be immutable 
and to be understood exactly as in the early times after the 
Prophet’s death. The historical approach accepts the need for 
adapting rules to changed circumstances in the course of history. 
Translated into the Western wording of the debate one could 
present it as the question to what extent divine law coincides with 
																																																						
76 M Siddiqui, ‘Clarity or Confusion – Classical Fiqh and the Issue of Logic’, in Nielsen & Christoffersen 
(n 18) 18. 
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid. 
80 El-Malik (n 18). 
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid 4. 
	25	
	
human law or whether natural law may coincide with positive 
law.84  
 
Additionally, Hoover analysed the work of Ibn Taymiyya, a great scholar and 
theologian from the Hanbali School.85 Hoover’s thought is that early scholars 
and commentators used the term of Shariah law in the wrong sense, 
misconstruing or neglecting the role of rational arguments in Islamic interpretive 
and norm-creating processes.86 As such, Islamic scholars and commentaries 
have focused singularly on literal interpretations of scripture and divine 
revelations.87 This strand of scholarship has also examined the pre-modern 
study on Shariah law as perhaps more appropriately called theological 
jurisprudence (Fiqh).88 In this regard, Hoover states: 
 
[I]bn Taymiyya may thus be seen as a theological jurist 
responding to inquiries and challenges concerning what should 
rightly be said about God. The apologetic and philosophical quality 
of this Fiqh arises in as much as he deems it permissible, 
constructive or even necessary to take up rational reflection and 
argumentation in theological matters.89  
 
This thesis will highlight the contested areas and issues that are produced by 
Shariah law and its impact on the foreign actor’s understanding of Saudi 
arbitration law and proceedings, including their ability to enforce arbitral awards 
and the need for Shariah compliance.  
 
1.3.4 Shariah and Commercial Transactions 
 
																																																						
84 M van Hoecke, ‘Islamic Jurisprudence and Western Legal History’, in Nielsen & Christoffersen (n 18) 
46. 
85 J Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism (Brill Publishers, 2007) 25. 
86 Ibid; see also YY Haddad & BF Stowasser (eds), Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity 
(AltaMira Press, 2004). 
87 Hoover (n 85) 25. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
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Islamic contracts share commonalities with conventional commercial 
arrangements in commercial transactions;90 however, there are fundamental 
differences between the two.91 For example, in conventional contracts, 
contracting parties can freely determine the terms of the contract, provided that 
the specific contractual terms do not contravene the ordinary law.92 Most 
contracts are intended as an exchange of goods or services, and the underlying 
motive is that the seller will profit from the transaction.93 By way of contrast, an 
Islamic contract is permissible only where it is free from the following impurities: 
uncertainty (Gharar)94 in the contractual obligation and addition to other 
prohibitions on interest (Riba)95 in the financial obligations.96 
 
In this regard, Razali posits that the use of the Internet as a medium of 
communication has widened the scope for contract formation among the 
contractual parties.97 In fact, the majority of the commercial transactions are 
conducted through the Internet for which the contracting parties’ physical 
presence is not required.98 Razali next relies on the provisions of Shariah to 
point out that e-contracts might render a contract null and void because an e-
contract may be uncertain, lacking any direct knowledge of the existence of the 
commodity, and neither party sees each other or has direct communication with 
the other.99 However, Razali draws on the opinion of the Hanafi School to find 
																																																						
90 M Fayyad, ‘Classification of Contractual Agreements in Comparative and Islamic Jurisdictions: Does it 
Make Any Sense?’ (2013) 27(3) ALQ 203-229. 
91 See MH Bashayreh, ‘The Treatment of Unregistered Commercial Joint Ventures in Jordanian Law’ 
(2009) 23 ALQ 59-103. 
92 D Elshurafa, ‘Islamic Capitalism-An Imminent Reality or a Hopeful Possibility for Islamic Finance?’ 
(2012) 26(3) ALQ 339-360. 
93 Bashayreh (n 91) 59-103. 
94 Crawley assess how the principle of Gharar can infect a construction contract. See S Crawley, ‘Does an 
Extension of Time Clause Prevent a Construction Contract Being Infected by Gharar?’ (2012) 26(2) ALQ 
155-174. 
95 Jusic and Ismail assess how the principle of Riba can infect a contract. See A Jusic & AM Ismail, 
‘Islamic Finance in the Western Balkans: Prospects and Regulatory Challenges’ (2012) 26(2) ALQ 193-
210; see also Billah (n 47) 392-408; H Harasani, ‘Analysing the Islamic Prohibition on Riba: A 
Prohibition on Substance or Form?’ (2013) 27(3) ALQ 289-296. 
96 Nadar outlines the challenges facing parties in complying with Islamic law in relation to dispute 
resolution. A Nadar, ‘Islamic Finance and Dispute Resolution: Part 1’ (2009) 23 ALQ 1-29; see also 
Razali (n 72) 207-16; NKK Zanki, ‘Contemporary Attempts to Harmonize Usury with Islamic Law: A 
Study of Al-Sanhuris Civil Codes’ (2016) 30(1) ALQ 72-89. 
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98 Ibid 207. 
99 Ibid 213. 
	27	
	
that e-contracts are deemed compliant with Shariah only when the buyer has 
given the right of inspection of the commodity.100 
 
In respect of the more theoretical aspects of this doctoral research, this thesis 
will draw on a highly variable and evolving tradition of Islamic jurisprudence. In 
Shariah law, the boundary distinction between public and private law 
maintained in classic (liberal) theory does not hold.101 Shariah regulates all 
areas of life as a moral system of governance, thereby constraining the rights 
and freedoms of individuals to enter into certain kinds of contracts, for instance 
those which included interest based clauses or penalties.102 The distinctive 
nature of Islamic contract law principles casts into significant doubt the search 
for a all-encompassing, general, or universal theory of contract law.103 Pluralistic 
theories of contract law, which emphasise respect for remedies for unjust 
enrichment or losses, redistributive justice and paternalism would appear, 
therefore, better suited to the religious and legal conditions which prevail in 
Saudi Arabia.104 However, if such a theory is applied to the practical context of 
the Saudi legal system, it would serve to further undermine, rather than 
enhance, the legitimate expectations of private parties, particularly foreign 
commercial parties, by creating more, rather than less, uncertainty around 
arbitral outcomes.105 A more viable approach is to find a middle ground between 
unitary and pluralistic theories of contract law and its dispute resolution.106 
 
1.3.5 Arbitration and Award Enforcement 
 
When it comes to the literature on arbitration within Saudi Arabia, there is a 
breadth of research conducted on the framework set out by old Arbitration Law 
promulgated in 1983; however, little research has been done to critically 
analyse the arbitration framework after the implementation of the New 
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Arbitration Law in 2012. Despite the relative dearth of work on the current 
regime, past work remains insightful for the purposes of the present analysis. 
This section aims to highlight key texts addressing the issues facing the Saudi 
arbitration regime that the new law aimed to address. 
 
First, the work of Saleh analysed the arbitration laws of Arab countries, 
including Saudi Arabia, giving due consideration to the judicial decisions and 
key legislations of each jurisdiction.107 His work was published prior to the 
enactment of the new law, but provides a core analysis of understanding the 
Islamic approach to arbitration and situating Saudi Arabia within the 
environment of the Arab world. Similarly, El-Ahdab considered the various 
approaches to Shariah involvement in arbitration proceedings throughout the 
Middle East, giving due focus to Saudi Arabia.108 Specifically, El-Ahdab also 
took up the issue of arbitration from the perspectives of the various schools of 
Islamic thought and touched on the interpretational issues that the varying 
perspectives introduce into the arbitration environment in the Kingdom. 
 
Additionally, there are two doctoral theses that have touched on some of the 
issues relevant to this study. First, Al Eisa conducted a critical analysis of how 
the New Saudi Arbitration Law compared to the Old Arbitration Law, paying 
particular focus to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in the 
Kingdom.109 This thesis builds upon that author’s conclusion that the New 
Arbitration Law does not resolve the main legal problems in the Saudi system 
for recognising and enforcing arbitral awards and aims to dive deeper into the 
inherent conflicts between a Shariah-based domestic system and the desire to 
modernise as part of a secular international arbitral environment.  
 
Second, another doctoral study by Almutawa undertook a comparative study to 
examine the challenges of enforcing arbitral awards in GCC states and what 
steps could be taken to create a uniform approach to enforcement within the 
																																																						
107 S Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain & Saudi Arabia 
(LexGulf Publishers Ltd, 2012). 
108 Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International, 
2011). 
109 Mohammed I AlEisa, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Legal Problems Associated with Recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Saudi Araba: Will the New Saudi Arbitration Law (2012) Resolve the 
Main Legal Problems?’ (PhD thesis, University of Essex, 2016). 
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Islamic region.110 What is notable from his research is that while the GCC is 
made of up of Islamic countries, they do not all utilise Shariah in their legal 
systems in the same way. Some, like Saudi Arabia, rely on Shariah as the 
primary source of the nation’s laws, while others like Kuwait refer to it as a 
source of law, but not the main source of law. This has allowed some GCC 
states to better integrate international norms and treaty obligations into their 
legal systems, while others like Saudi Arabia are facing an accidental creation 
of legal pluralism in that it now needs to define those laws that apply to 
domestic and international parties as a single regime is proving insufficient to be 
effective for both. 
 
In addition to these Saudi specific sources, this work also situates itself within 
the principled research and detailed works of leading arbitral scholars such as 
Born, Fouchard, and Redfern. Their conceptions of fundamental international 
arbitration practices and trends are used to define the Western-based model 
with which Saudi Arabia is attempting to integrate.  
 
1.4 Statement of Issues 
 
In recent decades, the resulting Saudi legal framework for arbitration has 
achieved progressively greater practical understanding and acceptance in the 
international community.111 Saudi Arabia is in the process of modernising its 
domestic arbitration framework, has acceded to the New York Convention, 
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration, and enacted the Saudi 
Arbitration Act of 2012 and the Enforcement Act 2012.112 However, despite 
these modernisation attempts, there continues to be an inherent struggle 
between the generally accepted arbitration principles, such as full party 
autonomy, and the necessary application of Shariah law to all arbitral 
enforcement activities in the Kingdom. It has also been noted that there is a 
severe lack of knowledge among international contracting parties and 
																																																						
110 Ahmed Mohd Khurshid Almutawa, ‘Challenges to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the 
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arbitrators in respect of the Saudi arbitration framework.113 Foreign commercial 
actors and international arbitration regimes have demonstrated their ignorance 
or misinterpretation of Shariah law and the role it plays in the Saudi arbitration 
framework, resulting in unenforceable arbitral awards.114 
 
It is difficult to deny the significant practical challenges faced by international 
contracting parties in the achievement of recognition and enforcement of 
international commercial arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia.115 It is in this context 
that there is no shortage of theories and arguments as to the limits and 
novelties of Saudi law and the Saudi arbitration process. However, there has 
been a shortage of agreed solutions as to how to overcome the challenges 
faced by foreign private contractors and the difficulties of harmonising Islamic 
law principles with the Western model of contract construction and dispute 
resolution.116 This thesis will attempt to offer some recommendations as the 
basis on which to further improvements and developments to the new 
arbitration regime can be made to increase the effectiveness of the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia. 
 
1.5 Objectives and Aims 
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to identify the main challenges for arbitral 
parties attempting to enforce domestic and foreign arbitral awards within Saudi 
Arabia in light of the Kingdom’s public policy positions on Shariah law. In order 
to understand how the enforcement courts review arbitral awards, the research 
must first explore the development of arbitration practices within the Kingdom 
as well as the legal rules and features of the existing arbitration system. The 
culmination of this research is an exploration of the possibilities for developing a 
new regime for the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitral awards 
																																																						
113 For example, Al-Humaidhi assessed that ‘in many circumstances, an international arbitrator, mediator, 
or negotiator may fail to take into consideration the impact cultural and religious underpinnings may have 
on the process. This creates a higher sense of detachment, ambiguity and uncertainty within their 
dealings’. See H Al-Humaidhi, ‘Sulh: Arbitration in the Arab-Islamic World’ (2015) 29(1) ALQ 92; see 
also T Koraytem, ‘Two Surprising Aspects of Islamic Saudi Liberalism in Public and Private Law’ (2013) 
27(1) ALQ 87-95. 
114 S Tarin, ‘An Analysis of the Influence of Islamic Law on Saudi Arabia’s Arbitration and Dispute 
Resolution Practices’ (2015) 26(1) ARIA 131-54. 
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in Saudi Arabia that will further limit and refine the bases on which binding 
awards can be refused. To accomplish this aim, this research is structured into 
two primary objectives.  
 
The first objective is to map the current Saudi arbitration framework, as well as 
its recent developments in light of the reforms to both Saudi legislative and 
judicial systems, with an emphasis on the processes in place under both 
domestic law and international legal instruments pertaining to the recognition 
and enforcement of commercial arbitral awards. The idea behind this 
examination of the current Saudi arbitration framework is to explore the internal 
debate among Muslims jurists, as it constitutes an integral part of the Saudi 
legal and political landscape. This internal debate demonstrates the competing 
aspirations of the Saudi government in implementing the new Saudi arbitration 
framework, which seeks to reconcile its modernising ambition to bring Saudi law 
into line with international standards without compromising the integrity of its 
local laws and traditions. This thesis seeks to reveal and analyse the above-
mentioned challenges, with a special focus on the challenges confronted by 
international contracting parties in using international arbitration in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Second, this thesis acknowledges the need for greater tolerance and 
understanding of the implications of Saudi regulations, specifically the 
application of Shariah, in enforcement proceedings. Such consideration is 
crucial step on the path toward encouraging international contracting parties to 
embrace the Saudi arbitration regime and consider its limitations when entering 
into arbitral agreements and enforcing arbitral awards. It is here that this 
research offers recommendations to further develop the Saudi regime for 
recognising and enforcing commercial arbitral awards in the Kingdom. 
 
Third, this thesis seeks to dissect the arbitral award enforcement process in 
Saudi Arabia to identify the practical challenges that foreign parties face when 
attempting to have their awards recognised and enforced by the Saudi courts. 
This thesis will look at how such awards are often treated homogenously with 
domestic awards and the implications such treatment has on the ultimate 
enforceability of secular foreign arbitral awards within the Kingdom. 
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Fourth, this thesis will identify how Saudi Arabia has attempted to modernise its 
approach to arbitration by becoming a party to international arbitral conventions 
and integrating model provisions derived from the UNCITRAL Model Law into 
its revised Arbitration Law. 
 
Finally, this thesis will consider the key legal and policy obstacles that are 
preventing parties from achieving recognition and enforcement of their arbitral 
awards and the possible for solutions for how the Saudi government can 
remove those obstacles. The suggested recommendations aim to increase the 
overall effectiveness and efficiency of arbitral award enforcement in the 
Kingdom while also supporting Saudi Arabia’s transition into a more arbitration-
friendly jurisdiction. 
 
1.6 Research Questions 
 
To achieve the aims and objectives outlined above, specifically the impact of 
Shariah public policy on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
under the New Saudi Arbitration Law and coexisting regime, a number of more 
specific research questions are used to guide the lines of inquiry. These are as 
follows: 
 
1. How has arbitration developed in Saudi Arabia and what is the current 
status of the Saudi arbitration framework? 
2. How does the Saudi arbitration framework align with or differ from the 
principles embodied in international arbitration instruments? 
3. What role does Shariah law play in the Saudi arbitration law framework 
for commercial arbitrations and the recognition and enforcement of both 
domestic and foreign arbitral awards? 
4. What are the issues facing arbitral parties, arbitrators, and the Kingdom’s 
government and courts in applying Shariah law to enforcement 
proceedings? 
5. How is Shariah law interpreted and applied generally and more 
specifically in the arbitral context? 
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6. What influence have international arbitration instruments had on the 
Saudi approach to arbitration and recognising and enforcing arbitral 
awards? 
7. Can Shariah be separated from the Kingdom’s conception of public 
policy? 
8. Is it possible to reconcile Shariah applicability and international 
arbitration principles? 
9. What actionable steps can be taken to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of recognition and enforcement proceedings for both 
domestic and foreign arbitral awards under both the international 
arbitration instruments and within the Saudi arbitration framework? 
  
1.7 Methodology  
 
This study uses a number of key research methodologies to conduct its 
analysis. The first methodology is that of legal research. This study utilises and 
analyses primary source legal documents, such as acts of legislation, treaties, 
and other government documents, such as implementing rules and decrees to 
outline the current Saudi arbitration framework and reveal the challenges 
experienced by contracting parties attempting to enforce arbitral awards. The 
author also supplemented these primary sources with a wide variety of 
secondary sources, such as commercial arbitration journals and publications, 
the Saudi government website, which tracks the Royal Decrees and regulations, 
and the commentaries of arbitration scholars to ensure that the principles and 
trends analysed reflect the most up-to-date approaches to arbitral award 
enforcement, both within Saudi Arabia and in the broader international 
commercial arbitration setting. 
 
Further, this author engages in a doctrinal analysis and legal textual 
interpretation of the applicable Saudi legislations, international conventions, and 
Shariah provisions. By dissecting these texts, this study is able to draw 
conclusions about the intent and effects of such provisions within the arbitral 
context. This analysis also allows gaps between the two systems to be 
identified with the hope that they can be reconciled in the future.  
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Finally, this research engages in a certain degree of comparative analysis by 
examining the different approaches to arbitration proceedings and award 
enforcement under the generally-accepted international arbitration principles 
and under the current Saudi arbitration regime. Specifically, this thesis 
highlights the areas in which Saudi Arabia’s approaches differ from the Western 
traditions with which most international contracting parties are familiar and 
identifies the nuances implicated by the applicability of Shariah law. 
 
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
 
The primary line of inquiry for this research is the impact that Shariah, and as a 
result the interpretation of all Shariah as public policy by the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, has on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in the 
Kingdom. However, there are a number of notable limitations that require 
mentioning at the beginning of this study. 
 
The first limitation is that the current Saudi arbitration framework is relatively 
new. Saudi Arabia is in a period of judicial and legislative reform. The court 
system was reformed in 2007, creating enforcement courts that are responsible 
for hearing cases for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, and 
the Saudi Arbitration Law was reissued in 2012, marking the first changes to the 
law since 1983. Thus, this system has yet to find its footing and achieve any 
notable level of operational efficiency or best practices among the various 
bodies involved in the arbitral process. This makes analysing the regime and 
assessing the extent to which it has achieved its stated goals difficult. However, 
to overcome this limitation, the New Arbitration Law and the other Saudi reform 
efforts can be viewed as an attempt to correct the errors of history in the Saudi 
arbitration environment. This study will consider the extent to which these 
changes have adequately accounted for the issues of the pass and speculate 
on the likelihood that they will resolve these issues and, if not, what further 
actions should be taken to ensure that Saudi Arabia is an arbitration-friendly 
environment.  
 
The second limitation of this study is the relative dearth of literature on this 
subject. Much has been written about Saudi arbitration in the past and the 
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issues arising under the old arbitration regime; however, little consideration has 
been given to how issues of Shariah public policy come into play under the new 
Saudi arbitration regime. To construct this study, this thesis relies on 
foundational literature to identify the issues that existed within the old Saudi 
arbitration regime related to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
and considers how the changes made through the New Saudi Arbitration Law 
and adoption of international conventions has attempted to overcome these 
issues. The study then examines whether these steps are likely to be effective 
in addressing the root causes of the issues and offers proposals for how the 
recognition and enforcement processes can be improved. 
 
The third limitation of this study is the somewhat foreign nature of Shariah 
involvement in the field of arbitration more generally. Shariah typically becomes 
implicated only in Islamic states, but has marked effects on both domestic 
arbitrations within an Islamic state and foreign arbitrations that need to be 
enforced in an Islamic state. From an enforcement perspective, Shariah does 
not differentiate between Muslim and non-Muslim parties, subjecting them all to 
its requirements when attempting to enforce an arbitral award before the courts. 
Thus, it is important to note that this study considers both domestic arbitrations 
within Saudi Arabia and foreign arbitrations that must be enforced in Saudi 
Arabia, as the impositions of Shariah on the procedures in both processes run 
parallel. In addition to the lack of familiarity of certain parties with Shariah law, 
there is also the implicit challenge of applying and interpreting Shariah. Shariah 
is not a code in and of itself, but a system of principles derived from primary 
sources of Islamic law, the Quran and the Sunnah. These sources are then 
interpreted by judges and scholars from the various schools of Islamic thought. 
While the government generally emphasises the Hanbali School for legislative 
and judicial purposes, judges and government officials are not required to follow 
this approach and can inject their own interpretations of Shariah into their 
actions. This creates an issue for accurately defining the scope of Shariah for 
determining public policy parameters as in many cases the various schools of 
thought may have different interpretations of Shariah’s rules and applicability. 
Thus, it is crucial that those involved with a Shariah system have a clear 
understanding of the way in which Shariah is interpreted and applied, an issue 
which is thoroughly addressed by this thesis in chapter four. 
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1.9 Thesis Structure 
 
This research consists of seven chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 consists of this introductory chapter that outlines the aims, objectives, 
and methodology for this study. It also provides an extensive literature review to 
situate this study within the relevant academic work on issues related to the 
understanding the underpinnings of arbitral award enforcement in Saudi Arabia 
from the normative and policy perspectives. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a foundational overview of the development of arbitration 
within Saudi Arabia, both before and after the birth of Islam, leading up to the 
current Saudi arbitration regime. This chapter further provides a brief 
background on the Saudi legislative and judicial systems and the recent reforms 
that have taken place. Finally, this chapter considers the arbitral procedures 
under the New Saudi Arbitration Law promulgated in 2012. The discussion aims 
to clarify whether the current Saudi arbitration regime is effective and efficient to 
use for resolving commercial disputes and enforcing the resulting arbitral 
awards.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the basics of commercial arbitration award enforcement. It 
examines the scope of fundamental sources of commercial transactions and 
clarifies that choice of law can have a significant impact on the ultimate 
enforceability of an arbitral award within the Kingdom. Moreover, this chapter 
illustrates the challenges contracting parties confront when their awards are 
subject to enforcement in Saudi Arabia by identifying the main legal issues that 
will be explored in the subsequent chapters. 
 
Chapter 4 assesses the role that Shariah plays in Saudi arbitration proceedings 
and ultimate award enforcement. Grounding the discussion in the provision of 
the New Saudi Arbitration Law, this chapter seeks to identify the challenges for 
understanding Saudi arbitral procedures in the context of international 
arbitration. It specifically identifies the ways in which Shariah law impacts the 
arbitral process in both domestic and foreign arbitral proceedings and 
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encourages full legal compliance by international contracting parties and 
arbitrators when Saudi arbitration provisions are involved to ensure the 
enforceability of any resulting award.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the role of Islamic jurisprudence and explicitly details the 
challenges confronted by contracting parties and arbitrators when attempting to 
interpret the Saudi regulations or apply Shariah principles in the international 
arbitration context. This chapter also clarifies the role of the Islamic Schools in 
developing Islamic jurisprudence, and highlights the challenges that varying 
interpretations present for the enforcement of both domestic and foreign arbitral 
awards. This chapter also includes a discussion of the enduring role of Shariah 
law in the interpretation of Saudi regulations. 
 
Chapter 6 then turns its focus to the enforcement of arbitral awards in practice. 
It first considers the foundations of domestic enforcement upon which foreign 
arbitral award enforcement is based. The chapter then explores foreign award 
enforcement in greater detail, considering the influence of international 
instruments, such as the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Arbitration, to determine the reasons underlying the challenges confronted 
by international contracting parties attempting to enforce their arbitral awards in 
the Kingdom. This further assesses the applicable exemptions available to 
Saudi courts under Article V of the New York Convention, to illustrate the extent 
to which Saudi courts can exercise their judicial discretionary powers to refuse 
to recognise and enforce international arbitral awards on public policy grounds. 
 
Chapter 7 ultimately concludes with a summary of the key findings of this 
research study, along with a number of practical recommendations that can be 
implemented to improve the Kingdom’s efficiency in recognising and enforcing 
arbitral awards and eliminating the challenges the system presents for parties 
seeking its assistance. The recommendations represent those actions that this 
author believes can make the most significant impact toward developing a more 
harmonised arbitral enforcement regime within the Kingdom both in the near 
and long terms. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
BACKGROUND OF ARBITRATION IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Unlike many of its MENA neighbours that have created favourable 
environments for parties seeking to resolve disputes and enforce arbitral 
awards, Saudi Arabia has been unsuccessful at gaining the trust of foreign and 
local investors in its commercial arbitration practices.117 The New Saudi 
Arbitration Law was an attempt to change investors’ perceptions of the Kingdom 
in relation to arbitration and strengthen its governing framework. To understand 
the impact of recent legislative reform attempts in Saudi Arabia with regards to 
arbitration, it is important to first understand the historical development and 
underpinnings of arbitration generally within the Kingdom.  
 
This chapter focuses on the development and evolution of Saudi arbitration 
procedures and laws prior to the most recent reforms. This background will 
establish the foundation upon which the arbitration reforms are based and 
provide a framework for evaluating the distinct features and rules governing the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
After providing a brief history of arbitration in the Kingdom, this chapter critically 
reviews contemporary literature on the limits and possibilities of utilizing the 
Saudi arbitration framework to obtain and successfully enforce arbitral awards 
in disputes involving both domestic and foreign parties. The goal of this 
research is ultimately to identify the challenges confronted by parties seeking to 
enforce arbitral awards rendered within the Kingdom, a foreign jurisdiction, or by 
an international arbitral institution in Saudi courts and to suggests solutions to 
these problems.118  
 
Despite extensive academic commentary on arbitration in Saudi Arabia 
generally, the existing scholarship fails to fully uncover and test the intricacies of 
																																																						
117 See CN Bower & JK Sharpe, ‘International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase’ 
(2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 643. 
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enforcing arbitral awards within the Saudi legal system and its arbitration 
framework or propose effective solutions where gaps in the system are 
identified.119 By focusing on the procedural features of conducting the actual 
arbitration under the new Saudi Arbitration Law, the existing scholarship has 
diverted attention away from the more pressing question of whether Saudi law 
offers a normatively appropriate and effective means for enforcing and 
satisfying arbitral awards and achieving the effective settlement of international 
commercial disputes involving either Saudi or international contracting parties. 
 
To understand the practical effects of the New Arbitration Law requires a careful 
examination of the Saudi legislative and judicial systems. Only through an 
evaluation of the roles these systems have played can one determine the extent 
to which Saudi authorities have been successful at cultivating a welcoming legal 
environment that protects and accommodates the rights of parties in 
commercial disputes, including through effective and enforceable arbitral 
proceedings.120 Further, in addition to the implications of the New Arbitration 
Law for domestic arbitral awards, this chapter also considers the relationship 
between the Saudi Arbitration Law and international arbitration practices to 
examine the tensions that arise when attempts are made to enforce foreign 
arbitral awards in local courts.121 
 
This chapter proceeds in three main parts. First, it chronicles the history and 
development of arbitration in Saudi Arabia, both before and after the birth of 
Islam in the region, up through the present-day arbitration law framework. Next, 
it explores the Saudi legislative and judicial systems and their impact on the 
development of the Saudi arbitration regime. Finally, the chapter closes by 
assessing the scope of impact that Saudi arbitration principles have on 
international contracting parties.  
 
2.2 Growth of Saudi Arbitration 
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The development of arbitration in Saudi Arabia can be best examined in two 
phases—before the birth of Islam and after. Each of these periods is discussed 
in turn, demonstrating the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s arbitration regime as it 
evolved toward the modern framework. 
 
2.2.1 Arbitration Before the Birth of Islam 
 
The use of private means of dispute resolution to settle conflicts between 
contracting parties in commercial transactions has been practised in the 
Arabian Peninsula since before the birth of the Islamic religion.122 Referred to in 
the region as Takhim, this was a form of negotiated self-help resolution that 
mirrored mediation.123 Should that fail to resolve the dispute, would involve a 
third-party arbitrator, referred to as a Hakam, to oversee the dispute applying 
procedures developed through customary commercial laws in the respective 
trade, similar to the lex mercatoria, or Merchant Law,124 that was prominent in 
the Western part of the world.125  
 
Let us first consider how arbitral proceedings were conducted in the ancient 
Arab world.126 The literature suggests that most Arab tribes and foreign traders 
conducted business in Mecca and the resolution of any disputes took place 
within the traditional marketplaces.127 These disputes were resolved according 
to local trade practices and norms128 by an appointed third party, who was also 
a trader that possessed significant knowledge and experience in trade.129 These 
practices were used long before the birth of Islam.130 In fact, even the Quraysh 
tribe adopted this practice to resolve their commercial disputes, as there was 
not any other organized form of judicial system at that time.131 The arbitration 
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proceedings were simple. The individual bringing the claim before the arbitrator 
was the applicant and the person against whom the claim was made was the 
respondent. First, the arbitrator would ask the parties to take an oath ‘in front of 
one of the scared idols of the tribe or village, or, in some cases, in front of the 
main Arab idols’.132 If the respondent refused to take such an oath, the arbitrator 
would find in favour of the applicant. If the both parties took the oath, the 
proceedings would continue. During this process, the applicant had the burden 
of proof to prove the allegations giving rise to his claim. In time, having 
witnessed the success of this process, the people began to use an appointed 
third party to resolve both their commercial and non-commercial disputes, 
regarding this process as a fair, unbiased and knowledgeable means of settling 
conflicts.133 
 
2.2.2 Arbitration After Birth of Islam 
 
After the birth of the Islamic religion, the followers (Muslims) began to adopt the 
principles formulated in the Holy Qur’an, which ultimately formed the basis of 
their principles of daily life and served as a backdrop to the legal system. The 
Qur’an authoritatively provided that disputes were most appropriately decided 
by God, and this included disputes arising from their domestic and international 
commercial dealings.134 For example, Verse 4:59 of the Holy Qur’an preached 
that: 
 
O ye who believe! Obey God, and obey the Prophet, and those 
charged with authority among you. If you differ in anything among 
yourselves, refer it to God and His Prophet, if you do believe in 
God and the Last Day: That is best and most suitable for final 
determination.135  
 
Using this precept, Muslim traders managed to conduct their trading activities 
among themselves without disputes in their commercial transactions for lengthy 
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periods of time. In fact, Muslims traders enjoyed the influence of the Islamic law 
in their commercial transactions, as its provisions constituted a uniform set of 
trade rules. For example, when entering into a transaction, the parties knew that 
the principles of Gharar (uncertainty) and Riba (interest) were both prohibited 
under Islamic law and could not be involved in the agreement.136 However, 
despite the level of comfort felt by Muslim traders applying these principles, 
foreign contracting parties often had little knowledge of how these principles 
would impact performance and the validity of contracts entered into with Saudi 
nationals or commercial entities, which by their nature were governed by 
Shariah law.137  
 
To avoid these challenges many non-Muslims began to adopt Islamic trading 
customs in their dealings with Saudi citizens and businesses, including a 
willingness to submit their disputes to the Islamic arbitration system. 138 This 
concept of integrating the trade customs of where you are doing business is 
generally known as the concept of lex mercatoria or ‘merchant law’.139 
Adjudication proceedings before merchant law tribunals were simple and were 
governed by trade customs and business practices. As a result, these informal 
dispute resolution mechanisms did not suffer from the lengthy adjournments of 
modern litigation as the proceedings were brief and conducted orally.140 For a 
period of time, merchant law formed the basis of an internationalised and quasi-
unitary system of trade law and dispute resolution in which disputes were 
governed by the practices of the local environment.  
 
However, as trade continued to expand and become more globalised, foreign 
traders experienced significant cultural and legal differences when confronted 
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with Islamic trade practices, specifically those governed by principles of Shariah 
law.141 This in turn lead to an increase in disputes. Further, due to changes in 
the seventeenth century, the courts began taking the place of merchant law in 
the West for resolving disputes.142 As both national and local laws began to 
develop governing trade practices, merchant law was no longer the sole 
determinant in commercial disputes.143 This lead to complex and divergent 
trade laws across and between states and nations.144 This brought the need for 
a form of alternative dispute resolution back to the forefront.  
 
Returning to the Qur’an and the teachings of the Prophet, one can find 
passages and examples that support the use of arbitration for resolving 
disputes. Historical accounts reveal that the Prophet himself also accepted the 
decisions of arbitrators and encouraged others to arbitrate their disputes as 
well.145 For instance, the Prophet himself resorted to the appointment of a 
Takhim to resolve his dispute with the Banu Qurayza tribe.146 Yet, the use of 
arbitration predates even the Prophet. If one traces the roots of the Treaty of 
Medinah, which was signed in 211 A.D. and was an accord between Muslims, 
non-Muslims Arabs, and the Jews, it called for disputes to be resolved through 
arbitration.147 While arbitral practice has only received international attention in 
the last few centuries, its principles have permeated the long economic history 
of the Arabian region. These examples demonstrate that the use of arbitration is 
consistent with the principles of Islam. Further, the Ijima, Islamic legal scholars, 
have also confirmed that arbitration is acceptable as an Islamic dispute 
resolution tool, resolving any concerns that doing so may be contradictory to the 
principles of Islam.148 The one caveat to this is that while arbitration in principle 
is acceptable, the arbitral award must also be Shariah compliant to be 
enforceable within the Kingdom. 
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2.2.3 The Modern History of Arbitration in Saudi Arabia 
 
Given the compatibility of arbitration with Shariah principles, arbitral 
proceedings were used from the early days of oil exploration up until the 1950s 
as the primary means of resolving disputes between Saudi entities and between 
Saudi entities and foreign companies. However, the ARAMCO arbitration in 
1958 caused a drastic change in the Kingdom’s attitude toward arbitration.  
 
To provide a brief overview of the ARAMCO case, during the 1930s ARAMCO 
entered into an exploration contract with the government of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia.149 Under the concession agreement, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
conferred exclusive rights to ARAMCO to explore, prospect, extract, treat, 
manufacture, transport and export petroleum from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
over a duration of sixty years. During the term of the contract, ARAMCO 
discovered one of the largest oil fields in the world in Saudi Arabia.150 
 
In the 1950s, the owner of a leading shipping company approached the Saudi 
government requesting that the government sign a concession agreement to 
transport oil from Saudi Arabia.151 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia imposed 
certain obligations through the concession agreement on shipping company, 
including that the company build a maritime school at Jeddah for educating 
Saudi people, develop the Saudi port and west coast and maintaining a fleet of 
tankers under the Saudi Arabia flag.152 In return, the shipping company was 
granted tax incentives and a right of priority in the transportation of oil from 
Saudi Arabia for a thirty year period. This contract was subsequently ratified by 
a Saudi Royal Decree, giving it the force of law and requiring the compliance of 
all oil companies in Saudi Arabia.153 
 
ARAMCO contested the Royal Decree of the shipping concession agreement 
on the ground that the rights of priority conferred violated ARAMCO’s rights to 
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exclusivity assigned to it under a separate concession entered into with the 
Saudi government.154 ARAMCO refused to comply with the Royal Decree and 
alleged that the Kingdom was in breach of contract, having violated ARAMCO’s 
exclusive right of to export domestic oil reserves to foreign markets. ARAMCO 
argued that this exclusive right to export was materially connected to rights of 
transportation.155 The Saudi government was unable to negotiate the ARAMCO 
and shipping concession agreements, and ultimately, the dispute between 
ARAMCO and the Saudi government was referred to arbitration per the 
concession agreement terms.156 
 
The Kingdom submitted that the terms of the concession agreement did not 
explicitly grant ARAMCO exclusive rights to transport oil to foreign markets, 
drawing on sovereignty principles from French administrative law to argue that a 
state has the right to exercise its regulatory powers to control and safeguard the 
economic interests of Saudi Arabia.157 It was further argued that Aramco did not 
export the oil found in the concession area with its own oil tankers; rather 
buyers sent their own oil tankers to export the oil from the Saudi seashore. This 
was deemed material since buyers had no rights under the Aramco concession 
agreement. The counsel for Saudi Arabia further contended that the contract 
with the shipping company did not conflict with ARAMCO’s concession 
agreement because the agreement clause did not mention exclusive right of 
transportation of oil to foreign destinations. Finally, and crucially, the Saudi 
government had not agreed to a stabilisation clause.158 
 
ARAMCO rejected the arguments presented by the Saudi government’s 
counsel, arguing that the content of the concession agreement clause clearly 
showed the ARAMCO was granted exclusive legal rights to export and transport 
oil found in the concession area to foreign markets. ARAMCO’s counsel based 
their argument on the interpretation of the word ‘transport’ and emphasised, ‘the 
right to use all means and facilities for transport and export, including the 
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terminal and port facilities it had constructed’.159 ARAMCO further denied the 
Saudi contention that buyer’s exported oil through their own tankers contending, 
‘in order to secure the flow of oil and its products to world markets, the 
Company had used forms of sale recognized by maritime law’.160 They strongly 
argued that the concession agreement did not include any provisions permitting 
the Kingdom to unilaterally modify the dispositive terms of the agreement or to 
materially alter or restrict the exclusive rights assigned to ARAMCO under 
contract. Ultimately, ARAMCO argued that the Royal Decree was ‘incompatible 
with the Concession Agreement and the obligations assumed by the 
Government in exercise of its sovereignty’.161 
 
An arbitral tribunal of three arbitrators was established to determine the real 
intention of the contracting parties in the ARAMCO Concession agreement. In 
deciding the dispute, the arbitral tribunal referred to ‘the law of Saudi Arabia and 
to its Hanbali School, which contained no precise rules about mining 
concessions and a fortiori about oil concessions’.162 The arbitration panel held 
that under the oil concession the entered into by the government granted 
exclusive rights to ARAMCO to explore and extract oil and petroleum in the 
concession area, but that the title of the land rested with the government. 
Further, the arbitral tribunal interpreted as follows: 
 
[A] Regime of mining Concessions based on contract, a 
solution not contrary to Islamic law. The Concession is 
compatible with two fundamental principles of Islamic law: 
The principle of Liberty to contract and the principle of respect 
for contracts.163 
 
In this view, the arbitral tribunal held that the Saudi government was party to the 
concession agreement with a private person and that the essence of the 
principle of freedom of contract and party autonomy is that both parties with 
																																																						
159 Schwebel (n 150) 248. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Schwebel (n 150) 248. 
162 Ibid 249-50. 
163 Ibid. 
	47	
	
contractual rights be afforded equal rights and footing, regardless of the 
sovereign status and authority of one party.164 
 
The arbitral tribunal reasoned that Islamic law did not mandate siding with the 
arguments presented by the Saudi government. Conversely, it found that the 
principle of party autonomy is fully recognised under the provisions of Shariah 
law.165 Extrapolating from this, the arbitral tribunal held that the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia had no capacity to grant concession to the shipping company.166 
What was notable about this decision is that the tribunal found there to be a 
legislative gap and filled that gap by referring to the Aramco concession 
agreement.167 However, it was difficult for the Saudi government to accept this 
view because the contracting parties agreed to resolve disputes arising from the 
concession agreement by referring to principles of Shariah law. While the 
tribunal did not definitively resolve the scope and applicability of Shariah in the 
interpretation of concession contracts, the arbitrators did propose that Islamic 
scholarly opinion be treated as an interpretative tool when there are gaps in the 
legislation.168 Yet, in this case, they simply drew on the ARAMCO concession 
agreement to determine the dispute.  
 
There was no question that Saudi Arabia was dissatisfied with the arbitral 
tribunal’s decision and the principles that were applied in resolving the 
dispute.169 Nonetheless, the Saudi government complied with the arbitral 
tribunal’s verdict and did not attempt to exercise the shipping agreement.170 
However, this decision adversely impacted the attitude of the Saudi government 
towards international arbitration.  
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In light of arbitral decision in ARAMCO, in 1963, the Saudi government forbade 
all agencies from undertaking arbitrations to resolve disputes without first 
receiving approval from the Council of Ministers. This is a policy that continues 
to apply to the government until this day, despite the nation’s adopted of the 
International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Citizens of another State.171 Yet despite this prohibition, the 
government found itself resorting to arbitration on multiple occasions, forcing 
the state to make exceptions to this prohibition.172 Ultimately, Saudi Arabia 
continued to pursue adoption of various international treaties that authorized the 
State to engage in arbitral proceedings. 
 
It should be noted that the chilling effect of the ARAMCO decision on arbitration 
was not restricted to the government level; there was a distaste among Saudi 
society for arbitration in light of the decision. After ARAMCO, private sector 
arbitration was governed by the Commercial Court Act.173 This Act governed ad 
hoc arbitration taking place to resolve commercial disputes within the Kingdom 
or involving Saudi parties. The use of ad hoc arbitration eventually gave rise to 
the use of institutional arbitration within the Kingdom. This was developed by 
applying the Rules of the Chamber of Commerce; specifically, ‘[m]erchants may 
agree to appoint the Chamber as arbitrator and entrust it with the mission of 
settling their commercial disputes which might arise between them’.174 
Eventually the implementing rules and regulations for the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry Act were promulgated and these governed all 
arbitrations held by the Chamber.175 
 
2.3 The Role of Arbitration in Settling Commercial Disputes 
 
The importance of arbitration in resolving commercial disputes should not be 
underestimated.176 Arbitral proceedings are assumed to be a mechanism that is 
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independent177 from national court proceedings to resolving commercial 
disputes.178  
 
In response to market concerns, and in the spirit of harmonisation and 
modernisation of Saudi Arabia’s national arbitration rules and procedures, the 
2012 New Arbitration Law draws on elements of the UNCITRAL Model Law and 
other leading international arbitration regimes, including rules codified by the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), as the basis for sound reform.179 In 
keeping with best international arbitration practices, parties are afforded 
considerable freedom to select the rules and procedures applicable to arbitral 
proceedings.180 Such reforms reflect and embody the established principles and 
values of modern commercial law, including freedom of contract, arbitral finality 
and party autonomy.181  
 
There a number of opinions on what the true purposes of international 
arbitration are in settling international commercial disputes.182 Some suggest 
that international commercial parties prefer the delocalised procedures and 
‘choice of rules’ of institutionalised arbitration regimes because it is assumed 
they will achieve higher levels of consistency, neutrality and predictability in 
dispute resolution procedures.183 Moreover, in many instances, international 
contracting parties prefer to resolve their dispute through arbitration rather than 
litigation.184 The goal is to bypass state interference in private contracts which 
contradict the consent and will of both parties, for instance through the 
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invalidation of contracts through application of mandatory national laws or 
invocations of public policy defence.185 More generally, foreign contractors may 
seek to avoid the additional expense of dealing with unfamiliar legal systems 
and procedures.186 Uncertainty may also arise from language barriers involved 
in proceedings in foreign courts applying foreign law.187 By way of contrast, 
international or delocalised arbitration is seen as preferable because it affords 
broad freedoms to international contracting parties to choose the arbitrators and 
venue of the arbitration.188 Most importantly, contracting parties are accorded a 
wide measure of discretion to select the choice of law and procedures that will 
apply in the event of a dispute with a contracting party.189 Most often, it seems 
that international contracting parties choose arbitration because they seek 
enhanced consistency and predictability in their dispute resolution 
procedures.190 
 
However, other scholars have focused not only on the legal virtues of 
arbitration, which are assumed to champion the rights and will of contracting 
parties against arbitrator or political interference by state courts or legislator, but 
equally extol its pragmatic value as a means of resolving disputes in an efficient 
and non-adversarial manner.191 To the above point, it has been argued that 
international contracting parties agree to arbitration on the expectation that 
arbitrators will ‘split the difference and reform the contract so that both parties 
may continue in business on reasonable terms’.192 Though similar to that of 
judicial authority, arbitration does differ from litigation in some important 
respects. The role of the arbitrator is to determine the facts of the disputes and 
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render the awards as stipulated in the arbitration agreement in accordance with 
the intent of the parties and the terms of the contract.193 
 
Notably, international contracting parties often seek to choose an arbitration 
forum, that is most favourable to their interests should a dispute arise.194 
However, international contracting parties need to consider the specific reasons 
for selecting a particular arbitration forum prior to the occurrence of disputes.195 
The procedural rules of the enforcing state should be given special 
consideration prior to the formation of a contract, allowing the parties to 
anticipate challenges around the future recognition and enforcement of 
international commercial arbitral awards before national courts.196  
 
2.3.1 How Do National Courts View Arbitration Practices 
 
Regardless of the particular reasons why a party chooses to opt for arbitration, 
the underlying point is that they are making a conscious decision to opt-out of 
litigation proceedings. An important inquiry then becomes how the national 
courts respond to the development of arbitration.197 As Lew, Mistelis and Kroll 
point out: 
 
[I]n the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, 
the development of modern international arbitration practice 
began. However, it was based on national laws. The 
approach of these national laws was directly reflective of the 
attitude of most national courts. The law and the courts were 
reluctant to recognize that the commercial world was 
agreeing to arbitration as part of their business decisions.198 
 
In essence, the substantive law was the same but the forum was different. 
National courts would often view arbitration as a rival and, in many ways, they 
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continue to do so.199 This is in some sense a consequence of the contractual 
autonomy enjoyed by parties to choose their arbitration process, thereby 
bypassing the control functions of national courts.200 However, the two 
processes are not completely separate—the national courts were vested with 
judicial power to closely supervise the arbitration process, particularly when it 
comes to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.201 
 
2.3.2 Perceptions of Arbitral Practice 
 
As indicated in the foregoing discussion, the arbitration plays an increasingly 
important role in the resolution of the growing number of disputes with a 
commercial nature and international or transnational dimension.202 Moreover, 
states increasingly rely on international commercial arbitration and national 
arbitration law to participate in the system of world trade.203 
 
[A]s world trade expanded, the need to create a mechanism for 
international recognition and enforcement of both arbitration 
agreements and awards in relation to international commercial 
agreements was of paramount importance. To facilitate arbitration, 
two Hague Conventions were concluded in 1899 and in 1907, 
both entitled The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes. These conventions created the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, which still exists and functions today. 204  
 
Due to the successful operation and implementation of international 
conventions for the development of arbitration, several other international 
treaties, regulations and conventions were adopted. For example, The Geneva 
Conventions of 1923 and 1927, and the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 1958,205 were 
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ratified among the world’s leading trading nations, the building the foundation 
for quasi-harmonisation and a uniform system for adjudicating international 
commercial disputes.206 Following these conventions, arbitral institutions like the 
International Chamber of Commerce207 and the London Court of International 
Arbitration208 were established with the precise aim providing an efficient, 
flexible and impartial model of arbitration. 
 
In contrast to these more global developments, many countries in the Middle 
East and other Muslim states were resistant to the growing trend toward the 
harmonisation and internationalisation of arbitration proceedings.209 One 
primary reason concerned the state’s right to exercise its sovereignty and public 
autonomy by refusing to recognise laws or procedural arbitration regimes that 
undermined legitimate differences in local laws, culture, and values.210  
 
The heart of the problem is that any degree of regulatory diversity or pluralism 
fosters uncertainty over the applicable laws. By way of example, many argue 
that religion and customary principles are difficult to apply in resolving 
international commercial disputes, as each member state has its own religious 
beliefs and customary laws.211 Moreover, regulatory diversity may even dilute or 
impair the rights and protections of commercial actors that are otherwise subject 
to that national legal regime.212 In practice, states or local courts may abuse 
their public powers by asserting the supremacy of state law without reasoned 
justification or respect for procedural due process.213 These issues raise 
legitimate concerns over the appropriate role and function of international rules 
and regimes on both international and domestic arbitration.  
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To the above point, El-Ahdab outlines the scope of arbitration by referring to the 
verse 58 of the Holy Qur’an, which stipulates:  
 
[I]t follows from this that if one is authorized to judge, one is 
authorized to make judgment with a binding character. An arbitral 
decision settles disputes and thus must be binding upon the 
parties. It follows from this that the authority in charge of 
arbitration must be appointed in such a manner as to be able to 
settle the dispute, namely the decision must be taken by a majority 
if unanimity is not possible consequently, the number of arbitrators 
must be odd.214  
 
The above illustrates the importance of arbitration in the Shariah tradition. It is 
worth mentioning that ‘the potential wealth of Shariah is still unexploited by most 
modern Arab legislators’.215 Thus, it is pertinent to examine the provisions of 
Shariah to understand the relationship of its principles to arbitration when 
resolving international commercial disputes. 
 
In assessing this relationship, one must consider the views of the Islamic 
schools of thought on arbitration. According to the Hanafi School, the approach 
of arbitration is liberal since:  
 
[The Hanafi School] allows more cases to go to arbitration than 
the Maliki, Shafii or Hanbali schools. The Hanafi School teaches 
that arbitration is valid in all cases, which do not involve legally 
fixed punishment (Haad) and retaliation (Qiasa), although the 
inarbitrability of qisas is contested by a minority of Hanafi 
scholars.216 
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In contrast, the Maliki school vests the Qadi (Judge) with broad discretionary 
powers and jurisdiction to discover the truth in relation to the disputes.217 
 
Taken together, it appears that the divergence of opinions among the schools 
adds a layer of complexity to understanding the role of arbitration in Islamic 
society.218 For example, it has been shown that Western arbitration regimes 
have a shared cultural and legal heritage.219 As such, one can argue that 
international arbitration standards are already a reflection and codification of the 
norms, procedures and practices that are already recognised and observed by 
their national legal system and societies.220 However, in Muslim practising 
states, there is an entirely different historical context and legal culture.221 
 
What is clear at this stage is that the differences of interpretation provided by 
the Islamic schools on the scope of arbitration may pose challenges in utilising 
international arbitration to resolve disputes arising from international commercial 
transactions because the parties come from different jurisdictions and employ 
different practices and customs in resolving their domestic commercial 
disputes.222 Applying these practices when interpreting transnational laws also 
poses challenges.223 In this light, a lawyer has to be well aware of the 
substantive issues emerging from a transaction, which may often be determined 
by a referring to procedural rules.224 Thus, it becomes even more imperative to 
understand the legal regime of international commerce because the parties 
sometimes use the term law to denote more than the objective norms enacted 
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by the legislative branches of the government.225 For example, arbitration allows 
for broader considerations to be heard by the tribunal than is permitted in the 
traditional judicial process because courts can only base their decisions on 
accepted legal sources.226 
 
On the other hand, it is also necessary to understand the power and scope of 
an arbitrator in international commercial arbitration, which is more limited than 
that of the national courts or judge.227 For instance, arbitral awards rendered by 
arbitral tribunals are recognised under national laws, but an award cannot be 
enforced without the assistance of the national courts.228 Further, if the parties 
fail to mention the scope of issues that can be arbitrated or the applicable 
arbitral procedural laws are not clear from the contract, then the local arbitration 
law, or the lex arbitri, may be applied when conducting the arbitration 
proceedings.229 
 
Consider this scenario that demonstrates the important of arbitral law in 
international arbitration proceedings. There is a cross-border transaction 
involving international contracting parties that broadly negotiate with two or 
more business parties undertaking the same business, such as a manufacturing 
agreement and investment agreement.230 In this process, the parties often 
might be in the process of negotiating their contractual obligations under the 
agreement and dealing with issues arising out of those transaction 
agreements.231 At this stage, the parties may fail to formulate explicit 
contractual clauses governing, for instance, relief or remedies within the terms 
of their arbitration agreement.232 In those circumstances, the arbitral tribunal 
may have little choice but to consider, or give weight to, the relevant arbitration 
																																																						
225 Goode et al (n 211) 5. 
226 Park (n 184) 1-38. 
227 Redfern et al (n 3) 2. 
228 El-Ahdab (n 108) 47. 
229 Lew, Mistelis & Kroll (n 2). 
230 Dasteel (n 57) 539-52. 
231 FN Botchway, ‘Can the Law Compel Business Parties to Negotiate?’ (2010) 3(3) JWELB 286-303. 
232 MT Grando, Evidence, Proof, and Fact-Finding in WTO Dispute Settlement (Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
	57	
	
rules or applicable national law to determine the types of remedies available to 
resolve the dispute.233 
 
Within this context, international contracting parties need to have prior 
understanding and knowledge of their contractual rights and obligations under 
the national laws rather than relying solely on the application of international 
conventions, transnational laws of the parties choice of law to govern all 
aspects of the dispute.234 Notably, some trade nations have made specific 
reservations when implementing the provisions of international conventions.235 
Goode states that ‘conventions should be innovative and create the devices 
needed in international trade’.236 This would encourage states to adopt them 
without modification. Others argue that trade nations could enact special 
legislation to simplify and protect the commercial and contractual interests of 
international contracting parties in resolving their disputes.237 
 
However, the critical question becomes whether the Saudi government would 
have succeeded in gaining the confidence of international contracting parties in 
its arbitration framework, particularly for recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia, without becoming a party to such 
international arbitral instruments. Further, given the Kingdom’s public policy 
stance with regard to Shariah application, it remains unclear what level of 
confidence parties currently maintain. To begin to answer this question, it is 
necessary to examine the modern Saudi Arbitration framework to assess the 
arbitration procedures as stipulated in the Saudi Arbitration Act and identify any 
difficulties relating to the use of international arbitration in the resolution of 
disputes. 
 
2.4 The Modern Saudi Arbitration Law  
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After the Saudi government became a party to the prevailing international 
arbitration conventions and treaties, such as the New York Convention and the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention, it 
realized that it needed to reform its arbitration procedures.238 A first attempt at 
arbitral reform was the Saudi Arbitration Regulation of 1983. Up until this point, 
there was a severe lack of clear procedures and judicial support for arbitration 
within the Kingdom and private arbitration attempts were sporadic at best.239 
One particular difficulty was the lack of provisions on how awards were to be 
enforced, particularly when those awards were made outside of the Kingdom. 
 
The Saudi Arbitration Regulation attempted to address these concerns by 
providing a uniform set of rules that would govern arbitrations related to person, 
entities or activities in the Kingdom that would be easily accessible to both 
foreign and domestic parties.240 The goal of the law was to demonstrate the 
judicial and legislative support for commercial arbitration in the Kingdom to 
alleviate the fears of contracting parties. However, this law was not completely 
party focused; it also granted the government a significant degree of control 
over arbitration procedures including vesting agencies and the courts with 
supervisory authority, typically the CSCD, the Board of Grievances and, to a 
certain extent, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry.241 
 
Throughout practice under the 1983 Arbitration Law, three concerns persisted. 
First, despite the law’s willingness to recognise the validity of an arbitration 
clause in a contract, it was unclear how a party could be compelled to 
participate if that party refused to cooperate. Second, there was an on-going 
debate over the extent to which Saudi law was required to be applied to the 
substance of the dispute. Finally, the law did not specify the grounds, if any, on 
which the competent court or authority could refuse to enforce an arbitral 
award.242 
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In 2012, Saudi Arabia took action to remedy the concerns witnessed over the 
preceding three decades. In fact, with the enactment of the new Saudi 
Arbitration Act, the Kingdom has witnessed notable developments in its 
arbitration procedures, particularly by addressing the old problems of 
inconsistent and unintended interpretations of Shariah provisions in arbitral 
procedures.243 This new law represents an attempt at achieving a more 
comprehensive and independent approach to arbitration that provides 
significantly more procedural clarity and, in reality, it seems to be working. Early 
numbers suggest that more foreign commercial actors have opted for arbitration 
in Saudi Arabia rather than in foreign forums after the promulgation of the new 
law.244 This attempt to simplify the dispute resolution process in the Kingdom 
and bring it more in-line with global arbitration trends, such as those preponed 
by UNCITRAL, were intended to increase protections for foreign businesses 
and investors.  
 
The New Arbitration Law remains anchored in the Hanbali school of thought, 
but simultaneously modernises this dispute resolution mechanism. For instance, 
parties are no longer required to bring their arbitral awards before the Board of 
Grievances for enforcement, removing much of the unpredictability associated 
with its decisions and allowing parties to directly seek the assistance of 
specialized judges on the Enforcement Circuit.245 
 
Despite these attempts to create a more welcoming environment, some 
commentators suggest that international contracting parties are still dissatisfied 
with the Saudi arbitration procedures.246 Notwithstanding the clarifications and 
additions in the New Arbitration Law, it also created thirty-three additional 
articles, nearly doubling the number of applicable provision to navigate than 
those contained in its predecessor legislation.247 
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Scholars argue that international contracting parties challenge the provisions of 
the new law because of uncertainty, particularly with regard to their 
interpretation and application in international arbitration. For example, Article 14 
of the New Arbitration Act stipulates certain requirements for appointment of 
arbitrators, including that they have sufficient capacity to serve, are of good 
moral conduct and maintain an education in Shariah law.248 It is fair to say that 
international contracting parties may be uneasy with Saudi government’s failure 
to provide detailed guidance on how terms such as ‘good conduct’ are defined, 
among others. The development of clear guidance on the use of such terms is 
essential because the New Arbitration Law promises to modernise the Saudi 
arbitration regime ‘by recognising for the first time parties’ autonomy to tailor 
their arbitration procedure in certain important respects, including by explicitly 
recognising the adoption of institutional arbitration rules’.249 For the party to 
effectively exercise this autonomy, it is imperative that they understand the 
terms with which their decisions must comply to able to subsequently enforce 
any future award without challenges to its validity. 
 
While the isolated goals of the New Arbitration Law are laudable, it is just one 
piece in a larger modernisation and reform effort taking place in the Kingdom. In 
order for the provisions of this law to be effective, the legislature and the 
judiciary must also be healthy and able to serve in their supportive capacities. 
Thus, it is necessary to probe beneath the formal text of the New Arbitration 
Law to assess the ‘real’ objectives behind this reform from the KSA’s 
perspective. To further explore these concerns, the following attempts to clarify 
the manner in which Saudi legislation is enacted and the foundational sources 
from which Saudi lawmakers derive their authority and legitimacy,250 followed by 
a comparable explanation of the Saudi judicial process. In each section, the 
discussion is intended to focus of the Saudi government’s position on the 
recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards, particularly when 
the enforcement of those awards implicate matters of religious concern or other 
public order norms. 
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2.5 Saudi Legislative System  
 
The Saudi legislative system itself has a unique history. Historically, Saudi 
Arabia has been reluctant to codify its laws, but this approach has changed 
under the current king. This section looks at the background of the Saudi 
legislative system and the legislative reforms that are taking place within the 
Kingdom, including the reform of the Saudi arbitration law. 
 
2.5.1 Background of Saudi Legislative System 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has evolved over three phases. First, from 1744 
to 1818, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was formed as an alliance between 
Muhammad Ibn Abdel Wahab, the religious leader, and Muhammad Ibn Saud, 
the political leader.251 During this period Ibn Abdel Wahab helped Ibn Saud 
spread ideas of societal unification and socio-religious reform by preaching they 
would restore the correct Islamic rituals and beliefs.252 However, in the early 
nineteenth century Al-Saud conquered the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia253 and from 
1824 to 1891, Turki Ibn Abdullah established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with 
Riyadh as its capital city. Following a long conflict amongst his descendants, the 
Kingdom was conquered once again by Al-Rashid in 1891.254 The third stage 
began in 1932 and has continued until the present. King Abdulaziz Al-Saud 
formed the modern constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on September 
23, 1932. King Abdulaziz attempted to accommodate societal interests by 
establishing a modern independent government to achieve recognition on the 
international stage and obtain the confidence of foreign investors necessary to 
encourage investment in Saudi Arabia.255 Regarding arbitration, King Abdulaziz 
attempted to codify the teachings of the four Islamic schools to clarify the 
procedural and substantive rules applicable to arbitration. These reforms were 
instituted to enable international contracting parties to more effectively resolve 
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their international commercial disputes. However, this step was strongly 
opposed by the traditional Shariah scholars.256 For example, Baamir express 
that ‘the fear that the expansion of civil jurisdiction might come at the expense 
of Shariah and might lead, in the end, to the application of laws unrelated to 
Shariah.’257  
 
The primary argument advanced by scholars was that Shariah law is a divine 
law and as such takes priority over man-made laws.258 Some conservative 
Muslim scholars have been resistant to any attempt to codify provisions of 
Shariah, owing to fears that this would lead to interpretative errors, or 
illegitimate revisions to timeless and immutable divine commands. This 
resistance to innovation in traditional Islamic jurisprudence continues despite 
the demand for new laws and juristic interpretations which can more effectively 
reflect changes in Islamic societies in contexts of globalisation and financial 
integration.259 
 
Levelling a challenge to rigid approach of traditional jurisprudence, Bramsen 
persuasively argues that the divine law of Shariah has been subject to multiple 
interpretations over the centuries.260 To eliminate divergence in scholarly 
opinions, Bramsen and other scholars examine the problems and possibilities of 
codifying Shariah principles in legislative documents like a written 
constitution.261 Many have acknowledged the apparent limitations of this 
approach insofar as attempts to codify Shariah law may result in the formulation 
of binding rulings or doctrines based on subjective interpretations of principles 
which are indeterminate and subject to competing meanings.262 Nonetheless, 
Bramsen and others draw on the writings of prominent Islamic jurists such as 
the great Hanbali Scholar Ibn Taymiyya.263 Indeed, Taymiyya endorsed a 
jurisprudential approach that brings into harmony both the demand for formal 
methods of legal interpretation that can be seen as faithful to the literal text of 
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the Qur’an with a more purposive or teleological reading of the applicable law 
as one that best reflects the needs and demands of the society in which its 
enforced.264 Taymiyya developed this idea into the concept of siyasa shar’iyya, 
a doctrine that has purpose even today.265 Simply put, ‘Siyasa shar’iyya 
represents governance in accordance with the divine law, and it called for a 
harmonization between the law and procedures of Islamic jurisprudence, ‘Fiqh’, 
and the practical demands of governance, siyasa’.266 
 
Yet, the Islamic world today still debates how to best balance the demands for 
formal compliance with modern day treaty-based and other commercial law 
instruments with international instruments, such as the New York Convention 
and the UNCITRAL Model Law with the requirements of Islamic divine law.267 
The question becomes how successful has the Saudi legislative system been in 
reconciling the requirements of international transactions with local norms and 
traditions, not least the constitutionally mandated provisions of Islamic law.268 
 
2.5.2 The Position of the Saudi Legislative System 
 
To assess the issues identified above, it is necessary to discuss whether the 
Islamic schools of thought had any role in influencing the enactment of Saudi 
legislation. The Islamic schools continue to play a vital role in the development 
of legislation generally in Islamic states,269 and their role in Saudi Arabia is no 
different.270 The schools interpret the provisions of Shariah law, and their 
opinions must be considered before any particular piece of Saudi legislation can 
be enacted.271 This stems from the belief that ‘the disciple of legal 
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understanding is the discipline of the derivation of rulings of the divine law, or, in 
other words, the disciple of the procedure of such derivation’.272  
 
With respect to the position of the Saudi legislative system, King Abdulaziz Al-
Saud was a follower of the Hanbali School and adopted the Hanbali scholars’ 
(Hanbalies) teachings in his government.273 These beliefs and teachings were 
reflected in his Royal Decrees. The teachings of the Hanbali School are 
conservative in nature. Hanbalies strongly base their views and reasoning on 
the Holy Qur’an and Sunna’h, thereby giving little weight to secondary sources 
such as Ijma and Qiyas. As a result, the teachings of the Hanbali School are 
comparatively strict on religious issues as compared to other Islamic schools. 
However, their teachings on commercial and financial transactions are in 
practice found to be relatively flexible and tolerant.274 
 
It is commonly assumed that the Saudi King plays a vital role in the legislation 
process; however, other bodies such as the Shura council and the Council of 
Ministers also play a significant role in the Saudi legislative system. The head of 
state, or King, is under a constitutional obligation275 to consult with an expert 
body, such as the Shura Council (also known as Al-Shura), before adopting 
decisions or issuing new legislation. This consultation requirement stems from 
the belief that Al-Shura is ‘not exclusive to the government system, but deals 
with all fields and levels of life, particularly the social’.276 The Al-Shura 
represents a democratic mechanism of law-making because it allows Saudi 
citizens to participate directly in the administration of state policies.277 The Al-
Shura also is empowered to determine how best to reconcile the interests of the 
nation with the principles of Islam as stipulated in the Shariah. 278 
 
Return attention to the New Arbitration Law, it is necessary to consider whether 
the Saudi legislative system has been effective in reconciling Shariah provisions 
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with international instruments, particularly the New York Convention and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, with regard to providing a sound arbitral legal 
framework.279 Answering this question requires first analysing the impact of the 
Saudi legislative reforms. This in turn will shed greater light on the Saudi 
government’s attitudes toward modernising the Saudi arbitration framework, 
particularly with regard to the recognition and enforcement of international 
arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia.  
 
2.5.3 Reformation of Saudi Legislative System 
 
After the enactment of the Basic Law of Governance in the year 1992,280 the 
Council of Ministers, the Al-Shura councils and the Saudi King shared Saudi 
legislative responsibilities for promulgating new laws.281 Since this structure was 
implemented, it has been suggested that the reformation of the Saudi legislative 
system is needed.282 The key reform proposals include further simplification of 
the Saudi law-making processes and additional clarity over the scope and 
applicability of Shariah.283 Through such reforms, the Saudi government will be 
better positioned to promote private sector growth and stability, as well as 
improve foreign relationships at the international level.284 
 
Set against these broader geopolitical and economic shifts—including a growing 
population, religious sectarianism, regional conflicts with neighbouring Iran and 
volatility and growth in the oil markets—the Saudi legal system has undergone 
a period of transformation and change over the last four decades.285 Pertinent 
to the foregoing analysis, the Council of Ministers was established precisely to 
formalise and simplify the relationship between religious bodies and the King.286 
By establishing a Council of Ministers, the Saudi political establishment has 
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taken important measures to make Saudi laws more investment and commerce 
friendly, while remaining compliant with Shariah law.287 
 
Yet, it is undeniable that Saudi legislation affords normative primacy to their 
national principles in their international commercial transactions, which is often 
at odds with the implied or express terms of the arbitration agreement, including 
through inclusion of mandatory international arbitration or stabilisation 
clauses.288 The application of Shariah principles may also implicate issues 
around the validity, operation and enforcement of a contractual agreement in a 
manner that adversely impacts a foreign contractor’s economic interests or 
rights under the contract.289 
 
To counter some of these concerns, the Council of Ministers is comprised of 
highly qualified and educated individuals who are appointed from diverse fields 
or sectors, including the fields of health, science, economics, culture and 
religion, among others.290 The Council is empowered to implement the 
objectives of international conventions and treaties in the Saudi legislation to 
improve efficiency of Saudi economic performance.291 Such measures are 
intended to ensure that international contracting parties have confidence in the 
Saudi systems. 
 
However, it is important to mention that Saudi legislative reform confers 
absolute legislative power to the Council of Ministers and to the ultimate arbiter, 
the King.292 The Al-Shura cannot issue any legislation or regulation without the 
approval of the Saudi King.293 Furthermore, the Basic Law of Governance 
stipulates that the Saudi legislation and regulations should be derived from the 
Holy Qur’an and the Sunna’h.294 In the above light, it is necessary to examine 
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the impact of these reforms on the Saudi legislative system itself.  
 
2.5.4 The Impact of the Reformation on Saudi Legislative System 
 
As previously mentioned, in recent decades, the Saudi government has 
accorded greater priority to policies promoting free trade, liberalisation and 
expansion of its commercial markets.295 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also 
become more proactive in international economic development by joining the 
World Trade Organization in 2005296 and ratifying several international 
conventions and treaties. For example, the Kingdom has begun to invest in 
other sectors for long-term development. It also ‘insist[s] that oil process must 
be stabilized so that they can not only invest in productive capacity to meet 
future increases in demand but also invest in alternative renewal sources of 
energy’.297 The Saudi Kingdom has been among the best performing countries 
in the Group of Twenty (G-20) leading industrialized countries and emerging 
markets. 
 
It is arguable that the reformation of the Saudi legislative system has been key 
to the success and growth of the Saudi economy. 298 In this vein, many scholars 
have reflected on aspects of legal reform which will be necessary to building 
trust in the Saudi legal system and its dispute settlement mechanisms. Long 
and Maisel, for instance, that ‘the key to good governance is public 
participation, not process, and how a society participates is based to a great 
extent on its cultural and social norms and values’.299 It is notable, here, that 
Saudi Arabia practices the traditional political process of public participation 
through Al-Shura and the Council of Ministers, while at the same time 
emphasising the importance of modernization without secularization.300 
Moreover, Saudi governance has evolved from a traditional culture to a modern 
giant within the world oil economy; yet, Saudi governance remains subject to 
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Islamic law.301 
 
2.6 Position of the Saudi Judicial System  
 
Having explored the impacts of reform on the legislative system, it is also 
important to consider the effects on the Saudi judicial system, particularly given 
the necessary role it plays in the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards. 
 
2.6.1 Before the Reformation of the Saudi Judicial System  
 
It comes as no surprise that the Saudi judicial system requires compliance with 
Shariah principles to fulfil its judicial obligations under Saudi law.302 As Article 
46 of the Basic Law of Governance stipulates, Saudi judges are obliged to apply 
the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna’h, along with the relevant rules derived from 
Saudi legislation, when deciding cases or adjudicating matters of justice.303 Prior 
to ratifying the New York Convention in 1996, and before the reforms made to 
the Saudi judicial system in 2007,304 the Board of Grievances305 had 
jurisdiction306 over the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and 
foreign judgements, regardless of the nature of the disputes, whether civil, 
commercial, administrative307 or labour related.308 Notably, the Board of 
Grievances was not willing309 to recognize or enforce commercial arbitral 
awards resulting from disputes resolved under foreign procedural and 
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substantive laws because the awards typically contradicted the provisions of 
Shariah law and this was deemed a matter of public policy.310  
 
Through Saudi Arabia’s ratification of international treaties and conventions, 
which the Kingdom has indicated its acceptance of in principle, the Kingdom 
has bound itself to new legal obligations, such as those imposed by the New 
York Convention of 1958, including a duty to recognise and enforce 
international arbitral awards.311 However, the Convention’s provisions continue 
to offer Saudi judges a measure of interpretative discretion to refuse to 
recognise or enforce an international arbitral awards—on the grounds of public 
policy.312 This exception carved out by the New York Convention in effects 
permits the behaviour of the local courts to refuse recognition of domestic or 
international arbitral awards found to be in conflict with Shariah principles. 
Naturally, this might create challenges for international contracting parties 
because the Article V ‘safe harbour’ clause does not provide clear guidance or 
threshold legal criteria for determining whether national mandatory law or public 
policy has been breached.313 This is all the more problematic because Saudi 
courts have historically adopted a strict interpretation of Shariah in justifying the 
courts’ non-recognition and enforcement of awards and judgments issued 
outside of Saudi Arabia or in accordance with the law of a legal system other 
than that of Saudi Arabia.314  
 
Indeed, it is difficult to find any decision where the Saudi judicial authorities, 
previously the Board of Grievances and with the new Enforcement Regulations 
the newly-appointed Enforcement Judges, have been willing to execute an 
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order or award issued in a country of origin other than Saudi Arabia.315 In light of 
the above, it is necessary to consider the current position of the Saudi judicial 
system on recognising and enforcing international arbitral awards in Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
2.6.2 After the Reformation of the Saudi Judicial System 
 
In 2007, the Saudi judicial system was reformed and modernised.316 The Law of 
the Judiciary was enacted, resulting in the comprehensive reorganisation of the 
existing judicial framework and the adoption of new rules governing the 
jurisdiction of Saudi courts.317 Article 9 of the Law of the Judiciary established 
the new structure and hierarchy of the courts, which are composed of three 
levels: the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the First Instance Courts. 
Further, these courts are classified as general, penal, family, commercial and 
labour courts.318 The Court of Appeals operates and functions through 
specialized panels.319  
 
Despite these reforms, there is still uncertainty over the jurisdictional authority of 
Saudi courts to refuse recognition of arbitral awards. The only glimpse of 
guidance is contained in Article 25, which mandates: 
 
[W]ithout prejudice to the provisions of the Law of the Board of 
Grievances, the courts shall have jurisdiction to decide all cases in 
accordance with the rules governing the jurisdiction of courts set 
forth in the Law of Procedure before Shariah Courts and the Law 
of Criminal Procedure.320 
 
																																																						
315 Saudi Arbitration Act 2012, ch VI. 
316 Al-Jarbou (n 118) 177-202. 
317 Ibid. 
318 See Law of the Judiciary, art 9. 
319 See Ibid art 15. 
320 Ibid art 25 (explaining the scope of court jurisdiction). 
	71	
	
Thus, the Law of the Judiciary, fails to provide clarity around the recognition of 
arbitral awards, and instead reinforces that Saudi courts are under a legal duty 
to observe and enforces aspects of Shariah law.321 
 
2.7 Enforcement Circuit 
 
In another set of important reforms, the Saudi judicial council established the 
Enforcement Circuit, which is governed under the Enforcement Law 2012.322 
The purpose of this circuit is to enforce arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia. Notably, 
the Enforcement Law of 2012 contains relatively detailed provisions regarding 
recognising and enforcement of arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia.323 
 
However, the enactment of Enforcement Law arguably fails to address the 
challenges confronted by international contracting parties who seek to enforce 
arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia.324 One reason for this is that the prevailing 
party is still required to submit a petition to the competent Saudi court before an 
award will be recognised.325 During this process, the judge must ensure that the 
arbitral award does not contravene the mandatory principles of Shariah law, 
contradict any existing judgment or decision of a competent court or infringe on 
any royal decrees issued by the Saudi king.326 
 
Notwithstanding the above, Articles 2 through 7 of the Enforcement Law set out 
the powers and jurisdiction of enforcement judges to enforce arbitral award in 
Saudi Arabia.327 These articles entrust enforcement judges with the power of 
compulsory enforcement and the supervision of enforcement officers subject to 
the usual proviso that such award do not contravene Saudi legislation or 
Shariah principles.328 The law also makes clear that enforcement judges are not 
part of the recognised judicial authority; nevertheless, they play an important 
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role in the enforcement of arbitral awards.329 However, before a party can seek 
the assistance of an enforcement judge, the arbitral award must first be 
recognised by a competent court330 This creates tension within the Saudi 
arbitration framework as the proper law for governing recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards continues to remain uncertain and subject to the 
discretionary justice of national courts.331 
 
While the Saudi government has made significant efforts to modernise its 
judicial system, particularly with regard to the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards, the new legislative regulations do not provide complementary 
provisions on these topics to guide the judges.332 Instead, the Enforcement 
Circuit has simply replaced the Board of Grievances as governed under the now 
partially repealed Rules of Civil Procedure, 1989.333 With the reforms made to 
the Saudi court structure, the Enforcement Circuit is now part of the Saudi 
General Courts and has broad jurisdiction to supervise and enforce foreign and 
domestic arbitral awards, subject to Shariah principles and existing 
legislation.334 This offers room for further development of a new arbitration 
regime for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in Saudi 
Arabia.335 
 
2.8 International Contracting Parties 
 
This thesis has primarily focuses on contract-based commercial arbitration, and 
as such does not address the finer points of treaty-based investment arbitration, 
specifically Bilateral Treaty Investments (BITs). Nonetheless, this study’s 
assessment of the Saudi governments attempts to establish a more business 
																																																						
329 Al-Ammari & Martin (n 2) 387-408. 
330 Saudi Arbitration Act 2012, Article 53 stipulates, ‘The competent court, or designee, shall issue an 
order for enforcement of the arbitration award. The request for enforcement of the award shall be 
accompanied with the following: (1) the original award or an attested copy thereof. (2) A true copy of the 
arbitration agreement (3) An Arabic translation of the arbitration award attested by an accredited 
authority, if the award is not issued in Arabic (4) A proof of the deposit of the award with the competent 
court, pursuant to Article 44 of this law’.  
331 MT Grando, Evidence, Proof, and Fact-Finding in WTO Dispute Settlement (Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
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333 See Royal Decree No. M/53, dated 13.8.1453 AH. 
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friendly environment, and the ways in which Sharia may intersect with these 
issues, would be incomplete without briefly mentioning the impact of foreign 
direct investment in Saudi Arabia’s economy.  
 
As conventional wisdom has it, the globalization of the world economy has 
helped international contracting parties expand their businesses around the 
world.336 Foreign commercial parties are investing in the Saudi economy337 and 
increasingly demanding338 protective laws339 to guard their investments.340 The 
mindset of foreign commercial parties is readily apparent. They are motivated 
primarily by the pursuit of immediate and high returns on their investments.341 
As a result, they seek to stabilise their expectations through the application of 
clear and predictable laws.342 
 
This begs the question, to what extent are the rights of foreign commercial or 
investor parties protected in Saudi Arabia? While this thesis deals primarily with 
commercial arbitration, it is worth briefly reflecting on the implications for foreign 
direct investment in the Kingdom. While this thesis has focused on arbitration 
among private parties, it is worth keeping in mind that the Saudi government’s 
attitude to arbitration has been largely informed by Aramco, a dispute which 
involved the Saudi government and a private party. This raises wider questions 
																																																						
336 For example, Edwards pinned down that globalization is still at an early stage. For a thoughtful 
analysis of globalization on International trade, see M Edwards, Future Positive International Co-
operation in the 21st Century (Earthscan Publications Ltd London, 1999). Zekos also asserts that the 
recent growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into low-income countries by relying to the World 
Bank report. From 1990 the FDI was $2.6 billion, which increased to $9 billion in 2001 and subsequently 
increase to $162 billion over the same period. See GI Zekos, Economics and Law on Competition in 21st 
Century Globalization (Nova Science Publishers, 2014) 51-52. 
337 Al-Hejailan idea was that the objective of foreign investment in the Saudi economy, as ‘we realize that 
the ultimate objective of all foreign investment is to earn profits, the Saudis are now adjusting their 
policies to accept such an objective-provided it is on the basis of long-term partnership, rather than the 
short-term “quick buck” approach that some contractors had adopted in construction and procurement’. 
See WM Ballantyne & HL Stovall, Arab Commercial Law: Principles and Perspectives (American Bar 
Association, 2002) 4. 
338 Milhaupt and Pistor asserts that the challenges raised by foreign investors to protect their investment 
under the provision of law, as ‘the demand for law is also affected, because globalization puts pressure on 
different constituencies within a given system that may benefit or lose from market integration and capital 
flows. It also adds new constituencies, in particular, foreign strategic and portfolio investors, whose 
demand for formal legal solutions to governance issues may differ from that of domestic constituencies’. 
See CJ Milhaupt & K Pistor, Law and Capitalism (University of Chicago Press, 2008) 45. 
339 Nadar argues, ‘The development of law often follows the development of a new industry as to provide 
the supporting legal framework designed to address the new concerns that arise from the operation of the 
new industry’. A Nadar, ‘Islamic Finance and Dispute Resolution’ (2009) 23(1) ALQ 7-8. 
340 Edwards (n 339) 5-6. 
341 Zekos (n 337) 52. 
342 G van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 48. 
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about how certain disputes involve state parties, including state controlled 
companies, are classified under Saudi Law. As Goode notes, ‘investor’s rights 
are classified as “intermediary and only contractual” [while] in other 
[agreements], there may be a fiduciary relationship’.343 Moreover, the Saudi 
government’s treatment of wider issues around its treaty obligations under 
various investment agreements will have implications for all aspects of 
enforcement of foreign awards, including in the area of commercial arbitration. 
 
The wider point being made here is a deceptively simply one. International 
contracting parties to understand their rights and liabilities under the law of the 
enforcing state if they are to secure and protect their investments and 
commercial interests.344 As has been previously mentioned, the provisions of 
Shariah play a vital role in Saudi legislation. The provisions of Shariah law 
mandate that parties respect and undertake their obligations as agreed in their 
contract.345 For example, the verse of the Holy Qur’an states: 
 
[O] Ye who believe, respect your contractual undertakings’ and 
‘He authorized what he did not forbid’. Consequently, that which is 
not forbidden is not wrong and what is not wrong is valid.346 
 
By extension, and using the above Islamic precept as our guide, the Saudi 
government must fulfil its obligations under Sharia, while bringing its laws into 
line with international customs and practices. To do this it will have to implement 
certain measures to protect foreign investors contractual rights, including by 
satisfying the criteria identified under the applicable investment treaties. Such 
internationally-recognised standards may include fair and equitable treatment, 
non-discrimination, or a prohibition against the denial of justice and the 
																																																						
343 Goode et al (n 211) 489. 
344 Trakman posits that the parties should be aware of both the marketplace because ‘continuing 
experience in world trade provides a tested environment in which merchants can interact freely, choosing 
their trade partners and contract terms with an expanding awareness of both the marketplace and of one 
another. Together, market, agreement and time allow business instruments to evolve into uniform codes 
and documents, comprehensive in their terms and farsighted in their application to an ever-changing 
business world’. See LE Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law (Fred B. 
Rothman & Co, 1983) 2. 
345 Edwards (n 337) 5-6. 
346 El-Ahdab remarks, ‘the development of law often follows the development of a new industry as to 
provide the supporting legal framework designed to address the new concerns that arise from the 
operation of the new industry’. See El-Ahdab (n 108) 24-25. 
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requirement for equivalent protection of foreign contracting parties under 
national law.347 
 
Many of foreign investors’ concerns may be overcome by first simplifying the 
interpretation of national laws and, second, by harmonising national laws with 
the rules and principles of international law to avoid conflicts between 
international commercial parties as to the applicable procedural and substantive 
laws.348 To this point, many have argued for the need to simplify the standards 
or principles governing the interpretation of contractual rights in investment 
contracts.349 Under an investment contract, investor parties are vested with two 
sets of rights in the investment agreement: rights under international law 
conferred by the investment treaty and rights conferred under domestic law 
arising from the investment agreement.350 However, challenges remain over the 
nature of rights in the dispute; for instance, whether the rights are derived from 
a contract governed by the municipal law of the host state or are otherwise 
regulated under a particular bilateral or multilateral investment treaty.351 Another 
significant issue concerns the rise in treaty shopping by foreign investors. Here, 
foreign investors assert the jurisdiction of courts in which they are most likely to 
obtain a favourable decision or otherwise take advantage of national laws that 
best protect their economic interests.352 The growing practice in treaty shopping 
however presents a problem for the following reasons: 
 
[T]reaty shopping breaches the reciprocity of a treaty and alters 
the balance of concessions attained therein between the two 
contracting states. When a third-country resident ‘shops’ into a 
treaty, then the treaty concessions are extended to a resident, 
whose state has not participated in this arrangement and may not 
reciprocate with corresponding benefit (e.g. exchange of 
																																																						
347 See official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
<http://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/KingdomForeignPolicy/Pages/KingdomPolicy34645.aspx > 
accessed 28 August 2014. 
348 Nadar (n 339) 1-29. 
349 Goode et al (n 211) 489. 
350 Ibid. 
351 ME O’Connell, International Dispute Resolution Case and Materials (Carolina Academic Press, 
2006). 
352 AYS Reuven & CHJI Panayi, Rethinking Treaty Shopping: Lessons for the European Union 
(Amsterdam, 2010). 
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information). The usual quid pro quo of the treaty is therefore 
compromised and the process subverted.353 
 
Furthermore, every legal system recognises the right of parties to exercise 
some degree of freedom of contract and party autonomy in their international 
commercial transactions.354 As previously mentioned, parties are accorded 
broad freedom to choose their governing law in the contract, under the New 
Arbitration Law provisions, which are themselves founded on international 
standards developed under the ambit of the UNCITRAL rules.355 The principles 
of party autonomy have the important function of enabling contracting parties to 
understand their contractual rights and obligations.356 Nonetheless, in so far as 
parties are bound by the terms of their contract it is important that they take 
extra caution while drafting their international commercial contracts.357 More 
particularly, international contracting parties should to take due account of 
‘mandatory laws outside the lex contractus which are dictated by the public 
policy of the states involved’.358 Further contracting parties must be cognisant of 
the fact that the ‘applicable contract law itself may contain mandatory rules 
which cannot be contracted out’.359 
 
At this juncture, it is necessary to mention the measures taken by the Saudi 
government to protect foreign investors contractual rights. To put it briefly, 
Saudi Arabia has taken some necessary measures in protecting the contractual 
and economic interests of foreign investors, including by acceding to 
																																																						
353 Ibid. 
354 Trakman asserts that in international commercial transactions, ‘merchants decide with whom they wish 
to contract and upon what terms; they determine the limits of their own requirements; and they establish 
the parameters of their obligations. They do so themselves. The law does not fulfill such functions for 
them. Within this context, the sanctity of their bargain is not merely a legal privilege; it is a commercial 
necessity. The business agreement, construed against the background of similar international agreements, 
is the most effective means towards interpersonal harmony in international trade. The contract is devised 
as a matter of the free will of the parties; it is reciprocal in intent; and it is adaptable in its scope of 
application’. See Trakman (n 347) 1. 
355 C Croft, C Kee & J Waincymer, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013) 1-5. 
356 Park (n 184) 1-38; see also, MT Grando, Evidence, Proof, and Fact-Finding in WTO Dispute 
Settlement (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
357 Berman (n 192). 
358 N Horn & CM Schmitthoff, The Transnational law of International Commercial Transactions Vol 2 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1982) 10. 
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international treaties with the contracting states.360 For example, the Saudi 
Arabian General Investment Authority361 (SAGIA) was to provide commercial 
and financial guidance and a safe environment for both Saudi and foreign 
investors to trade in Saudi Arabia.362 A specific regulation has been enacted for 
this purpose, the Foreign Investment Act, which relaxes and liberalises the 
capital retention and shareholding requirements that foreign investors must 
meet before they can invest in the Kingdom.363 The SAGIA plays a vital role by 
issuing licences to foreign investors for permanent or temporary investments in 
the Kingdom. Similarly, the Saudi government has enacted the Foreign 
Investment Act & Executive Rules of 2000,364 strengthening the corporate rights 
of foreign investors over their assets. Likewise, the Saudi Real Estate Law of 
2000 allows foreigners to own, sell and invest in the Saudi real estate market.365 
 
Through these liberalising reforms, it appears that the Saudi government has 
issued several economic policies and regulations to facilitate stable and efficient 
macroeconomic growth in all sectors of the Saudi economy.366 One notable 
example in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia plays a major role is the energy 
sector, namely by exporting its oil resources to the world market.367 These 
measures offer another example of how Saudi Arabia has attempted to protect 
both its own sovereignty over natural resources and the vested rights and 
interests of international contracting parties in the Saudi economy.368  
 
While not explicitly related to the focus of this study, which is to examine the 
recognition and enforcement of domestic and international awards, and 
differences in treatment of these two types of awards, Saudi Arabia’s evolving 
attitudes to the rights of foreign parties necessarily feeds into the wider 
discussion on enforcement of awards involving private parties. The above 
																																																						
360 See ZS Al-Herbish, ‘Jurisdiction over Banking Disputes in Saudi Arabia’ (2011) 25 ALQ 221-228. 
361 See SAGIA website, <http://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/ > accessed 8 November 2013. 
362 R Wilson & Other, Economic development in Saudi Arabia (Routledge Curzon, 2004) 85. 
363 See SAGIA website <http://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/ > accessed 8 November 2013. 
364 Article 2 deals with foreign capital investment in Saudi Arabia: ‘The Authority is authorized to issue a 
license for foreign capital investment in the Kingdom for any investment activity whether permanent or 
temporary with the exception of the activities excluded under the third article of the Act’. See Ibid. 
365 See Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, DC < http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-
information/laws/Foreign_Investment_Act_and_Executive_Rules.aspx> accessed 29 August 2014. 
366 Wilson & Other (n 363). 
367 KE Young, The Emerging Interventionists of the GCC (LSE Middle East Centre, 2013). 
368 A Evans, ‘Arbitration and The Role of Law’ (2010) 21 ARIA 295-305. 
	78	
	
discussion tends suggests the willingness of the Saudi government, in recent 
years, to enact laws and measures aimed at protecting the contractual rights of 
international parties, including by implementing standards provided for under 
international conventions and treaties without contradicting Shariah law. The 
following chapters will explore the tension between such international 
instruments and the application of Shariah principles in greater detail. 
 
2.9 Conclusions 
 
This chapter examined the history and development of the Saudi arbitration 
framework and overall related Saudi reform efforts. The discussion notes that 
the Saudi arbitration system has evolved through the modernisation of the 
Saudi legislative system in 1992, the KSA’s ratification of the New York 
Convention of 1958, its membership in the World Trade Organisation in 2005, 
and its continuing substantive reforms. Recent reforms include the enactment of 
the new Saudi Arbitration Act of 2012 and the Enforcement Act of 2012, which 
have assisted both domestic and international contracting parties to understand 
the essential requirements for the recognition and enforcement of commercial 
arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia. To complement its legislative activities, the 
Saudi government also reformed the judicial system in 2007 to facilitate court 
proceedings, specifically with the establishment of the Enforcement Circuit that 
maintains jurisdiction over actions to for enforce arbitral awards.  
 
Yet, academics and experts on continue to maintain different opinions about 
whether the current law of Saudi Arabia has been adequately modernised when 
compared with Western arbitration models and mechanisms of resolving 
international commercial disputes. For example, the United Kingdom’s 
legislative system is secular and adopts a more liberal approach to its economic 
and social policies.369 However, the Saudi legislature adopts a more religious 
and conservative stance when enacting legislation and the Saudi government 
justifies this approach on the grounds that the law of the land is primarily based 
																																																						
369 See J Trappe, ‘Arbitration procedure in England and Germany: Some Comparative Remarks’ (1997) 1 
ADRLJ 3-14; see also J Warbeck, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution in the World of Business: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Use of ADR in the United Kingdom and in Germany’ (1998) 2 ADRLJ 104-
131. 
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on the principles of the Holy Qur’an and Sunna’h and secondarily on the source 
of Ijma, Qiyas and Ijtihad, which are also applied to commercial disputes. Many 
traditional Islamic scholars continue to fully defend absolute conformity with the 
requirements of Shariah, or divine law as it has been practiced and interpreted 
over centuries;370 but scholars suggest that a strict interpretation of Islamic 
sources may be ill-suited, under-developed and insufficiently adapted to deal 
with the complexities of modern commercial instruments. Yet, many others 
comment on how deeply embedded Islamic principles and values are in the life 
and practices of the modern Muslim. As Nasr has remarked: 
 
[I]slam is not only an ideal, although it is of course an ideal, 
especially as far as the ethical norms exemplified by the Blessed 
Prophet and the great figures of the religion are concerned. But for 
ordinary Muslims it is also a reality with which they live day and 
night. Therefore, in many cases they make use of religious 
teachings to solve family problems, to further economic or social 
goals, or even for the exercise of power.371 
 
Similarly, modern Islamic scholars have expressed the view that the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia has made significant reforms to legislative and judicial processes 
during the last half-century. It is evident that the Saudi Kings have afforded top 
priority to reforming372 the traditional arbitral system, particularly through the 
enactment of New Arbitration Law and the related legislative and judicial 
reforms. Of course, one should acknowledge that the New Arbitration Law 
adheres to the multiple sources of Shariah principles, including the Holy Qur’an 
and Sunna’h, as well as with the widely accepted UNCITRAL Model Law. The 
Saudi government has also taken a more proactive approach toward 
establishing greater stability in relevant markets and through improved rights 
protections for both domestic and international commercial parties.373 
																																																						
370 SH Nasr, Islam in the Modern World, Challenged by the West, threatened by Fundamentalism, 
Keeping Faith with Tradition (1st edn, Harper Collins, 2010) 5. 
371 Ibid 21-22. 
372 Al-Jarbou plausibly asserts that ‘the impact of globalization and international trade and relations will 
not allow Saudi Arabia to remain isolated from the rest of the world by relying only on traditional ideas’. 
See Al-Jarbou (n 118) 198. 
373 Baamir remarks that ‘Saudi Arabia concluded an investment promotion and protection agreement with 
the following 17 countries: Italy, Germany, Belgium, Taiwan, China, France, Malaysia, Luxembourg, 
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Nonetheless, the application of Saudi arbitration law to foreign investments and 
international commercial arbitral disputes appears to remain at odds with the 
main reason for resorting to international arbitration in the first place as a more 
flexible, faster and cheaper dispute resolution mechanism. 
 
Therefore, it is no wonder that international arbitration has become a generally 
accepted method of dispute settlement among international contracting parties 
in relation to commercial transactions. Saudi Arabia must now apply those 
modernisation efforts and account for similar considerations regarding the 
recognition and enforcement of international commercial arbitral awards by 
bringing its interpretations of national law provisions in-line with those of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention. Moreover, agents 
involved in international arbitration, whether arbitrators, parties or advisers, 
need to familiarise themselves with national laws before integrating international 
arbitration into their agreement, insofar as they are not represented in the 
majority of national legal systems.374 In other words, an international arbitral 
award is valid only by virtue of its recognition by a national law. Interestingly, 
some trading nations have developed a separate regime for arbitration of 
domestic and trans-national commercial disputes, for example, the London 
Court of International Arbitration.375 
 
While the Saudi government has relaxed its attitude toward international 
arbitrations, and has proven to be accepting of the recognition and enforcement 
of international commercial arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia, controversy remains 
among academics.376 There is no easy solution to the problem identified above, 
																																																																																																																																																														
Spain, Turkey, India, Republic of Korea, Philippines, Switzerland, Egypt, Singapore, and Austria. These 
agreements aim to promote and protect the investments of nationals and the enterprises of one contracting 
party in the territory of another by providing an appropriate legislative environment in which to stimulate 
and increase investment, trade and industrial activity’. Baamir (n 18) 114. 
374 M Wescott, ‘The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration’ 
(2016) 82(3) Arbitration 302-305. 
375 See the London Court of International Arbitration official website, 
<http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/history.aspx> accessed 13 November 2014. 
376 Al-Ammari and Martin remark, ‘both the New Arbitration Law and the Enforcement Law require that 
Shariah is not violated in the arbitration agreement, the arbitration process and the issued award. The 
requirements under these two new laws still present a challenge to international companies seeking to 
enforce their arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia. However, well prepared parties and arbitrators should be 
able to manage those issues. That can be done by taking the requirements of Shariah and these new Saudi 
laws into consideration throughout the arbitration process’. Al-Ammari & Martin (n 2) 408. Similarly, 
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particularly as it relates to the development of a newer, more comprehensive 
regime for the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards in 
Saudi Arabia. However, this study aims to address why and how international 
contracting parties are experiencing a variety of challenges relating to the 
recognition and enforcement of international commercial arbitral awards in 
Saudi Arabia and determine whether a new regime can be established and 
promoted for the Saudi arbitration system that can reconcile Shariah principles 
with global arbitral trends.  
 
																																																																																																																																																														
Baamir expresses that ‘the enactment of a new law will not necessarily mean the end for these existing 
problems’. Baamir (n 18) 49. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE BASICS OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARD ENFORCEMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter focused on the development of arbitration practices within 
the Saudi legal framework, including the provisions of the most recent 
arbitration and enforcement regulations, and then general reforms happening in 
the legislative and judicial branches.  
 
This chapter shifts focus to discussing how an award reaches the point of 
recognition and enforcement in Saudi Arabia once issued by the tribunal and 
the issues faced in enforcing such awards in Saudi Arabia, whether foreign or 
domestic. This section will first consider the sources commercial transactions 
that give rise to the disputes and highlight the applicable contractual theories 
that pose challenges for non-Muslims and international commercial parties to 
getting an award recognized and enforced in Saudi Arabia. This chapter also 
distinguishes between the enforcement of domestic versus foreign arbitral 
awards and begins to identify the grounds on which the Saudi courts can refuse 
to recognize or enforce an award. 
 
3.2 The Applicable Law in Commercial Contracts and Dispute Settlement 
	
The law of arbitration, as it has evolved beyond the state and internationally, 
establishes a distinction between law of the contract and the governing law of 
the Arbitral Tribunal. In accordance with the principle of party autonomy, the 
contracting parties have freedom to nominate which national laws will govern 
the substantive law applicable to the contract, the curial law applicable to 
arbitration proceedings and the law of the seat of arbitration (the law of 
forum).377 In international commercial arbitration, the choice of law can be 
implied by the terms of the agreement. In deciding what rules ought to apply in 
the event of a conflict, a properly constituted arbitral may be called upon to 
																																																						
377 J Huleatt-& Gould N., ‘International commercial arbitration: a handbook’, (1999 2PndP ed., LLP, 
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decide among the laws of the relevant legal systems to arrive at a decision.378 
The law applicable to the contract will have a significant impact on the tribunal’s 
interpretation of the rights and obligations arising from the contract in dispute.379 
The law of the seat of the arbitration or lex arbitri is generally determined in 
accordance with the governing procedures of the tribunal. These procedures 
may be ad hoc (informal or pre-arbitration procedures), or institutionalised.380 In 
the latter of the above examples, tribunals are given wider latitude to auto-
determine their own competency and jurisdiction to consider the admissibility 
and merits of a dispute referred to them.381 
It is also worth mentioning the law of the arbitration agreement. While the law of 
the arbitration agreement is usually the same as the substantive law of the 
contract, this is not always the case. In most cases, the applicable law of the 
contract is the same as the substantive law of the arbitration agreement. In 
exceptional circumstances, however, there may be a variance between specific 
clauses and the law governing the arbitration agreement. The next sections will 
examine the cases in which the applicable choice of law of an arbitration, and 
the underlying contract, in Saudi-seated arbitration interacts or even collides 
with other key principles of international commercial law and dispute 
settlement.382  
 
The law of contracts underpins all commercial transactions. In common law 
jurisdictions, contractual parties enjoy the autonomy to determine the terms of 
the contract to which they are bind and the laws that will govern a case should a 
dispute arise.383 The choice of law plays an important role in arbitration 
																																																						
378 For a general discussion see See C.A. Whytock, The Arbitration-Litigation Relationship in 
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380 For example, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) recommends: ‘Any disputes 
arising out of connection with this contract, including any questions regarding its existence, validity or 
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are deemed to be incorporated by reference into this clause’. 
381 For example in art. 16 (1) of the Model Law: ‘The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, 
including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.’ 
382 G. Leventhal, ‘The New Saudi Arbitration Law: Modernization to the Tune of Shari’a’, (2013) 20 J. 
Int’l. Arb. 2, 13-3. 
383 For a general discussion see R Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford University Press, 
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procedure. Thus, to the extent that the Saudi Arbitration Law is implicated as 
either the procedural or substantive law governing a dispute or the law 
governing the enforcement of an arbitral award, it is crucial to have a sound 
understanding the Saudi arbitration law’s provisions and its relationship with the 
more widespread international arbitration law and procedures.384 
 
When contemplating using arbitration as a means for resolving commercial 
disputes, it is important that the parties consider their rights, and any 
impediments to enforcing those rights, created by the substantive and 
procedural laws governing both the arbitration proceedings themselves and 
later enforcement efforts. Where there is lack of clarity over the applicable 
choice of law, this can create challenges for the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards due to ‘the traditional notion in some legal systems that 
submission to a national court involves the implied acceptance of its substantive 
law’.385 
 
In conventional contract law practice and theory, a contract is formed when 
there is a meeting of minds between two or more parties who demonstrate a 
clear intention to enter into a contract.386 To avoid disputes over the meaning of 
contractual clauses, contracting parties should make their intentions clear and 
memorialized in writing before concluding a commercial contract, particularly an 
international one, precisely because different legal systems may apply different 
standards and tests for determining the will of the contracting parties.387 For 
example, in certain jurisdictions, a contractual term can be read together with 
other provisions of the state’s own substantive law and may result in a specific 
definition or qualification of a particular term or clause in the disputed contract. 
This is particularly relevant in Islamic legal systems, wherein contracts 
containing non-Shariah compliant terms and provisions, including interest 
																																																						
384 Gus van Houtte, ‘International Arbitration and National Adjudication’, (1983) in C.C.A. Voskuil and 
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385 J Paulsson, N Rawding & L Reed, The Freshfields Guide to Arbitration Clauses in International 
Contracts (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International, 2011) 17. 
386 Fayyad (n 90) 204. 
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related or future clauses, may be rendered void and the offending contractual 
provision consequently nullified, in whole or in part.388 
 
Many scholars have argued that state regulators should develop clear rules and 
principles of contractual law and regulation, thereby enabling commercial 
parties to exercise their contractual rights and obligations in all of their foreign 
and domestic commercial transactions.389 However, in the absence of a uniform 
international standard of contract interpretation, courts across variegated legal 
systems will often determine their willingness to enforce an award arising from 
an arbitral dispute in accordance with that jurisdiction’s applicable rules, often 
resulting in different legal outcomes from one state to another.390 Although it is 
not always possible at the contract drafting stage, the parties should give due 
consideration to the jurisdictions where assets are located and any future 
arbitral award may need to be enforced, and to effectively address any 
foreseeable impediments to enforcement when negotiating the terms of the 
transaction.391 This is a necessary measure for commercial actors who seek to 
eliminate uncertainty or conflict over the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards.392 
 
This raises the important issue of the applicability and legitimate scope of 
national arbitration laws, including contract regulation and other mandatory laws 
in international commercial transactions because the successful party may seek 
recognition and enforcement of their arbitral awards in national courts.393 Some 
international treaties, such as the New York Convention, have been ratified by 
member states, including Saudi Arabia, to achieve harmonisation in 
international arbitration, particularly with regard to the recognition of arbitral 
awards by the enforcing member states’ courts.394 However, in practice, 
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diversity in national arbitration laws often defeats the application of these 
intended uniform standards governing the recognition and enforcement of 
international commercial arbitral awards.395 Where such model standards are 
silent on issues impacting the rights and standing of parties under national laws, 
such as the waiver of grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards before the national courts, state regulators should 
seek to reform their arbitration regimes.396  
 
Reform of national arbitration law should aim to close gaps in the law in a 
manner that best reflects the harmonising aims of international arbitration 
regimes, while eliminating the potential for conflict between national and 
international rules on the finality, arbitrability and separability of arbitration 
awards, disputes and contractual clauses.397 By bridging this gap, disputing 
parties will benefit from strengthened guarantees in the enforcement of their 
rights, even when the implied or express terms of contract are unclear or 
contested. In short, the goal of reform is to ensure the effective enforcement of 
the final decision of the arbitrating body, in accordance with the applicable law 
of the contract.398  
 
Karton argues that in international arbitration the arbitral tribunal applies a law 
that is different from that which is applied by national court judges in the 
resolution of commercial disputes.399 In contrast, Zekos argues that there is no 
difference in the method of resolving a dispute between a court and an arbitral 
tribunal.400 He suggests that ‘a judge derives his authority from the sovereign, 
while an arbitrator derives his authority from the sovereign, but his nomination 
depends on the parties’ agreement’.401 
 
Yet, it has been argued that courts consider arbitration as a competitor of judicial 
trials. The is because arbitrators do not typically act like courts. For example, the 
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control function of courts endows them with broad powers and competence to 
determine matters of justice, including by balancing the rights of contracting 
parties and the public interest in accordance with the wider objectives of national 
law and policies.402 In contrast, arbitrators have a narrower mandate and more 
strictly defined function. More specifically, they will generally be expected to 
adhere the express terms of the contract as faithfully as possible. 403 The 
important point is that arbitration, as a mode of dispute settlement, imbues in 
contractual parties the autonomous freedom to determine the terms of contract 
that bind them, including where and how disputes are to be resolved. Further, 
arbitrators will seek to apply the relevant choice of law, which has been chosen 
by the contracting parties.404 Conversely, judicial authorities are obliged to have 
regard for the rule of law of the state in which the court is seated.405 In practice, 
this means that a country will apply its national arbitration rules when 
contemplating the recognition or enforcement of any arbitral award, international 
or domestic. 
 
It should be emphasised, however, that the mere use of arbitration mechanisms 
does not necessarily eliminate uncertainty over the meaning and usage of 
contractual terms, or conflicts over the best theory or method of contract 
interpretation in the case of dispute.406 Indeed, the prevailing view has been that 
the law of contract will in most cases be assessed in accordance with the 
‘closest connection rule’, which is typically the law of the place in which the 
contract was made and performed. As Nye writes: ‘[T]he general rule is, in 
conformity to the presumed intention of the parties, that the contract, as to its 
validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation, is to be governed by the law of the 
place of performance’.407 
 
It is therefore necessary to examine how the decision to arbitrate disputes arises 
to enable further enquiry into whether contracting parties in their commercial 
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agreements are able to exercise their autonomy in practice under Saudi 
arbitration law.408  
 
 
3.3 The Parties’ Autonomy 
 
Some argue that there is no freedom of contract or true party autonomy 
between the contractual parties in international commercial transactions.409 
Rather, the ‘strong were able to impose unfair and oppressive bargains upon 
those who were weak and vulnerable’.410 To address this issue, state 
legislatures have on occasion intervened to limit the freedom of contracting 
parties to form their contract as a check on this power imbalance.411 While this 
goes against the traditional notions of party autonomy, one can defend of the 
intervention of state legislature’s in the private contract sphere on the grounds 
that dispute resolution and enforcement together form a necessary mechanism 
by which states are able to protect their political prerogatives and the public 
interest.412 In fact, contractual parties often attempt to avoid unfavourable legal 
consequences stemming from the contract by seeking protection from national 
contract regulations of contract on issues like unfair contract terms, equitable 
relief, and the like.413  
 
Every legal system provides parties with the freedom to decide the terms of 
their own contracts in relation to their international commercial transactions. 
Once the terms are agreed to, the contract is binding on the parties. However, 
the burden is on the parties to understand how their chosen dispute resolution 
structure will play out in practice, including the effects of any applicable 
substantive, curial and mandatory provisions of national law (i.e. public policy or 
public order norms). Hence, the parties need to take extra care when drafting 
their commercial agreements and should take into consideration the prevailing 
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positions of the implicated jurisdictions when developing their dispute resolution 
plan. For instance, currently, it should come as no surprise to a party that 
anticipates having to enforce an arbitral award in Saudi Arabia that the award 
needs to comply with Shariah law, even if this was not a requirement of the 
substantive law governing the dispute.  
 
Horn and Schmitthoff further elaborate that contractual parties do not have to 
take into account mandatory laws in the lex contractus (the law of the contract); 
however, the contractual parties should be aware of the mandatory rules 
dictated by the public policies of the states whose laws governing the 
substantive contract and the enforcement of the ultimate arbitral award.414 
Moreover, one can argue that in reality, parties’ autonomy in freely entering into 
contracts is limited mainly by the public policy rules of the state under whose 
law the arbitral awards are eventually recognised and enforced.415 In this 
regard, it has been persuasively argued that the nature of parties’ autonomy in 
international transactions as ‘a hierarchy of dependence, not independence, in 
which the individual’s bargaining position had become inferior to that of the 
organisation with which he was obliged to deal, whether as employee or 
client’.416 
 
In light of the above, one can question whether the principle of party autonomy 
is actually upheld in the resolution of international commercial disputes. 
Experience demonstrates that this principle is largely respected in dispute 
resolution proceedings. However, when the parties’ autonomy and the law 
conflict, it usually stems from the need to enforce an award in an unexpected 
jurisdiction. Different legal systems take different approaches to the 
interpretation of rights and duties of parties engaged in international commercial 
transactions governed by commercial contracts.417 When contractual parties 
draft their agreements, they are often unable to anticipate all potential 
disagreements over terms, changes in circumstance or other matters resulting 
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in future disputes relating to the performance and conclusion of the contracts 
should a dispute arises in the future.418  
 
Parties typically seek effective tools and remedies to enforce their rights or 
settle matters as disputes arise, giving them flexibility to allow for continuation, 
modification or termination of the contract as necessary, including providing for 
the remedies available when contractual terms are breached.419 This approach 
is consistent with the policy principles underlying the concept of party 
autonomy, which is ‘to provide flexibility in the negotiation of security 
agreements rather than restricting them to a uniform set of rules’.420 Flexibility 
can be introduced, as Akseli argues, through ‘minimal use of mandatory rules to 
achieve transparency and predictability of rights’.421 
 
However, when both international and national laws begin to intersect at the 
various stages of resolving a commercial arbitration dispute, concerns are 
raised suggesting that the national law should not govern international 
commercial contracts. Instead, international commercial law or transnational law 
should govern all phases of resolving the dispute. The benefit of this approach 
would be that the common usages of standard contract law terms and their 
definition as embodied by the accepted legal norms are more likely to give 
effect to the contractual terms and obligations agreed by the contracting 
parties.422 This enables international contractual parties to utilise contract 
agreements as their means of planning and controlling their future outcomes.423 
While an ideal approach that allows for phases of dispute resolution to be 
governed by laws chosen by the parties, this fails to address the procedural 
mechanics of recognition and enforcement and the often lack of compatibility 
between the laws from one jurisdiction to another. 
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The idea of applying national law during dispute resolution involving 
international commercial transactions has always been contentious because the 
sources of national law are primarily structured to govern domestic 
transactions.424 This underlines the importance of having a national law that 
reflects current global trends in commercial arbitration and expressly 
contemplates the need to recognise and enforce both foreign and domestic 
arbitral awards. However, when it comes to addressing the substance of the 
dispute, an alternative to identifying a substantive national governing law under 
the choice of law rules would be to allow the arbitrators to resolve the dispute in 
accordance with the lex mercatoria. Under this approach, the arbitrator would 
determine the disputes in accordance with the intention of the contractual 
parties by using lex mercatoria, as it consists of the general principles of law of 
contract and customs and usages of merchants in their commercial 
transactions. In this way, national laws are used to effectuate those awards, 
providing as much credence to the law governing the substance of the dispute 
as is possible.425 
 
Looking at the scope of party autonomy, it is apparent that the applicability of 
the choice-of-law (national legislation) rules and lex mercatoria represent 
radically different approaches to the same problem in international commercial 
transactions.426 However, the purview of these two options is limited to 
substance of the dispute. The closest thing to lex mercatoria when it comes to 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is the New York Convention, 
but it is still often modified by or subject to the member state’s domestic laws 
and policies. 
 
3.4 How National Law Affects Both Domestic and International 
Arbitrations 
 
The principle of sovereign autonomy contends that law making authority is 
within the exclusive purview of the state. The context of arbitration and 
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enforcement law, national arbitration laws often are primarily developed or 
enacted to deal with local or domestic problems.427 When it comes to dealing 
with a national arbitration law, international commercial actors seek to limit their 
exposure to arbitrary interventions by the state, including unfair or unilateral 
modification of contract terms by state parties justified on public policy 
grounds.428 For example, one concern is that a government may amend the 
governing law to its advantage after the contract is made as was the context for 
the Aramco dispute.429 The underlying concern in such situations is the 
perpetual uncertainty over how a dispute relating to international commercial 
transactions will be resolved.430 It should be emphasized that these concerns 
are not just limited to dealings with the state. The possibility that a state will 
amend its laws can also significantly affect future enforcement efforts within a 
particular jurisdiction. 
 
When a prevailing party from an arbitration submits their arbitral award before 
the national courts for recognition and enforcement, the national courts are 
required to give effect to the mandatory rules of the governing state on 
enforcement matters.431 It is at this point that a national court may seek to set 
aside a final arbitral award, which was decided based on foreign national or 
international rules, on the grounds that it violates the public policy principles or 
mandatory provisions of the national law of the enforcing state.432 On the whole, 
it is evident that the rights of international commercial parties are most 
effectively safeguarded when they have a working knowledge of the rules that 
will apply to the operation of a contract and the resolution of a dispute. This 
knowledge will allow them to take measures to protect their contractual rights.433 
 
Considering the above, it becomes clear that that the choice of law governing 
the substance of the dispute is inseparable policies national laws on 
enforcement. The two must be aware of the other’s existence and any award 
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must take into account the jurisdictions in which it is to be enforced for any 
award to be effective. The goal of such foresight is to reduce legal uncertainty in 
international commercial transactions.434 Bearing this in mind it is appropriate to 
briefly discuss the scope of choice of law in international commercial 
transactions. This will help to clarify the importance of choice of law in 
international arbitration, particularly for recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards in the enforcing state. Rules governing the choice 
of law in international commercial contracts are designed to fills any gaps in the 
applicable legislation or indeterminate principles related to the contract, 
therefore bringing about a more effective and stable system for resolving of any 
disputes that arise between the contractual parties.435  
 
3.5 Effect of Choice of Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards  
 
Choice of law is a fundamental principle in international commercial 
contracts.436 By prioritizing the parties’ choice of law in international commercial 
transaction, the arbitrators are able to refrain from undertaking a conflict of laws 
analysis.437 The ability to choose the law governing the dispute is often a large 
draw for parties when deciding to commit to an arbitration clause, but practically 
speaking, the contractual parties cannot determine with absolute certainty every 
rule that will be applicable in resolving their contractual disputes in international 
commercial transactions.438 For example, when applying the chosen procedural 
and curial law for governing the dispute, it is imperative that the arbitrator 
understands what powers the arbitration agreement or arbitration clause 
attempts to confer upon him because such a clause might be invalid under the 
chosen law.439 In this sense, the arbitrator should not only give effect to parties’ 
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autonomy, but also understand how choice of law operates in the international 
arbitration setting, as a failure to properly abide by the chosen governing law 
may be the reason why a national court could refuse to recognise or enforce an 
arbitral awards issued elsewhere.440 
 
Thus, in international arbitrations the arbitrator invariably applies the parties’ 
chosen law,441 rather than the rules of national law or private international 
law.442 Neither does the arbitrator rely on the solutions available from trade 
usage under the lex mercatoria in resolving the dispute.443 The combined 
application of the rules of national law and the principles of lex mercatoria in 
international arbitration is highly controversial, especially where there are no 
generally accepted rules of an arbitrator’s liability in rendering an arbitral 
award.444 Since the arbitrator derives his powers from the parties’ autonomy, 
the arbitrator is also bound to resolve the disputes according to the authority 
conferred upon him by the arbitration agreement or the procedural rules chosen 
by the parties.445 Consequently, if the disputes relates to matters that exceed 
the scope of the arbitration agreement or are otherwise non-arbitral under the 
chosen substantive law, the relevant national courts to which the award is 
submitted for recognition may deem the award invalid and unenforceable.446 
 
Some scholars suggest that as long as national arbitral laws differ, the arbitrator 
must submit to the scope of jurisdiction from the parties’ choice of law when 
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determining the validity of the arbitration agreement.447 For example, arbitrators 
do not have the power to determine a dispute that is outside the scope of his 
authority, unless the contractual parties agree to confer the arbitrator with 
special jurisdiction to decide that particular dispute.448 If such a provision has 
not been consented to by the contracting parties, the award may not have a 
binding effect.449 This presents challenges that may directly impact the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in national courts. Many of these 
challenges stem from the fact that arbitration clauses have a contractual 
character that obliges the parties to arbitrate their disputes before pursuing 
other legal remedies through the courts.450 Thus, one cannot overstate how 
crucial it is that the arbitrator and arbitral parties understand the substantive law 
of the enforcing state, particularly with respect to any mandatory laws with 
which the parties are required to comply in the course of transacting the 
agreement or executing their contractual duties.451 
 
Having spoken about choice of law generally, let us know return the focus to 
Saudi Arabia and the legal tests used to determine the applicability of foreign or 
international laws as judged by the Saudi-mandated system of Shariah law. 
Shariah law is not only embedded in Saudi legislation, but is treated by Saudi 
authorities and subjects as a supreme source of divine law.452 As such, from the 
Saudi perspective, it trumps the applicability of all other legislation. Given the 
importance of the parties understanding the law of the enforcing state, we once 
again confront the perennial challenge of how to improve foreign parties’ and 
arbitrators’ understanding of Saudi arbitration law and its relationship with 
international law.453 
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3.6 Understanding the Recognition and Enforcement of Awards in Saudi 
Arabia 
 
Up to this point, the discussion has focused on the development of arbitration 
practices in Saudi Arabia, the general reforms taking place within the arbitration 
landscape in the Kingdom and the relationship that Shariah principles have in 
various arbitration environments. This section shifts the focus to the practical 
mechanics of arbitral award recognition and enforcement in light of the 
foregoing discussion. 
 
3.6.1 Differentiating Between Domestic and International Arbitration 
 
The first important aspect for assessing the applicability of the laws on the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is to determine what constitutes 
a domestic arbitral award versus an international arbitral award. Prior to the 
2012 law,454 there was significant debate among scholars over the status of 
arbitration proceedings involving Muslim and non-Muslim parties. Generally 
speaking, any arbitration that takes place between Saudi individuals or 
businesses within Saudi Arabia will constitute domestic arbitration proceeding 
and will result in a domestic arbitral award. Additionally, an arbitration taking 
place between a Saudi party and a foreign party seated in Saudi Arabia and 
applying Saudi law would constitute a domestic award. Further, if an arbitration 
relates to a contract performed in Saudi Arabia between two foreign parties and 
the arbitration is seated in Saudi Arabia and governed by Saudi arbitration law, 
this would result in a domestic arbitral award. 
 
Defining what constitutes an international, or foreign, arbitral award is a bit more 
complex. There are a number of circumstances that arguably give rise to a 
foreign arbitral award under Saudi law. First, there is the classic definition of a 
foreign arbitration—an arbitration taking place outside of Saudi Arabia between 
two foreign parties. Under these circumstances, any attempt to enforce the 
foreign arbitral award would likely relate to one party having assets that could 
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be attached to satisfy the award within the Kingdom. Similarly, if the arbitration 
takes place within Saudi Arabia, but all of the parties are foreigners or non-
Muslim citizens, the arbitration may be deemed a foreign arbitration and result 
in a foreign award, depending on the procedural (curial) and substantive laws 
applied in forum of arbitration. Further, it has also been accepted that an 
arbitration taking place abroad between two Saudi parties, even if governed by 
Saudi and Shariah law, may also result in a foreign arbitral award. 
 
The passage of the New Arbitration Law of 2012, helped clarify how the 
Kingdom would view such matters and delineated the circumstances under 
which an arbitration would be international or foreign, thereby resulting in a 
foreign arbitral award. Article 3 of the New Arbitration Law provides that an 
arbitration shall be international if the dispute relates to international commerce 
and one of the following occurs: if the parties have their head offices in more 
than one country at the time the arbitration agreement is concluded; if the 
parties have their office in the same country but either the arbitration venue is 
outside of that country, the place where the contract is performed is outside of 
that country, or the place most connected to the subject matter of the dispute is 
outside of that country; both parties agree to submit the dispute to an arbitral 
institution outside of Saudi Arabia; or finally if the dispute covered by the 
arbitration agreement is connected to more than one country.455 
 
The importance of this distinction relates to the national judge’s power in 
reviewing and enforcing an arbitral award. In the case of foreign awards, the 
judge is limited to considerations of whether the law complies with the Shariah 
provisions of Islamic law. If the law does not comply with the prohibitions or 
authorizations adhered to in Saudi society, a judge may refuse to enforce the 
award on public policy grounds. The standards that are generally accepted for 
public policy refusals is if the award represents a flagrant injustice or is contrary 
to Islamic morals. If the award is a domestic award, the judge has slightly 
broader authority in that the underlying proceedings would have been governed 
by Shariah law and the award should also be Shariah compliant. If the award is 
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not compliant, then the court can set aside the award under the New Saudi 
Arbitration Law. 
 
3.6.2 When Does the Saudi Arbitration Law Apply? 
 
Simply put, the New Saudi Arbitration law applies by default to any arbitration 
taking place within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to any international 
commercial arbitration should the parties agree to submit to Saudi law. This 
latter circumstance is a possibility that the old arbitration law did not 
contemplate.456  
 
Article 2 of the New Arbitration Law delineates when arbitral proceedings are 
subject to Saudi Law. It is important to note that Shariah law always take 
precedence over codified laws. Specifically, Article 2 provides that the terms of 
the law are ‘[w]ithout prejudice to provisions of Islamic Sharia’. The article then 
further provides that the arbitration law’s provisions are also subject to any 
‘international conventions to which the Kingdom is a party’. In essence, this 
delineates the hierarchy of applicable law to be Shariah, followed by 
international conventions,457 then Saudi national arbitration law. Accordingly, 
while Article 49 of the new Saudi Arbitration Law implies that awards are final 
and non-appealable, it nevertheless establishes methods for setting certain 
awards aside. For instance, Article 8 allows awards in international commercial 
arbitration to be reviewed by a competent Riyadh Court of Appeals (unless 
agreed to otherwise). In practice, this means that Shariah law and the Saudi 
Arbitration Law will apply to domestic arbitrations; whereas foreign arbitrations 
will be subject to the parties’ choice of law coupled with international treaties, 
then subject to Shariah to the extent that a party seeks to enforce an arbitral 
award within the Kingdom. 
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In determining the circumstances in which Saudi national law will apply, Article 
2 holds that: ‘[T]his Law shall apply to any arbitration regardless of the nature of 
the legal relationship of the dispute, if [the] arbitration takes place in the 
Kingdom or is an international commercial arbitration taking place abroad and 
the parties thereof agree that the arbitration be subject to the provisions of this 
law’.458 Thus, it is now possible for parties conducting arbitrations outside the 
Kingdom to choose to apply Saudi law to facilitate the easier enforcement of 
arbitral awards within Saudi Arabia.459 However, while the law applies generally 
to commercial matters, there are certain commerce subject matters where the 
Arbitration Law does not apply.460 These include personal status matters, 
criminal matters, public matters and administrative law matters—circumstances 
that the Kingdom has determined are not suitable for referral to arbitration.461 
 
One marked difference between the old Saudi arbitration law and the new law, 
is the old arbitration law subjected arbitration to the supervision of Saudi 
national courts, thus involving the judiciary in proceedings that by their nature 
are intended to private and autonomous.462 The two most common phases of 
dispute resolution in which the courts would become involved were at the 
initiation of proceedings and the enforcement of awards. The court’s 
involvement was founded on the argument that it was responsible for ensuring 
the compliance of the proceedings with Shariah law. In reality, this often 
resulted in a full review of the dispute by the courts.463 Under the New 
Arbitration Law, this scope of review has been tailored. While the courts still 
perform a supervisory role to some extent, the permissible lines of inquiry are 
limited as explained in the following section. 
 
																																																						
458 Saudi Arbitration Law 2012, art 3. 
459 See H.Mohd. Sharif Al Mulla, Conventions of Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Arab States, 
14 ARAB L. Q. 33, 55 (1999) (who explains that judicial authority has no warrant to examine merits of 
the case when enforcement is sought under the Arab League Convention). 
460 J. Ahmed, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Some Arab Countries—Legal Provisions and Court 
Precedents: Focus on Bahrain’, (1999)14 Arab L. Q. 169, 173.  
461 Arbitration Law 2012, art 2. 
462 Ali Al-Khasawneh, ‘The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law: A Comparative Examination of the Law and Its 
Effect on Arbitration in Saudi Arabia’ (2015) 13(2) Santa Clara Journal of International Law 443, 445. 
463 See Essam Al Tamimi, The Practitioner’s Guide to Arbitration in the Middle East and North Africa 
(2009) 371. 
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3.6.3 Key Aspects of the New Arbitration Law 
 
While Chapter 2 focused on the reasons for Saudi arbitration reform, this 
section explores some of the key aspects of the new arbitration law. The 2012 
Arbitration Law represents a more comprehensive approach to governing 
arbitration in Saudi Arabia than has ever existed in the past. Primarily, the New 
Arbitration Law simplified the dispute resolution process and streamlined the 
process and requirements for enforcing arbitral awards. The current Saudi 
Arbitration line aligns itself with many global trends in commercial arbitration, 
which is no doubt the result of the legislature taking heavy inspiration from the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. 
 
Among the more ADR friendly provisions contained in the New Arbitration Law 
are: affording greater independence to the arbitral process; enhancing and 
clarifying the procedural powers of the arbitral tribunal; and streamlining the 
process for the enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards 
through the national courts.464 Among other important features, the new law 
permits the separability of an arbitration agreement from the remainder of the 
commercial contract and expressly recognizes the parties’ autonomy to make 
decisions regarding the applicable procedural and substantive laws, the venue, 
arbitral tribunal composition and other procedural matters. However, all actions 
taken, and decisions made, during the arbitral process must still comply with 
Shariah principles. This modernisation of the arbitration framework was an 
attempt to harmonise the Islamic jurisprudence of the Hanbali school with the 
prevailing developments in the world of modern commercial arbitration. 465 
 
With regard to arbitral awards specifically, the New Arbitration Law provides 
clear legal guidelines for the nullification of arbitral awards. This change helped 
close a significant gap in the prior arbitration law that did not address 
																																																						
464 Kaggiani (n 310) 16. 
465 Article 1 of the Basic Law of Government which delineates the powers of state organs, and sometimes 
described the Constitution states that its legal system is founded upon ‘the Book of God (the Quran) and 
the Sunnah of his Prophet. The Basic Law partially fulfills the role of the Constitution as it organizes the 
rules of power’.  
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nullification.466Under the old law, award nullification was considered on a case-
by-cases basis, taking into account the form and merits of the award. This 
process often added significant time and expense to the arbitral process. This 
new nullification procedure clarifies the bases on which an award can be 
invalidated and brings the Saudi arbitration regime in line with contemporary 
arbitral standards. 
 
Next, the law has addressed the circumstances under which an award be 
appealed. As suggested above, Article 49 of the New Arbitration Law provides 
that an award can only be appealed on the grounds that the award is invalid. 
The law further elaborates on these grounds by delineating the reasons for 
which an award can be declared invalid in Article 50. Part of the appeal process 
is asking that the court set aside the award on the grounds that the award is 
invalid. Yet, notably under Article 54 of the new law, a challenge to validity of 
the award does not result in an automatic stay of enforcement proceedings. 
This is an instance where the court is provided with broader discretion to 
determine whether the request to set aside the award or the request to stay 
enforcement are based on ‘serious reasons’. Unfortunately, the law does not 
define what constitutes a ‘serious reason’, but one scholar suggests that any 
reason to believe an award violates Shariah or public policy would likely be 
sufficient to warrant a stay of enforcement.467 
 
3.6.4 How Awards Are Rendered 
 
Once arbitral tribunals have been initiated, there is typically a timeframe within 
which the arbitral tribunal must issue the arbitral award. While this will vary 
depending on the procedural rules governing the arbitral proceedings, under the 
New Saudi Arbitration Law the tribunal has twelve months from the start of the 
proceedings to issue an award, with the ability to extend this deadline for an 
additional six months if needed.468 If an award is not rendered within the 
designated time period, either party may request that the arbitration 
																																																						
466 AH El Ahdab and J El Ahdab Arbitration with the Arab Countries (Kluwer Law International; Kluwer 
Law International 2011) pp. 593 – 671. 
467 Ibid 29. 
468 Saudi Arbitration Law 2012, art 40. 
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proceedings be terminated and jurisdiction over the dispute transferred to the 
courts.  
 
Additionally, there are requirements on the number of arbitrators that must 
agree on the outcome of the proceedings for an award to be made. Under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, the parties are permitted to agree on how the arbitrators 
may issue the award.469 However, the New Arbitration Law requires that a 
majority of the arbitrators agree on the award and the parties are unable to 
override this provision by agreeing otherwise.470 
 
Further, both foreign arbitration laws and the New Arbitration Law set forth 
certain requirements that must be met with regard to the form and contents of 
the arbitral award. Those under the New Arbitration Law are actually more 
formal than those required by the UNCITRAL Model Law and most other 
jurisdictions. First, the arbitral awards must be in writing and signed by the 
arbitrators.471 The award must also clearly state the reasons upon which the 
award is issued in all proceedings, the parties may not opt out of this 
requirement.472 Finally, the New Arbitration Law requires the following details to 
be clearly presented in the arbitral award: the date and place of issuance of the 
award; the names and addresses of the parties; the names, titles, addresses, 
and nationalities of the arbitrators; a summary of the arbitration agreement, the 
parties’ oral and written pleadings, applications, documents, and any expert 
reports; the verdicts; and the arbitrators’ fees, arbitration expenses, and the 
allocation of these expenses among the parties.473 
 
Once the award is drafted and signed by the arbitrators, the award must be 
delivered to the parties within fifteen days of its issuance. Further, the award 
may not be published unless the parties expressly agree to its publication in 
writing.474 
 
																																																						
469 UNCITRAL Model Law, art 29. 
470 Saudi Arbitration Law 2012, art 39. 
471 Ibid art 42. 
472 Ibid. 
473 Ibid. 
474 Ibid art 43. 
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3.6.5 Finality of Arbitral Awards 
 
Part of the appeal of arbitration proceedings is that arbitral decisions are final.475 
The New Saudi Arbitration Law recognizes this principle to a certain extent, 
providing that ‘[a]rbitration awards rendered in accordance with the provisions of 
this Law are not subject to appeal, except for an action to nullify an arbitration 
award filed in accordance with the provisions of this Law’.476 Such an action to 
nullify is essentially a limited form of appeal of the arbitral decision to competent 
courts. In determining the appropriate court to file an appeal, Article 8 provides 
that ‘[t]he court of appeal originally deciding the dispute shall have jurisdiction to 
consider an action to nullify the arbitration award and matters referred to the 
competent court pursuant to this Law’.477 Further, when an international 
commercial arbitration is involved, ‘the court of appeal originally deciding the 
dispute in the city of Riyadh shall have jurisdiction, unless the two parties to 
arbitration agree on another court of appeal within the Kingdom’.478 The limited 
grounds on which an action to nullify award can brought include: the lack of or 
invalidity of an arbitration agreement; a party’s lack of capacity when entering 
into an arbitration agreement; insufficient notice to a party to the arbitration to 
allow him to present a defence; if the tribunal failed to apply the rules agreed 
upon by the parties; if the appointment of arbitrators is inappropriate and in 
violation of the arbitration law; if the award exceeds the scope of the issues 
presented for arbitration; or if the award is made without regard to conditions 
affecting its substance or as the result of void arbitration proceedings.479 
 
3.6.6 Enforcement of Arbitral Awards  
 
The Enforcement of Arbitration Awards is governed by Chapter 7 of the New 
Arbitration Law. Specifically, it provides that an ‘arbitration award rendered in 
accordance with this Law shall have the authority of a judicial ruling and shall be 
																																																						
475 The principle of finality of the award and authority of a tribunal to determine their own competence to 
decide issues is partially codified in Article 19 of the 1975 ICC Rules and Article 25 (1) of the 1998 ICC 
Rules. 
476 Ibid art 49. 
477 Ibid art 8(1). 
478 Ibid art 8(2). 
479 Ibid art 50. 
	104	
	
enforceable’.480 To enforce an arbitral award, ‘a party must file a request for 
enforcement with the competent court and the competent court shall issue an 
order for enforcement accompanied by an original or attested copy of the 
award, a true copy of the arbitration agreement, an Arabic translation of the 
award if not issued in Arabic, and proof of deposit of the award with the 
competent court’. 481 
 
Additionally, Article 55 of the new law sets forth three conditions that must be 
met and verified by the competent court before an arbitral award will be 
enforced. First, the award must not contradict any award or decision rendered 
by a court, board or committee having jurisdiction over the settlement of the 
dispute in Saudi Arabia. Second, the award must not violate Shariah or any 
other form of public policy in the Kingdom. Finally, the party against whom the 
award is to be enforced must have been properly notified. These requirements 
mirror the provisions of the arbitration laws of neighbouring Middle Eastern 
countries, including the UAE and Qatar.482 
 
3.6.6.1 Enforcement of Domestic Arbitral Awards  
 
In a domestic arbitration, a Saudi court will consider and apply the provisions of 
the national arbitration law, in this case the New Arbitration Law, along with 
Shariah principles when determining whether to recognize or enforce the 
arbitral award. When an arbitral award is issued through proceedings conducted 
in accordance with national arbitration laws, most schools hold that these 
awards are de facto enforceable.483 However, the issue with enforcement is that 
arbitrators themselves do not have the authority or ability to enforcement the 
award or compel the parties to comply. Thus, award enforcement necessitates 
the cooperation of competent national courts to effectuate arbitral awards in the 
event a part does not voluntarily comply. As a general rule, the newly 
established enforcement judge is limited in what it may consider during 
																																																						
480 Ibid art 52. 
481 Ibid. 
482 For a historical overview see Brower & Sharpe, ‘International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The 
Third Phase,’ (2003) 97 AJIL pp. 643, 647. 
483 Ahdab & El-Ahdab (n 253) 49. 
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recognition and enforcement proceedings.484 Article 2 of the new Enforcement 
Law, authorizes the Enforcement Tribunal to review and enforce such awards 
related to commercial, private, and international matters. Notably, Article 10 
provides allows for any decision of the Enforcement Judge to be appealed to 
the Supreme Administrative Body of the Board. 485 The review jurisdiction of the 
enforcement judge is not clear, and a degree of uncertainty surrounds the basis 
on which the Judge can refuse to enforce a judgment deemed to contravene 
Shariah law.486One possible reading is that while a judge may not use an 
enforcement action as an opportunity to review and opine on the substantive 
merits or reasonableness of the arbitral award it is, however, authorised the 
scrutinise the procedural conditions in determining the validity of the award.487 
This includes considering whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate, 
whether the award was, in fact, rendered by the arbitrators, and whether the 
award deals with the subject of the dispute. If there the judge finds procedural 
defects or issues with the arbitral proceedings, the judge may refuse to 
recognise or enforce the arbitral award.488 In fact, depending on the 
circumstances, a judge may even completely set aside the award if he 
determines that it amounts to a flagrant error, an injustice to the parties, or is 
contrary to public policy.489 
 
																																																						
484 The execution judge now assumes review functions once reserved for Board of Grievances, was only 
recently introduced New Enforcement laws which came into effect on March 2013 by issue of Royal 
Decree No. M/53 (the ‘Enforcement law 2013’ hereinafter) in parallel to the Saudi Arbitration Law 2012. 
Under the 2007 Board of Grievances Law, parties who sought enforcement of arbitral awards before the 
Board were often exposed to entire retrials of an original dispute based on the merits of Shariah law. 
Article 13(g), The Board of Grievances Law 2007.  
485 The New Enforcement Law, Royal Decree No. M/53 of Sha’ban 1433 Hejra corresponding to July 3, 
2012, Georgian. 
486 Article 11 of the new Enforcement Law states that the Enforcement Judge may enforce a foreign 
arbitral award only on the basis of principles of reciprocity and if the party seeking enforcement can 
ensure that (i) Saudi courts, specifically the commercial courts of Board of Grievance, do not have 
jurisdiction with regards to the dispute, (ii) the award was rendered following proceedings in compliance 
with the requirements of due process, (iii) the award is in final form as per the law of the seat of the 
arbitration, (iv) the award does not contradict a judgment or order issued on the same subject by a judicial 
authority of competent jurisdiction in Saudi Arabia, and (v) the award does not contain any clauses which 
contradict Saudi public policy. 
487 See, e.g., N. B. Turck, Resolution of Disputes in Saudi Arabia, (1991) 6 Arab L.Q. 3, 4 (explaining 
that Saudi Arabian courts continue to asset general jurisdiction over any commercial dispute before 
them); 
488 Ibid. For general reference see Board of Grievance Case No. 944/1/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), decision of 
the Review Committee No. 116/T/1 of 1988 (1408 AH). 
489 Ala Eddine, Muine Al-Mahakkam (1973) 25. 
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Exercised appropriately this judicial enforcement review authority is intended to 
serve a supervisory function over domestic arbitral proceedings to ensure that 
they are being conducted in compliance with the governing national laws. 
However, in practice, judges have difficulty limiting their scope of consideration 
with regard to the issues presented before them and often engage in a review of 
the merits in making their determinations. We might draw an analogy from US 
law to argue that this amounts to an impermissible ‘second level of jurisdiction’ 
over the arbitral award.490 
 
3.6.6.2 Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards  
 
Increasingly, there little support for the argument that enforcement of a foreign 
arbitration award should be set aside on public policy grounds.491 In the US, for 
instance, the enforceability of both foreign arbitral awards and agreements to 
arbitrate is widely upheld, even though public policy exceptions are frequently 
invoked.492 US courts have consequently enforced foreign awards involving non 
US parties, even when ‘a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic 
context’.493 The US jurisdiction consequently is a paradigmatic example of a 
jurisdiction which favours arbitration agreements, regardless of whether these 
contravene the procedural and substantive policies a state.494		
	
																																																						
490 For a general discussion, see Cedric Ryngaert, ‘A Reasonable Exercise In Jurisdiction’ in Jurisdiction 
In International Law (2nd Edition Oxford University Press, 2015) 14. 
491 Most national jurisdictions have enacted or amended their national arbitration law with the aim of 
substantially limiting the grounds on which an award can be set aside. This trend notwithstanding, many 
jurisdictions do provide warrant for national courts to challenge awards on grounds of lack of jurisdiction 
or procedural irregularities. In English law, courts may hear appeals against an award on the merits (e.g. 
on a point of law). However, even in the UK, natural justice remedies, including judicial review of arbitral 
awards, may, nonetheless, be excluded from an arbitration agreement with the consent of all parties. Civil 
jurisdictions have followed suit. For instance, Belgium amended its Uniform Law of 1972 in 1985, which 
significantly the grounds on which an arbitral award issued in a delocalized forum to be set aside (which 
were limited to those procedures where a party with a connection to Belgium was party to the dispute). 
See generally, A. Samuel, Jurisdictional problems in International commercial arbitration: A Study of 
Belgian, Dutch, English, French, Swedish, Swiss, U.S. and West Germany, (Schulthess polygraphischer 
Verlag, Zurich, 1989) p.2-8. 
492 H Xiao, Refusing Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under Article V(2) of the New York 
Convention in China: From the Judicial Experience of Europe and U.S.A., (2005) 2 US-China L. Rev. 51, 
54 available at www.jurist.org.cn/doc/uclaw200507/uclaw20050707.pdf.  
493 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985). 
494 X Qiu, Enforcing Arbitral Awards involving Foreign Parties: A Comparison of the United States and 
China 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 607, 620 (2000). 
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International arbitral awards bring with them a dichotomous struggle for the 
courts in Islamic states. Many Middle Eastern countries have begun to construct 
public policy defences more narrowly in respect of enforcement proceedings.495 
Lebanon, a prime example of a country which has made significant efforts in 
this direction, has incorporated a provision in its national arbitration which 
provides a more limited exception of ‘international public policy’.496 The 
implication that the invocation of a public policy defence as the basis for refusal 
or non-enforcement would only stand if the awards were found to infringe 
international norms of morality and justice, including customary principles of 
sanctity of contract or pacta sunt servanda497 (in addition to other international 
norms or rules of treaty interpretation such as rebus sic stanibilus).498  
 
Let us now consider the perspective of Saudi Arabia. Islamic laws recognise 
that non-Muslims are free to conduct their business relationship as they please 
and are not limited to the religious values and prohibitions contained under 
Shariah law.499 However, if a Muslim becomes a party to the contract, then 
Shariah law is implicated and the contract must comply with its provisions.500 In 
practice this means that non-Muslims can enter into contracts that would be 
prohibited between Muslims or if a Muslim was a party to the contract. Yet, the 
implications of Shariah go beyond applicability to the contract itself and are 
implicated when attempting to enforce an international arbitral award within the 
Kingdom regardless of whether Shariah was applicable to the substance of the 
																																																						
495 Mark Wakim, ‘Public Policy Concerns Regarding Enforcement of Foreign International Arbitral 
Awards in the Middle East’ (2008) 21 New York International Law Review 1, 27. See also J. Y. Gotanda, 
Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages: Is the Tide Changing?,(2007) 45 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 507, 512–13. 
496 For a general discussion see Faisal Kutty, The Shari’a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration, 
(2006) 28 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 565, 593. 
497 This refers to the principle of ‘changed circumstances’ The rebus sic stantibus doctrine is regarded as a 
general principle of international law, as embodied by Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 1969, see Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 ICJ 92 (Sept. 25), Other 
emerging norms of the international community, including access to justice, including rules on the 
protection of aliens, access to justice, fundamental human rights. 
498 In Sapphire Int’l Petroleums Ltd. V. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 ILR 136 (1963) at ¶ 51, the tribunal 
averred that sancity of contract is a ‘fundamental principle of law which is constantly being proclaimed 
by international courts, that contractual obligation undertaken must be respected. The rule ‘pacta sunt 
servanda’ is the basis of every contractual relationship’. 
499 H S Shaaban, ‘Commercial Transaction in the Middle East: What Law Governs?’ (1999) 31 Law and 
Policy in International Business 157 ,158. 
500 J McKormack, ‘Commercial Contracts in Muslim countries of the Middle East: A comparison with the 
United States’ (2009) 37 Int’l J. Legal Inf. Available at: 
<http://works.bepress.com/jacqueline_mccormack/1> last accessed 9/12/2017.  
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dispute. This stems from the requirement of Shariah compliance with all actions 
taken by the court, including in enforcement activities. 
 
Foreign or international arbitral awards are enforced in Saudi Arabia pursuant to 
its status as a signatory of the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Saudi Arabia became a party to the 
New York Convention on April 19, 1994. The Convention requires that all 
signatory states must recognize the arbitration agreements and awards issued 
by other member states.501 By acceding to the Convention, the Kingdom hoped 
to increase its position in the modern international commercial community.502 
This served as a signal to the world that Saudi Arabia was abandoning its mere 
tolerance of arbitration in the aftermath of the ARAMCO proceeding and 
becoming more welcoming to commercial arbitration practices within the 
Kingdom.503 The hope was that its adoption of the New York Convention would 
increase foreign investors’ confidence in engaging in commercial activities in 
the KSA because they would know that the Saudi courts would honour a 
dispute adjudicated by a non-Saudi tribunal.504 However, in practice this is not 
always the case. In contrast with other ‘arbitration friendly’ Middle Eastern 
jurisdictions, Saudi Arabia adopts a more ambivalent approach as to the public 
policy standards that may be considered on review during enforcement 
proceedings.505Notably, prior to its accession to the New York Convention, 
Saudi Arabia asserted it sovereign right to require	 petitioners seeking 
enforcement of their foreign arbitral awards to allow for domestic review of 
entire merits of the dispute.506 
 
3.6.6.3 Reasons for Refusing to Enforce an Arbitral Award 
 
																																																						
501 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,21 U.S.T. 
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
502 John C Hoppe, ‘Saudi Arabia’ in Dennis Cambell (ed), Legal Aspects of Doing Business in the Middle 
East (1986) 157, 192. 
503 ‘Saudis Accept New York Convention’ (1994) June Dispute Resolution Journal 25. 
504 Ibid. 
505 See K. T. Roy, Note, The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public 
Policy Defense to Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?, (1995)18 Fordham Int’l L.J. 
920, 936–37. 
506 Saudi Arabia’s Decision on New York Convention Praised, RIYADH DAILY, Feb. 8, 1994. 
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Despite the binding nature of arbitral awards, there are limited circumstances 
under which the competent court may refuse to recognise or enforce an arbitral 
award, either foreign or domestic. The most commonly used grounds for 
refusing to enforce an arbitral award is that the award violates Saudi Arabia’s 
public policy. 
 
3.6.6.3.1 Refusing to Enforce Domestic Awards 
 
There are two points at which the courts can refuse to enforce an arbitral award. 
The first is when a party brings an action to nullify the award. Under the New 
Arbitration Law, ‘[t]he competent court considering the nullification action shall, 
on its own initiative, nullify the award if it violates the provisions of Sharia and 
public policy in the Kingdom’.507 The second circumstance is when a party 
attempts to enforce an arbitral award. When filing the request for enforcement 
with the competent court, the court can evaluate the awards compliance with 
Shariah principles and may sua sponte refuse to recognise or enforce any 
arbitral award that violates public policy.  
 
In Saudi Arabia, public policy equates to Shariah laws and principles.508 This is 
supported by a passage in the Hadith that state ‘Muslims must comply with 
contractual provisions except for those which authorize what is forbidden or 
forbid what is authorized’. Taymiya further explains this quote, stating that ‘[t]he 
rule in contracts and provisions is that anything is permitted which is valid and 
that only what is forbidden or annulled by the text of by ‘Qiyas’ (reasoning by 
analogy) is forbidden’.509 Simple examples of contracts or awards that would 
violate public policy include ones that contain gharar or riba. 
       
3.6.6.3.2 Refusing to Enforce Foreign Awards 
 
As noted in the preceding section, Saudi Arabia’s accession to the New York 
Convention commits the Kingdom to cooperating with the enforcement of 
																																																						
507 Saudi Arbitration Law 2012, art 50(2). 
508 Hassan Mahasni, ‘Islamic Law is a Main Part of Saudi Public Policy’ (Conference in Jeddah, January 
20, 1977). 
509 The Fatawa of Ibn Taymiya, III, 263. 
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foreign arbitral awards with the KSA. However, the New York Convention 
provides that a contracting state can refuse to recognise or enforce a foreign 
arbitral award when doing so would violate that state’s public policy if the state 
makes a reservation to the Convention under Article V(2)(b). Saudi Arabia is 
such a state. Thus, under the New York Convention, Saudi Arabia is within its 
rights to refuse to enforce an arbitral award it deems contrary to public policy, 
which generally means contrary to Shariah principles. 
 
In practice, Saudi Arabian courts have engaged in the de novo review of 
commercial disputes via public policy objections to the awards. While normative 
principles require that the Convention’s public policy exception be narrowly 
construed, Saudi Arabia has routinely used a broad interpretation to justify its 
refusal to enforce foreign arbitral awards. This practice has caused the New 
York Convention to lose much of its force within the Kingdom and is a 
contributing factor in why Saudi Arabia continues to come under scrutiny in the 
realm of arbitration. One troubling aspect of the 2012 Arbitration Law is that it 
does not constrict the national courts’ ability to interject itself to evaluate the 
substance of the award,510 but the process of legislative and judicial reform 
provides a clean slate for the Kingdom to create new practices and 
interpretations. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, it is imperative that the principles of party autonomy 
and respect for both national and foreign laws should be balanced in 
international commercial transactions, particularly in resolving international 
commercial disputes. The mere freedom to choose the applicable law is not 
sufficient to protect the rights and autonomy of states, their citizens and their 
investors. To combat the problem of legal uncertainty arising from the legal risk 
of non-enforcement of foreign awards, both parties to a contract need to gain a 
clear and complete understanding of the state’s regulation of contracts. They 
will also have to take particular care to rule out any ambiguity over the express 
or implied meanings of any terms that are open to interpretative dispute, 
																																																						
510 Arbitration Law 2012, art 50(4). 
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thereby ensuring that any provisions or language used in the arbitration 
agreement reflects the objectives or intent of the parties a dispute arise.511 
Arbitrators are tasked with resolving these disputes without infringing the 
provisions of either the choice of law governing the dispute or the mandatory 
law, contractual or regulatory, of the enforcement state. Absent consideration of 
the latter, parties face the risk that the award rendered, whether by a Saudi 
seated or foreign arbitral body, will not be enforced.  
 
As to the remaining challenges, it has been noted that there is still a degree of 
hesitation and confusion among international contracting parties about the 
application of both Shariah law and the national Saudi Arbitration Law in 
resolving international commercial disputes. This chapter explained how a 
better understanding on the part of these foreign parties would result in a more 
effective approach to international commercial arbitration, and one with a higher 
probability that non-Saudi seated or choice-of-law governed arbitral awards will 
be recognised and enforced by Saudi courts. It is well recognised commercial 
parties have sought to exclude Saudi legal system as the applicable ‘choice of 
law’, precisely because of the fear that local courts and authorities will apply 
Shariah to the arbitration, or underlying contract. Instead, these foreign parties 
may prefer to rely exclusively on non-Saudi arbitral law or international law. 
However, this often creates problems when some aspect of the dispute relates 
to Saudi Arabia. As emphasised earlier in this chapter, when arbitrators and the 
courts are tasked with determining disputes relating to international commercial 
contracts, the choice of law by international contracting parties plays a vital role. 
As such, when it is foreseeable that an award will need to be enforced in Saudi 
Arabia, the contract should be construed reasonably by the arbitral tribunal 
according to the Saudi regulations for recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards. 
 
As far as the notion of parties’ autonomy in international commercial 
transactions is concerned, this chapter posits that international contracting 
parties are not able to enjoy absolute freedom in their international contracts 
																																																						
511 S Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Global Constitutional and Administrative 
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under any circumstances due to the impositions imposed by the states in which 
they need to enforce an arbitral award. Further, intervention by the state 
through regulations could limit the parties’ autonomy for the simple fact that 
state reserves in the right to take any measures necessary to protect its 
sovereign prerogatives and the wider public interest, including by refusing to 
enforce an award, domestic or foreign, on public policy or Sharia related 
grounds. 
 
The purpose of this lengthy discussion of autonomy and the relationship 
between the choice of law governing the arbitration to the law of the 
enforcement jurisdiction is to demonstrate the importance of understanding the 
state’s relevant substantive law before the international commercial parties 
choose it as the applicable contract law. The examples in this chapter illustrate 
that international contracting parties’ and arbitrators often have fail to recognize 
or fully understand how Shariah principles apply in the context of arbitration 
disputes involving Saudi Arabia or enforcement within the Kingdom. This 
emphasises that the real challenge to effective recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia may actually lie in the 
misunderstanding or incorrect interpretation of Saudi regulations in international 
arbitration.  
 
Having explored in detail the nature of commercial contracts, party autonomy 
and the relationship of the substantive choice of law to recognition and 
enforcement, this chapter then turned to an analysis of issues arising in 
enforcement within Saudi Arabia. First, a discussion was had on the basic 
implications of Shariah and the role it plays in the background of all disputes 
that are in someone tied to the Kingdom, whether through one of the parties, 
the performance of the contract or the need to enforce an award within the 
Kingdom. Next, the chapter began to breakdown the provisions of the New 
Arbitration Law and demonstrated the differences in the applicability of laws to 
foreign and domestic arbitrations and the different instruments under which 
arbitral awards are enforced in domestic versus foreign arbitrations. This section 
ended by touching on the public policy reasons that Saudi Arabia can refuse to 
enforce an arbitral award. The following chapter will explore this grounds for 
non-enforcement in greater detail, with the hope of ultimately being able to 
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make actionable suggestions to contracting parties about how to account for 
Shariah principles when drafting their contracts and arbitration agreements. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE ROLE OF SHARIAH IN SAUDI ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Shariah law is ingrained in all aspects of the arbitral process in Saudi Arabia. 
From the development of Saudi arbitration laws to the conducting of domestic 
arbitral proceedings to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, Shariah 
compliance remains a prominent issue for consideration by both the parties and 
the arbitral tribunal when rendering arbitral awards. This reflects the immutable 
nature of Shariah in all aspects of Muslim life, such that it has achieved the 
status inviolable public policy. 
 
The goal of this chapter is to explore the role of Shariah in arbitration 
proceedings and ascertain the impact that it has for both domestic and foreign 
arbitral awards. This chapter begins with a discussion of why understanding the 
role of Shariah in Saudi arbitration practice is important. It then looks at how 
Shariah is incorporated into the various aspects of domestic arbitration 
proceedings and those international arbitration proceedings that voluntarily 
subject themselves to the application of Saudi Arabia’s arbitration law. It is 
necessary to understand how Shariah law intersects with the Saudi arbitration 
law because in order for any arbitral award, domestic or foreign, to be 
enforceable in the Saudi courts, that award must comply with Shariah 
principles. By understanding how the courts evaluate awards within their 
domestic system, one can ascertain the aspects of Shariah law that are 
weighted the most heavily that will likely translate over into the enforcement of 
international arbitral awards within the Kingdom. Finally, this chapter considers 
whether Shariah should be an area of concern for foreign investors or whether it 
is just another form of public policy that must be contended with as the world 
continues to become a globalized and boundless market. 
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4.2 Why Understanding the Role of Shariah Is Important 
 
One of the unique aspects of the New Saudi Arbitration Law, which makes it 
different from other recent Saudi legislative modernization attempts, is that it not 
only seeks to bring the Kingdom’s arbitration laws in-line with prevailing arbitral 
trends worldwide, but also to harmonize the need for modernization with the 
immutable principles of Shariah Law.512 Over the recent decades, parties are 
turning more and more frequently to the use of arbitration as the preferred 
method for resolving their disputes. However, the Islamic world has created an 
enigma for the Western conception of arbitration.  
 
The influence of Shariah in Islamic states and its effects of the acceptance and 
interpretation of arbitration agreements has added another lawyer of complexity 
to arbitration with which practitioners and parties must contend. Given the 
implicit nature of Islamic principles to the Saudi way of life, Shariah is more than 
just a different set of legal regulations; rather, it serves as a primary source of 
law and a guide for all aspects of daily life in the Islamic world. As such, 
compliance with Shariah has become recognized as a regarded form of public 
policy in Islamic states. As economies in the Middle East continue to grow and 
develop513 and foreign commercial actors and businesses continue to seek 
opportunities in the region, it has become more important than ever for non-
Islamic parties to possess a functional understanding of the implications of 
Shariah for arbitral proceedings.514  
 
4.3 The Shariah Roots of Arbitration Proceedings in Saudi Arabia 
 
Shariah and its role in the resolution of disputes through arbitration long pre-
date the development of the first codified Saudi arbitration laws.515 The 
foundation for arbitration procedures in Saudi Arabia, regardless of time or 
																																																						
512 Jean-Pierre Harb & Alexander G Leventhal, ‘The New Saudi Arbitration Law: Modernization to the 
Tune of Shari’a’ (2013) 30 Journal of International Arbitration 113, 113. 
513 E Kurry, ‘The Sitari’a Law Factor in International Commercial Arbitration’ (working paper, 2006) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=898704> last accessed 10 September 2016. 
514 Ahmad Alkhamees, ‘International Arbitration and Shari’a Law: Context, Scope, and Intersections’ 
(2011) 28(3) Journal of International Arbitration 255, 255. 
515 Harb & Leventhal (n 483) 114. 
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cultural setting, is the application of the provisions of Shariah law.516 For the 
Islamic believer, it is a religious duty to learn and observe Shariah law in all 
human endeavours, including international arbitration.517 Muslim states have a 
special duty to adhere to the Islamic religion by integrating Shariah and Fiqh 
into their laws and regulations.518 It has been suggested that Muslim states 
avoid civil strife and advance the public interest (Maslaha)519 because the 
provisions of Shariah provide a pervasive system of norms by which legal, 
political, commercial, or religious discourse can be regulated, but must be 
critically analysed by Fiqh.520 
 
To function in a modern world, most Muslim states have created centralised and 
secular legal systems similar to the civil and common law models adopted in 
most Western countries.521 However, by doing so, the language of the statutes 
and implementing regulations often fail to adhere to and even contravene the 
provisions of Shariah, creating conflicts that engender uncertainty and must be 
resolved.522  
 
When the modern Muslim state courts endeavour to apply a law exclusively 
based on Shariah procedure to resolve disputes, the courts often encounter 
difficulties in adjudicating the disputes because the majority of Shariah-trained 
counsel and judges have limited experience in understanding and interpreting 
modern secular state law.523 For example, An-Na’im contends that Muslims hold 
Shariah as a guide for developing their social and political relationships, but 
																																																						
516 Article 7 of the Basic Law of Governance explains, ‘Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
derives its authority from the Book of God Most High and the Sunna’h of his Messenger, both of which 
govern this law and all the Laws of the State’. See the Royal Order no (A/91), 1 March 1992, Published in 
Umm al-Qura Gazette No 3397. 
517 Mathews argues that Islam is not a part of the world; it is a ‘way of life’. His idea was that Muslim 
believers treat the preaching of Islam, in a more pervasive and important sense, not as a religion, which is 
how it is understood in the typical Western World. See C Mathews, Understanding Religious Ethics 
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 65.  
518 CB Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt, the Incorporation of the Shari’a into 
Egyptian Constitutional Law (Brill, 2006); see also I Abdal-Haqq, ‘Islamic Law: An Overview of Its 
Origin and Elements’, in HM Ramadan, Understanding Islamic Law, From Classical to Contemporary 
(Altamira Press, 2006) 1. 
519 FE Vogel, ‘Shari’a in the Politics of Saudi Arabia’, in MA Baderin, Islamic Law in Practice, Vol III 
(Ashgate, 2014) 67. 
520 Ibid. 
521 NJ Brown, ‘Shari’a and State in the Modern Muslim Middle East’, in Baderin (n 490) 47. 
522 Ibid. 
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these Shariah principles do not rise to the level of a legal code.524 Similarly, 
Mitchell points out that Shariah law ‘was never understood as an abstract code 
settling limits within which ‘behaviour’ was to be confined, but rather as a series 
of commentaries on particular practices, and of commentaries upon those 
commentaries’.525 It appears that the concept of the modern Muslim state is a 
postcolonial innovation based on a ‘European model of the state and a 
totalitarian view of law and public policy as instruments of social engineering by 
the ruling elites’.526 Yet, Shariah predates everything manifested by the modern 
secular state and thus maintains its dominance in any conflict between the 
two.527 
 
4.4 The Effects of Shariah in Practice in Arbitral Proceedings 
 
Having acknowledged the important role that Shariah plays in Saudi arbitration, 
this section shifts focus to look at how Shariah manifests in different aspects of 
arbitral practice and procedure. This section will highlight various crucial 
aspects of the arbitral process and identify how Shariah intersects with these 
areas, with the goal of raising awareness of the matters that foreign parties 
should concern themselves with if they will ultimately seek to have an arbitral 
award recognized and enforced in Saudi Arabia. 
 
4.4.1 Arbitration Clause  
 
The arbitration clause is the provision of a commercial contract in which the 
parties agree to submit any dispute arising from the contract to arbitration. The 
arbitration clause may also specify the seat of the arbitration, along with the 
substantive and curial laws that will govern the dispute. For an arbitration to 
																																																						
524 See An-Naim (n 269) 21. 
525 T Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 1988) 101. 
526 An-Na’im (n 269) 7. For example, Benton outlines that cultural intermediaries were challenges within 
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Cass, 1997) 1. 
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	118	
	
proceed and for any award resulting from the arbitration proceedings to be 
upheld, it is crucial that the arbitration clause be valid.  
 
There are a number of ways that an arbitration clause could be found invalid 
under Shariah law. First, the clause cannot provide for the appointment of non-
Muslim arbitrators. The Saudi Shariah Courts have argued that permitting non-
Muslims to arbitrate a dispute may render an arbitration clause as invalid. 
Second, it is contrary to the provisions of Shariah law for the arbitration clause 
to restrict the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract.528 Third, if the 
arbitration clause contains any uncertainties (gharar), the clause would violate 
Shariah principles and be held invalid. Finally, the arbitration clause cannot be 
immoral or violate public policy. The Hanbali doctrine explains, ‘any clause 
which accompanies the contract is valid unless it is impossible or contrary to 
public order or good morals’.529 This is similar to Western commercial laws in 
which contract clauses can be stricken under most regimes if found to violate 
public policy.530 
 
Prior to the creation of a regulated arbitration regime in Saudi Arabia, it was 
common practice for contractual parties to orally agree to submit a dispute to 
arbitration after a dispute had arisen during a transaction.531 This was primarily 
because many Muslims were unable to read and write during the first century of 
Islam and contracts and other commercial transactions were performed by a 
witnessed exchange of words, which were deemed sufficient for the parties 
when referring a dispute to the judiciary.532 If the Muslim parties executed 
contractual clauses in their international commercial transaction agreements 
that were not practised in their trade customs and practices, these would likely 
																																																						
528 Securities Commission Malaysia (n 221). 
529 Baamir (n 18) 75. 
530 Section 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause: (1) If the court as a matter of law finds 
the contractor any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court 
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commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination. See DF Rolewick, 
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not be recognised under the provisions of Shariah law.533 Today, most 
arbitration agreements are in written form to avoid any confusion and guide the 
resolution of potential future disputes. Written evidence is deemed essential for 
adjudicating a dispute before the judiciary. The Saudi arbitration regulations 
have made clear that agreements must be in writing to be recognized by the 
competent court absent a stipulated agreement by the parties.534 
 
Article 9(3) of the Saudi Arbitration Act 2012 explains the scope of arbitration 
agreement:  
 
[A]n arbitration agreement shall be deemed written if it is included 
in a document issued by the two parties or in an exchange of 
documented correspondence, telegrams or any other electronic or 
written means of communication. A reference to a contract or a 
mention therein of any document containing an arbitration clause 
shall constitute an arbitration agreement. Similarly, any reference 
in the contract to the provisions of a model contract, international 
convention or any other document containing an arbitration clause 
shall constitute a written arbitration agreement, if the reference 
clearly deems the clause as part of the contract.535 
 
Notably, there has been some tension around the inclusion of arbitration 
agreements in Saudi contracts at the outset of the transaction. While Saudi 
Arabia has become more welcoming to the use of arbitration clauses, their 
inclusion at the outset still creates a risk that an award may be overturned or not 
enforced. The Saudi appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider contract 
awards, whether they are foreign or domestic. 536 When a case is brought 
before the appellate tribunal, the court considers the case de novo. During this 
review, the court may reconsider all of the evidence in the case as if it were a 
court of first impression. 537 If the court determines that the parties undertook to 
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resort to arbitration before the existence of a dispute,538 a proposition that 
cannot be reconciled with Shariah principles, then the Saudi court my refuse to 
recognise or enforce the arbitral award. This significantly impacts commercial 
transaction because arbitration is quickly becoming the preferred method of 
dispute resolution and arbitration clauses generally are included in the original 
contract before the existence of a dispute.539 
 
This is just one example of the broad powers that the courts have to refuse to 
recognize or enforce an arbitral award. In all instances, Saudi Arabia applies the 
principles of Shariah law when understanding the terms of the arbitration 
agreement.540 Any lack of clarity in the agreement or potential uncertainty, are 
deemed to run afoul of Shariah. In fact, the Shariah courts have refused to 
recognize arbitration agreements that failed to contain the arbitrator’s names.541  
 
The Shariah courts afford themselves very wide jurisdiction and powers to set 
aside or revoke an arbitration clause, on both procedural and policy grounds. 
However, the New Arbitration Law attempts to use legislative provisions to 
curtail this jurisdiction to a certain extent. Clearly, striking down a clause 
because it does not contain the arbitrator’s name, a common practice in 
arbitration proceedings as the need for the arbitrators does not arise until the 
existence of the dispute, goes beyond matters of public policy or Shariah 
compliance.542 The question then becomes how effective is the New Arbitration 
Law in effectively limiting the courts’ jurisdiction, such that if the arbitration 
clause is consistent with the procedural requirements laid down in the 
arbitration regulations, the local Shariah courts would not have authority to 
submit the arbitration clause to further review before the commencement of 
arbitration proceeding or refuse recognition of the final award. 
 
Continuing with the example of the arbitration clause, it should be noted that 
there was no clear definition of the arbitration clause in the 1983 Saudi 
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Arbitration Act. The Act simply required that the parties agreed to ‘resort to 
arbitration with regard to a specific, existing dispute [subject to which] it may 
also be agreed beforehand to resort to arbitration is any dispute that may arise 
as a result of the execution of a specific contract’.543 However, the New Saudi 
Arbitration Law simplified the definition of arbitration agreements under Article 1 
and Article 9 respectively. Article 1(1) of the New Arbitration Law states that an 
arbitration agreement: 
 
[I]s an agreement between two or more parties to refer to 
arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may 
arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, 
whether contractual or not. An arbitration agreement may be in the 
form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a 
separate arbitration agreement. 544 
 
Article 9(1) then further clarifies the basis on which arbitration can be invoked, 
providing that ‘the arbitration agreement may be concluded prior to the 
occurrence of the dispute whether in the form of a separate agreement or 
stipulated in a specific contract’.545 
 
These Articles are both consistent with traditional Western arbitration practice. 
The question then is whether and to what extent judges applying Shariah law 
will override these provisions and refuse to enforce any judgement based 
thereon.546 If they are upheld and enforced, then Saudi arbitration practice on 
the international level dovetails nicely with standard international practice. 
 
4.4.2 The Absence of an Arbitration Agreement 
 
Commercial parties that seek to resolve their disputes amicably to protect their 
business relationships will frequently refer to the applicable state laws in their 
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arbitration agreements.547 With respect to this practice, it has been observed 
that ‘when parties agree to arbitrate, they often are opting out of a system of 
government-created rights and obligations into an arbitration system in which 
privately created rights and duties are substituted’.548 
 
To effectuate the mutual desires of the parties, tribunals and courts encourage 
commercial parties to resolve their disputes by means of arbitration.549 For 
instance, the under Article 25(2) of the New Saudi Arbitration Law, the arbitral 
tribunal has the authority to adjudicate arbitral disputes in the absence of an 
arbitration agreement.550 Further, Article 38(2) of the Law empowers the courts 
to consider and enforce a settlement award entered into amicably by the 
parties.551 
 
4.4.3 Appointment of Arbitrators  
 
When it comes to the appointment of arbitrators, Shariah law does not address 
the appointment of arbitrators by way of an arbitration clause. This silence on 
the subject is because during the pre-Islamic period, arbitrators sat ‘almost 
permanently at trade fairs and adjudicated disputes which arose out of 
commercial transactions as well as the incidents arising from the public 
gatherings at a trade fair’.552 There was no need to appoint the arbitrators for a 
specific dispute, as the parties would simply refer their dispute to the sitting 
arbitrators at the trade fairs. 
 
After Shariah law was adopted throughout the Kingdom and the formal court 
system was created, judges or qadis were then involved to decide arbitral 
disputes. These judges become known officially as arbitrators and their role was 
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to facilitate the resolution of the dispute in accordance with the parties’ 
agreement. Similar to its prerequisites for judges, Shariah law imposes certain 
requirements that arbitrators must meet to be eligible for appointment to preside 
over a dispute, as discussed below. 
 
4.4.3.1 The Arbitrator Must Be a Practising Muslim and Familiar with 
Shariah Law 
 
The first requirement is that the arbitrator must be a practising Islamic individual 
that is familiar with Shariah law. The rationale for this requirement is that 
appointing an arbitrator who is qualified and experienced in Shariah law, as well 
as is a practising Muslims, would allow the arbitrator to understand the cause of 
action and interpret the principles of Islam correctly when resolving the 
disputes.553 The Muslim arbitrator ‘must have a knowledge of the Shariah and 
capacity to define legal rules. This condition is useful for the efficiency of 
arbitration in order to avoid the arbitrator’s award being set aside as contrary to 
public order’.554 
 
However, there is a limited exception to the ‘setting aside’ rule in the 
international context. Many modern Islamic scholars have emphasized the 
importance of the verses of the Holy Quran and mentioned that they may permit 
the appointment of a non-Muslim arbitrator under certain circumstances. For 
instance, when a commercial dispute is arbitrated in a non-Muslim country and 
the governing law is as per the foreign territory.555 In this case, if a Muslim 
resides outside the Islamic territory, he might choose a non-Muslim arbitrator to 
adjudicate his dispute. This choice appears to be permissible based on the text 
of the Holy Qur’an, that: 
 
[A]uthorizes a dying person to have two Muslims as witnesses, or 
two non-Muslims if he resides in a non-Muslim country. This 
exception which is permitted by the Koran, and which is based on 
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necessity or urgency, may be extended to an arbitration taking 
place in a non-Muslim country.556 
 
It should also be noted that modern Islamic scholars from the Hanafi School 
have expressed the view that the legal system may ‘accept the jurisdiction of a 
non-Muslim judge over Muslim litigants as valid in financial, civil or commercial 
cases’.557 
 
4.4.3.2 Arbitrators Can Be Chosen Only After a Dispute Has Arisen 
 
Some traditional Islamic legal scholars have argued that Western arbitration 
procedures that permit the appointment of arbitrators under the provisions of 
arbitration clauses in their commercial agreements should not be recognized 
the Shariah law, observing that ‘[i]n dealing with arbitration they refer 
consistently to the appointment of arbitrators and the commencement of the 
arbitration after a dispute has arisen between the parties’.558 The rationale for 
this failure to recognise pre-dispute specific appointments is that Shariah 
contract principles require that all parties to the contract need to give their 
consent. When the contracting parties consent to the appointment of a specific 
arbitrator to resolve any disputes arising out of the contract in the arbitration 
agreement, this is insufficient because the consent of the specific arbitrator(s) is 
missing. Invoking contract principles, the arbitrators consent to preside over the 
dispute must also be considered before the execution of an arbitration 
agreement.559 This is in stark contrast to other Saudi arguments that posit an 
arbitration agreement that does not name the arbitrators specifically could be 
refused by the courts under Shariah law as being uncertain and, therefore, 
invalid. These interpretational challenges are the subject of the following 
chapter. 
 
The rigidity of legal scholars who strictly applying Shariah principles to modern 
arbitration suggests that these highly respected beliefs in religious rules cannot 
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be overridden by modern rules and practices when conducting arbitration 
proceedings.560 In fact, Muslim arbitrators in Saudi Arabia may go beyond the 
text of the new regulations and apply principles of Shariah and their adopted 
Shariah interpretations to the dispute as a non-legislated condition of enforcing 
the contract.561 This approach is further support and reflected by the Saudi 
Kingdom subscription to the teachings of the Hanbali School. By adopting these 
teachings in enacting the Saudi Arbitration Law, the Hanbali School does not 
allow ‘the application to the arbitration process held in dar al-Islam of any 
substantive and procedural laws other than mandatory Shariah tenets and 
Saudi statutes’.562 This creates a clear tension between the modern tenets of 
party autonomy under the UNCITRAL Model Law and prevailing arbitration 
rules and the Shariah influence on the Saudi Arbitration Law. 
 
4.4.3.3 Only Men Can Be Arbitrators 
 
Whether women can serve as arbitrators in either domestic or foreign 
arbitrations in Saudi Arabia is a highly controversial issue—perhaps the most 
controversial issue in the Islamic arbitration system.563 The relevant verse of the 
Holy Qur’an provides that ‘the testimony of a single man is equivalent to the 
testimony of two women’.564 
 
Taken literally, Shariah compliance would be achieved simply by appointing two 
women as arbitrators. However, critics of this approach point out the obvious: 
even with two women as arbitrators, ‘it is unlikely that the courts in Saudi Arabia 
will accept an arbitration where a woman has acted as arbitrator. Some justify 
this exclusion by explaining that women “were considered less knowledgeable 
than men in [the field of business matters]”.’565 
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Yet, at least theoretically, the appointment of women is not specifically excluded 
under the provisions of Saudi law. The New Arbitration Law has clarified the 
eligibility requirements that pertain to the appointment of an arbitrator. Under 
Article 14(3), the New Arbitration Law stipulates that an arbitrator shall ‘be a 
holder of at least a university degree in Shariah or law. If the arbitration tribunal 
is composed of more than one arbitrator, it is sufficient that the chairman meet 
such requirements’.566 Article 14 remains silent on the gender of the arbitrator, 
which leaves room for legal debate on the appointment of women as arbitrators 
in the Saudi arbitration system, 567 which is becoming more of an accepted 
possibility as women are now being permitted to practice before the courts 
within the Kingdom. 
 
4.4.4 Legal Requirements for Appointment of Arbitrators  
 
The New Arbitration Law sets forth certain requirements for the appointment of 
arbitrators in addition to the matters discussed above. In particular, the Law 
requires that the potential arbitrator possess three things: legal capacity; good 
conduct; and qualifications in Shariah law.  
 
The imposition of these requirements takes into account that the selection of 
arbitrators is a key issue in arbitration.568 By complying with these requirements 
for appointment, the New Arbitration Law helps provide increased certainty into 
the acceptability of proceedings when Shariah law is implicated as well as for 
the likelihood of recognition and enforcement of any resulting arbitral award.569 
By utilising arbitrators that are qualified not only from an arbitration perspective, 
but from a Shariah perspective, these provisions are aimed to prevent parties 
from detrimentally violating the rules of Saudi and Shariah law, particularly 
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those that would jeopardize the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
within the Kingdom.570 
 
Specifically, Article 14 of the New Arbitration Law imposes certain conditions, 
such as legal status and educational qualifications, for determining the eligibility 
of an arbitrator.571 Notably, the Law incorporates standards for selecting 
arbitrators with which Shariah law is familiar. The most identifiable of these is 
that the arbitrator must be of full legal capacity, have a good reputation, as well 
as be educated in the area of Shariah.572 The Law makes it obligatory that 
arbitrators decide disputes according to principles established in Shariah;573 
however, the New Arbitration Law’s adoption of the Hanbali School’s liberal 
interpretation of Shariah in contract law has significantly simplified arbitration 
proceedings.574 
 
 
 
4.4.4.1 Legal Capacity 
 
The first requirement for arbitral appointment is that the arbitrator must have 
legal capacity. With the passage of the New Arbitration Law, there has been 
controversy over the concept of arbitrators’ capacity in adjudicating the arbitral 
disputes because the Saudi regulations are silent on the arbitrator’s ethical 
duties. For instance, the Hanbali scholars have asserted that an arbitral 
decision has the same binding nature as one made by the judicial court.575 
However, other scholars argue that if this is the case, the arbitrator then 
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legality of their objectives, unless these conditions were themselves valid’. His idea was that not to limit 
the scope of contracts by affirming to the jurists’ treaties, instead the scope of contract should be 
determined as valid contract unless it is forbidden by rule of law, or contravene to Shariah or public 
policy. See SE Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law: A Comparative Analysis With Particular 
Reference To The Modern Legislation In Kuwait, Bahrain and The United Arab Emirates (1st edn, 
Graham & Trotman, 1991) 94; see also T Koraytem (n 113) 87. 
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necessarily must have the same qualifications as a judicial court judge.576 On 
this view, it seems that the role of arbitrators in is similar to the ordinary courts 
when the arbitrator has the capacity to carry out judicial functions. For instance, 
the arbitrator may have authority and competence to determine whether the 
arbitration agreement is valid and, if so, the proper laws, including mandatory 
national laws that should be applied in reaching a decision.577  
 
Yet, in the Law itself, there are no affirmative functions of an arbitrator in 
arbitration proceedings.578 However, through bilateral and multilateral treaties 
and conventions under the political influence of the state, the responsibilities of 
arbitrators have been determined and affirmative functions have arisen.579 
Indeed, it is emphasised that the role of an arbitrator in is significant and far-
reaching.580 For example, Glossner claims that the arbitrator’s function is not 
only professional, but rather, it is conciliatory as well: 
 
[A]lthough there are institutions, which train arbitrators more 
referring to the non-lawyer, as the arbitrator must not be a lawyer. 
He can be just as well as technical expert, …but he must be a 
person of knowledge and high moral standards. He must be able 
to appease parties who may quarrel over a contract. Possibly he 
has to see that the parties agree to a settlement. It is only natural 
that the parties listen more intensely to somebody who speaks to 
them from a higher elevation of experience, knowledge, and 
reputation.581 
 
Undoubtedly, the capacity of an arbitrator is vital to resolving arbitral disputes 
effectively and efficiently.582 However, it is difficult to determine the capacity of 
an arbitrator on some points that may be stipulated in the regulations. One 
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cannot simply generate legal capacity; instead, man is subject to gradual 
development, and experience is needed to reach the required level of 
standards.583 It has been suggested that ‘the increasing professionalization of 
arbitration has brought along demands for concrete ethics codes – demands 
which started in the 1970s and which have become more pressing to the 
present day – and for an independent professional association (the 
International Bar Association)’.584 
 
Thus, there is support for the suggestion that the real challenge for arbitration is 
the informal character of arbitration practices.585 The purpose of the legal 
capacity requirement is to ensure that arbitrators are appointed who can 
balance the relative lack of formalities of the proceedings with the inherent 
standards of the law that must be taken into account. Requiring arbitrators to 
have specific knowledge and greater capacity for understanding the arbitral 
procedures and skills to interpret the substantive laws to resolve the disputes, 
thereby enables effective and efficient recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards in the enforcing states’ court.586 
 
4.4.4.2 Good Conduct 
 
The second requirement imposed on potential arbitrators is that they must be of 
good conduct. Article 14 of the New Arbitration Law explains that an arbitrator 
shall be of good conduct and reputation in order to act as arbitrator in arbitration 
proceedings.587 This prompts the question of how to analyse the conduct of an 
arbitrator to determine whether the arbitrator has conducted his duties fairly and 
soundly.588 The contracting parties frequently choose their arbitrator on the 
basis of their prior professional, business, or commercial expertise, and their 
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584 See R Michaels, ‘Roles and Role Perceptions of International Arbitrators’, in W Mattli & T Dietz (ed), 
International Arbitration and Global Governance, Contending Theories and Evidence (Oxford University 
Press, 2014) 61. 
585 Ibid 47. 
586 Park (n 549)1-38. 
587 Saudi Arbitration Law 2012, art 14(2). 
588 RM Rauber, ‘The Impact of Ethical Rules for Counsel in International Commercial Arbitration- Is 
There a Need for Developing International Ethical Rules?’ (2014) 17(1) International ALR 17-36. 
	130	
	
impartiality in adjudicating disputes.589 There is no rigid rule or practice as to 
how the contracting parties need to choose their arbitrator.590 Rather, it is a 
matter of discussion and negotiation between the contracting parties and their 
advisors when choosing an arbitrator.591 Yet, arbitrators as professionals do not 
enjoy the same discretion as a judge in resolving disputes. Their authority does 
not extend beyond the arbitration agreement under which they operate.592 As 
Redfern aptly comments, ‘some standard forms of international contracts, and 
particularly those used in the shipping and commodity trades and the insurance 
and reinsurance industries, identify the kind of arbitrator to be chosen in the 
event of a dispute’.593 
 
The idea behind having an abstract standard is that it would be futile to list 
specific good conduct requirements to be possessed by an arbitrator because it 
is understood that arbitration is intended to be a flexible method for resolving 
the disputes, not merely a mirror of court proceedings.594 Further, it is unwise to 
make an advance determination on qualifications in choosing an arbitrator 
before a dispute has risen because the nature of the particular dispute will often 
inform the desirable traits for the arbitrator.595 
 
In modern practice, some national arbitral regulations stipulate the requirements 
for arbitrators to participate in arbitration.596 However, the lack of such 
provisions to determine the qualifications of arbitrators does not seem to be a 
practical problem. In fact, many governments have elected to remove from a 
shortlist of potential arbitrators any person invited to act as arbitrators ‘to whom 
objection might be taken’.597 
 
If these approaches are employed correctly, it would likely lead to the efficient 
selection of arbitrators in both domestic and foreign arbitrations. Within this 
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context, it is crucial to emphasise the importance of understanding national 
arbitral regulations before appointing an arbitrator in international arbitration. An 
arbitrator’s failure to meet national regulations, particularly if there is public 
policy component such as Shariah, could lead to the failure of national courts to 
recognise and enforce the arbitral award.598 
 
4.4.4.3 Qualified in Shariah 
 
The third and final requirement for a potential arbitrator is that he must be 
qualified in Shariah law. This is one of the primary areas where the national 
arbitration law exerts itself with regard to the selection of arbitrators in both 
domestic and international arbitration.599 While there is a large degree of 
autonomy for international arbitration proceedings, they remain subject to 
national legal systems.600 Their autonomy extends only as far as the 
parameters of the national legal system within which they are involved, either as 
the lex arbitri or the enforcement state. States’ attitudes toward international 
arbitration have evolved as awards have more commonly needed to be 
enforced in states whose laws were not considered during the arbitration 
proceedings. Brozolo explains that this tension between autonomy and state 
laws have resulted in ‘to the recognition of the central role of party autonomy in 
all aspects of arbitration, and to a retrenchment of the powers of national courts 
to control both the process and its outcomes’.601 Part of this retrenchment has 
been the states attempts to set aside awards that do not meet the public 
policies standards asserted in their national arbitration legislation. 
 
Turning to the domestic law of Saudi Arabia, scholars disagree on the nature of 
the relationship between Shariah and state legislation.602 As a general principle 
of Shariah law, a judge or similar effective power is bound by Shariah to loyally 
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and effectively discharge his duties, either in person or by delegating his 
authority to his appointed officials.603 In this respect, it has been suggested that 
a judge must satisfy certain conditions to enable him to rule on cases effectively 
and defend the faith preached in the Holy Qur’an. Some of the conditions that 
scholars believe allow a judge to perform his duties include engaging in the 
strong administration of justice, according to the verses of the Holy Qur’an; 
knowledge of Islamic traditions tradition; and the ability to make independent 
decisions on the points of law.604 
 
Some scholars argue that judges must enjoy judicial independence from all 
other institutional influence and interference,605 but many Islamic jurists, and 
courts, disagree. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Ulama (Islamic 
scholars) criticised and rejected any laws that were derived from the Ottomans. 
This attitude of the courts toward the laws can be observed throughout the 
Islam-practising states.606 Further, considering the separation of powers 
between different branches of government, judicial independence ensures the 
judge’s power to review legislative acts and strike down any awards or acts that 
prove unconstitutional.607 However, such authority may become challenging for 
the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards by the Shariah 
courts. The stems from Prophet Muhammad’s preaching that expressly affirm 
the importance of qualification in Shariah to judge and decide disputes.608 
 
4.4.5 Choice of Forum  
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The choice of forum for an arbitration is relatively challenging when the 
contracting parties are from or accustomed to different legal systems.609 The 
challenge lies in the fact that (1) the parties to the commercial transaction must 
agree to a single forum; and (2) even when they do agree, the designated forum 
must itself be legally obligated to enforce the arbitrator’s decision.610 For 
instance, the regulations of particular states contain relatively detailed 
provisions regarding what matters can and cannot be determined in 
arbitration.611 While the arbitration may be acceptable in the state in which it 
was being arbitrated, the award may not be enforceable on the grounds of 
public policy in a state that prohibits the arbitration of such matters. In the Saudi 
context, contracting parties can exercise their freedom of contract to give 
authority to an arbitrator to decide disputes between them, however, if the 
arbitration itself is inconsistent with national law or Shariah law, the Saudi courts 
will not recognize the arbitral award.612 
 
To maintain continuity in an understanding of the general situation of Saudi 
arbitration procedures in international arbitration, it is reiterating the importance 
of the choice of forum.613 Permitting the parties to choose the forum for 
resolving their disputes makes the parties’ contractual relationship more 
predictable, as they are better able to assess their contractual rights and duties 
in relation to the particular and unique laws of the lex arbitri.614 Recognizing the 
importance of this choice, some suggest that contracting parties include either a 
forum selection clause or an arbitration agreement as a standard component of 
their commercial transaction documents to reduce the uncertainties that 
accompany commercial dispute resolution.615 
 
Where forum selection becomes problematic is when the contracting parties 
can select their preferred forum, but the rules of the selected forum turn out not 
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to be binding and enforceable in the state of enforcement.616 Cordero-Moss 
commented on this topic, explaining that ‘the governing law will be chosen on 
the basis of the connecting factor generally applicable to contracts, without 
regard to the drafting style of the contract’.617 In practice this means that the law 
applied to the dispute or the enforcement will be the one connected to the 
proceedings themselves and can override the selection of the parties in certain 
circumstances. 
 
Thus, when contracting parties neglect to understand the enforcing states’ 
arbitral regulations their choice of forum may lead to unexpected results or force 
them to confront challenges with regard to the recognition and enforcement of 
their arbitral awards in the enforcing state’s courts.618 Understanding the 
designated countries’ legal and religious laws is thus crucial. Redfern 
particularly highlighted this fact, stating: 
 
[T]he nationality of the parties must be taken into account, 
since the general practice is to hold an arbitration in a country 
that is ‘neutral’, in the sense that it is not the country of any of 
the parties to the dispute. The usual residence (or place of 
business of) the parties will have to be taken into account too, 
because of the need to cut down as far as possible on the 
expense and inconvenience of travelling. There are political 
factors, such as the general acceptability to the parties of 
some countries and, in particular, the question of whether any 
restrictions are likely to be imposed on the entry of the 
parties, their advisers and witnesses.619 
 
There is no question that arbitration lawyers can, and should, exercise almost 
complete freedom on the part of the contracting parties to choose the arbitration 
forum or institution and applicable law that will provide the best likelihood of 
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reaching the desired outcomes at the lowest cost620 However, this must be 
tempered by the reality that the initial appeal of some forums may quickly fade 
when attempting to enforce the arbitral award if due consideration was not given 
to the regulations and rules of the enforcing state. 
 
4.4.6 Jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
 
When a dispute arises between the parties, the first issue that must be 
confronted is that of jurisdiction. Specifically, a determination must be made 
about whether the courts have jurisdiction to hear the dispute or if the dispute 
must be submitted to arbitration. Generally speaking, when an arbitration clause 
exists, the courts will refer the dispute to arbitration. Some national legislatures 
even go so far as mandating a referral to arbitration upon scrutinising the 
documents submitted by the contracting parties.621 If the national court finds 
that the contracting parties are bound by an arbitration agreement or arbitration 
clause in their transaction agreement, then the national court must refer the 
dispute to arbitration without considering the contracting parties requests.622  
 
Some scholars argue ‘jurisdictional preoccupations in international business will 
often eclipse the functionally related questions of choice of law and the 
enforcement of judgments’.623 However, in arbitration practice this is not the 
case. Jurisdiction within arbitration refers to the entity that can hear the case 
and regardless of what entity serves as the adjudicator, they are bound to apply 
the law chosen by the parties.624 This eliminates the need for forum shopping 
frequently witnessed in litigation proceedings.  
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4.4.7 Choice of Substantive Law 
 
Consistent with the autonomy accorded to the parties in other aspects of the 
arbitral process, the contracting parties may also agree on the law that will 
govern the substance of the dispute. However, for arbitrations seated in Saudi 
Arabia, whether domestic or international, or in situations where a foreign 
arbitral award will need to be enforced in Saudi Arabia, it is incumbent that that 
the law chosen to govern the substance of the dispute not violate Shariah law. 
In the event that the substantive law chosen by the parties is contrary to 
Shariah law in an arbitration taking place in Saudi Arabia, that law will not apply. 
This is explained in Article 5 of the New Arbitration Law which provides that: 
 
Where the parties to arbitration have agreed to subject their 
relationship to the provision of a certain document (a model 
contract, an international convention or others), the provision of 
said document, including those specific for arbitration, shall apply 
unless contrary to Shariah law. 625 
 
Additionally, these constraints again appear in Article 38 of the Saudi New 
Arbitration Law of 2012, which permits the parties to choose the substantive law 
that will apply to their transaction and any disputes arising from it. This article 
requires the arbitrator to apply the substantive law chosen by the parties, 
providing that it is ‘[w]ithout prejudice to the provisions of the Shariah law and the 
Kingdom’s public policy’.626 Similarly, the courts enforcing an arbitral award 
rendered on the basis of a substantive law that violates Shariah would be 
deemed against public policy by the Saudi courts and the award would be 
refused. This demonstrates that while parties are accorded autonomy, that 
autonomy remains subject to the core values of the Kingdom in which the 
arbitration is conducted, or the awards enforced.  
 
In fact, some believe that the influence of an enforcing state’s arbitration law 
deprives arbitral parties of choosing their jurisdiction in commercial 
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arbitration.627 Thus, there is a practical question of how to address the 
divergence in the legal framework for arbitral proceedings from those of the 
enforcing state.628 Whether the enforcing state’s rules and laws pre-empt or 
conflict with the agreed arbitration procedure and choice of jurisdiction will 
depend on the nature of enforcing state’s arbitration law.629 This, of course, 
presents challenges for contracting parties seeking to manage and control their 
contractual options and rights consistent with the administration of state and 
religious sovereignty and public power.630 Put succinctly, Tang states: 
 
[T]he forum, which has been designated by the parties, may not 
be able to accept the prorogated power because accepting such 
power might infringe the sovereignty of another state or because 
exercising this power is impractical.631 
 
In brief, it becomes clear that contracting parties do not enjoy absolute freedom 
of contract to choose authority or binding arbitral tribunal authority to resolve 
their international commercial disputes.632 However, the attitude toward dispute 
resolution agreements has changed substantially in the international 
commercial world in the last several decades.633 In light of the international 
recognition of arbitration, individual countries are now much more inclined to 
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specify in their laws whether and to what extent dispute resolution agreements 
will be honoured and enforced.634 
 
It is perhaps necessary to clarify the grounds for a challenge to jurisdictional law 
applied to the dispute.635 The conflicts between the laws are often related to the 
basic elements of an arbitration clause. For example, when one of the 
contractual parties challenges the scope and jurisdiction of an arbitral clause 
over the particular dispute in question.636 In this connection, Buhring-Uhle 
claims: 
 
[S]ince uniform international standards about the assertion of 
jurisdiction do not exist, different bases of jurisdiction and different 
interpretations of the same bases can lead to multiple lawsuits in 
different jurisdictions when the defendant decides to launch a 
counter-suit in a different forum.637  
 
Given the complexity of issues related to the substantive and jurisdictional laws, 
it is important for contracting parties to seek legal advice from a Saudi lawyer or 
arbitrator when a Saudi party is involved, or an award may foreseeably need to 
be enforced within the Kingdom. It is important to understand the Saudi 
arbitration regulations before referring the dispute to arbitration.638 By doing so, 
they can ensure that their arbitral award will be recognised and enforced in 
Saudi courts. 
 
4.4.8 Conducting the Arbitration Proceedings 
 
As part of the increased grants of party autonomy, the New Arbitration Law 
allows the parties to choose the procedural laws and rules that will govern the 
arbitration proceedings. However, the parties’ choices remain subject to 
compliance with Shariah principles and due process. If the parties are unable to 
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agree on procedural rules or do not wish to make the decision, Article 4 of the 
New Arbitration Law permits the parties to designate a third party, such as the 
arbitrator or arbitral tribunal, to designate the procedural law and rules. This 
allows for the parties to seek the assistance of an arbitral institution with 
conducting the proceedings; however, the institution remains subject to 
implementing procedural rules that do not run afoul of Shariah principles. Article 
25 of the New Arbitration Law relates to this decision by providing that the 
parties can agree to submit the dispute to any procedure, including that of an 
arbitral institution, so long as the procedures chosen do not violate the 
provisions of public policy and Shariah. 
 
In practice, this means that parties are given the opportunity to voluntarily 
contract out of the application of the default procedural rules of the New Saudi 
Arbitration Law by exercising their autonomy to choose a set of procedural rules 
or an arbitral institution with which to submit the dispute. However, the parties’ 
autonomy is limited by public policy concerns because the chosen procedures 
must still be Shariah complaint. Further, reflecting the inherent fairness 
principles embodied in Shariah, the chosen procedural rules must respect due 
process and treat both parties equally, providing them each with a chancy to 
fully present or defend their case.639 
 
4.4.9 Issuance and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
 
While the general consensus throughout the arbitration field is that arbitral 
awards are binding and carry the same weight when it comes to enforcement as 
a court judgment, it is important to consider the impact that Shariah has when it 
comes to the issuance and enforcement of arbitral awards.640  
 
When it comes to the rendering of an arbitral award, the arbitrator or tribunal 
must be mindful is the details of an arbitral award if they are aware that the 
award will need to be enforced in an Islamic state, such as Saudi Arabia. By this 
point we have established that an award must be consistent with the Kingdom’s 
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public policy to be enforceable and that this includes compliance with Shariah 
law. Where this becomes tricky for the tribunal is when the traditional practices 
of disputes resolution themselves run afoul of Shariah principles. The most 
common example of this is the assessment of interest on a debt. Interest on a 
repayment of debt or the satisfaction of a judgment is a common feature in 
many business relationships, and interest often forms part of the arbitral award. 
However, the Qur’an prohibits the assessment of interest. It specifically states 
that, ‘O you who have believed, fear Allah and give up what remains [due to 
you] of interest, if you should be believers’.641 Thus, while interest may be 
permitted under the substantive laws of the arbitration, the laws of the seat of 
the arbitration, or the arbitral rules, such an award of interest risks the entire 
award being unenforceable in the Saudi Courts as being against public policy. 
To ensure the enforcement of the award, it is important that parties aware of the 
potential venues for enforcement and take proactive measures to educate the 
tribunal on the restrictions that must be complied with; otherwise, the award 
rendered is futile. 
 
The exception to this is where the portion of the award that violates Shariah can 
be separated from the remainder of the award. In some instances, the Saudi 
courts may set aside the non-compliant portion and enforce the remainder of 
the award. Specifically, Article 55(2)(b) of the New Arbitration Law provides that 
‘[i]f the award is divisible, an order for execution of the part not containing the 
violation may be issued’.642 However, one should note that this is a permissible 
and not mandatory provision and is not binding on the courts. Thus, it will be the 
decision of the particular judge to determine the separability of the award from 
the underlying contract and whether or not the award shall be enforced. 
 
In most circumstances, an enforcement proceeding is not an opportunity to 
review the merits of the case or to evaluate the validity of the arbitration 
proceedings absent an appropriate challenge from the parties; however, the 
public policy analysis involved in enforcing an award in an Islamic state creates 
a partial exception to this approach. The Saudi courts must conduct a limited 
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judicial review in fulfilling their function of ensuring that arbitral awards do not 
violate public policy and Shariah. They must determine whether the award was 
issued consistently with Shariah law and whether any provision of the award 
itself violates principles of Islamic law. The courts are not permitted to review 
the merits of the dispute, but they can scrutinize aspects of the arbitration 
agreement and actions taken by the arbitrator that would be outside the purview 
of consideration for courts in non-Islamic states.643 The last point 
notwithstanding, the court cannot simply refuse to enforce the award because 
the arbitrator followed a different view other than Islamic jurisprudence—there 
must be an identifiable violation of Shariah for the award to be set aside on 
public policy grounds.644 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter highlights the many complexities and potential pitfalls that a party 
unfamiliar with Saudi law and arbitration regulations may face in commercial 
arbitration proceedings.645 As discussed through the foregoing, the primary 
issue for non-Islamic parties is the substantial uncertainty regarding the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards on the basis that the arbitration 
proceedings or the provisions of the arbitral award contravene Saudi public 
policy or Shariah law. Further, even within the Kingdom itself, it is recognized 
that there are differences of opinions among Islamic scholars and jurists in 
developing the sources of Shariah as it applies to the modern world, arbitration 
procedures, awards and enforceability. These differences of opinion and 
interpretation will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. As a 
result, one can see that it is challenging for contracting parties to grasp the 
																																																						
643 Ahmed Alkhamees, ‘International Arbitration and Shari’a Law: Context, Scope, and Intersections 
(2011) 28 Journal of International Arbitration 255. 
644 Ibid. 
645 For example, Born points out ‘the uncertainty surrounding the subject of a procedural law is 
unfortunate and does not contribute to the stability or efficacy of the international arbitral process’. See 
Born (n 2) 1632-32. Interestingly, Buhring-Uhle outlines the consequence of uncertainty of the choice of 
law in arbitration proceedings. He argues, ‘if the Lawyers don’t understand that international commercial 
arbitration is something different from jury litigation, they will ruin arbitration’. See Buhring-Uhle (n 2) 
42; see also ML Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd end, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 59. 
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applicable Saudi regulations and their use and applicability in commercial 
arbitration.646 
 
Given these uncertainties, contracting parties face challenges with respect to 
the recognition and enforcement of their commercial arbitral awards effectively 
and efficiently in Saudi Arabia. The goal of this chapter was to highlight the 
areas of the arbitral process where recognition and enforcement could be 
jeopardized if the parties are not familiar with the nuances of the Saudi legal 
system and approach. Indeed, there are notable differences between Saudi 
arbitration proceedings and other non-Islamic arbitration regulations, particularly 
when contracting parties choose their arbitrators or refer their arbitral disputes 
to an arbitration institution or tribunal. 
 
It is here that the intersections between Islamic legal theory and state authority 
have created an unattainable ideal, since there has been sufficient attempt to 
clarify, delineate or even codify the fundamental principles and theories of 
Islamic contract law and dispute resolution. As such no developed 
jurisprudence on Shariah as the applicable law of an arbitration, or underlying 
contract, has evolved to complement development of the Saudi economy and 
its growing position in the global market.647 Nor is it clear what is mandated by 
Saudi law in all respect of the religious aspects of its public policy.  
 
The religious law of Islam, according to some more liberal Islamic jurists, has 
developed not in connection with the practices of the emerging Muslim state, 
but rather in direct ‘opposition to it’.648 The question begged is how is this 
																																																						
646 Akseli argues, ‘there is a debate as to whether states accept obligations for the protection of individuals 
or whether individuals are the recipients of rights which they can enforce. What ever view is preferred, 
where a State has entered into a treaty on behalf of an individual, or a group of individuals, it is self-
evident that those individuals have an interest in its performance or non-performance’. Akseli (n 414) 
343; Interestingly, Redfern et al posits that ‘rules of arbitration often provide an outline of the various 
steps to be taken; but the detailed regulations of the procedure to be followed are established either by 
agreement of the parties or by directions from the tribunal-or a combination of the two. The one thing that 
is certain is the at counsel should not bring the rule books from their home courts with them’. Redfern et 
al (n 3) 314. 
647 Schacht outlines the influence of the legal theory and practice of the Shariah. He noted, ‘it may be said 
that, as far as popular conscience is concerned, the sacred law is observed, even in the field of purely 
religious duties, to the extent to which custom demands it, so that essential duties are often neglected, 
non-essential practices faithfully observed, and even formalities which are unknown to the Shari’a 
imposed by custom’. See Schacht (n 448) 78. 
648 B Messick, ‘The Judge and the Mufti’, in Peters & Bearman (n 18) 95. 
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possible? After all, for Muslim jurists and followers, the tenets of the Qu’ran and 
Sunnah are unquestionably divine in origin, to be preached and exercised by 
his followers in their way of life.649 At the same time, Islamic law is by its nature 
pluralistic, in that it there is no single or authoritative school of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Instead, debates now emerge around the five recognised 
schools of Islamic law.650For critics of the more literal variants of classic Islamic 
jurisprudence, which may include the more conservative Hanbali school of law, 
the study and practice of Shariah has become highly fragmented, while growing 
ever more distant from the tradition of innovation and creativity in the 
interpretation of religious law, an ideal embodied by principles such as ijtihad. 
After the death of Prophet Mohammed, these scholars argue, the application of 
Shariah law and principles of ijtihad allow for the cultivation of new rules and 
judgments which are more suited to new legal realities and contexts.651 
 
It can be affirmed that Shariah is not static or rigid in understanding or 
interpreting the law or in resolving disputes because its main source is bound to 
the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah.652 Generally, arbitration disputes should be 
concluded by the free and valid will of the contracting parties because Shariah 
law requires the contracting parties to discharge their contractual obligations 
with bona fide intention.653 For example, the Holy Qur’an verse V: I preaches ‘O 
you who believe! Fulfil your contracts’!654 This simply means that ‘Allah makes 
whatever judgments He wills about lawfulness and other things and there is no 
opposing that’. 655 
 
Undoubtedly, in recent decades Saudi arbitration has achieved enormous 
popularity because of a certain measure of standardization of its arbitration 
framework. For example, enacting Saudi Arbitration Act of 2012 and 
establishment of the Saudi Centre for Commercial Arbitration in Riyadh. While 
																																																						
649 Rosenthal (n 574); see also Schacht (n 448). 
650 Rosenthal (n 574) 22. 
651 Schacht (n 448); see also A Affi & H Affi, Contemporary Interpretation of Islamic Law (Matador, 
2014). 
652 El-Ahdad & El-Ahdab (n 253)15. 
653 S Saleh, ‘The Role of Intention (Niyya) Under Saudi Arabian Hanbali Law’, (2009) 23(3) ALQ 347-
52; see also FM Al-Fadhel, ‘Respect for Party Autonomy under Current Saudi Arbitration Law’ (2009) 
23(1) ALQ 31-57. 
654 Jalalu’d-Din Al-Mahalli & Jalalu’d-Din As-Suyuti, Tafsir Al-Jalalayn (Dar Al Taqwa Ltd, 2007) 235. 
655 Ibid. 
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there is no clear guidance as to how these Saudi arbitral proceedings should be 
understood and implemented, efforts continue to be made. There writer 
believes firmly that there is room for developing a Saudi arbitration procedure 
that complies with both Shariah and international arbitration law to provide 
effective and efficient Saudi arbitration regime. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
HOW DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF SHARIAH LAW AFFECT 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter looked at the importance of Shariah law in Saudi 
arbitration and the practical implications that Shariah has for both domestic and 
foreign arbitral proceedings. This chapter looks to dive deeper into the Islamic 
jurisprudence that drives the application of Shariah principles by considering the 
roles of the Islamic schools of thought and Saudi legislation and policy. By 
identifying the internal tensions with the interpretation and application of Shariah 
law, one can better understand how the resulting principles are applied with the 
goal of achieving a comprehensive assessment of their interpretative 
methodology in arbitration practice. As Wakim succinctly argues: ‘The “religious 
variable” may affect either substantive or procedural analyses. As arbitrators 
interpret public policy, calculate limitation periods, or determine interest awards, 
cultural particulars may influence the result’.656 
 
First, it is imperative to remember that Shariah has no codified authoritative 
body of law on which legal practitioners, both legislators or the judiciary, can 
rely.657 Instead, Shariah law is derived from a variety of primary and secondary 
sources that are then interpreted through various schools of thought. The result 
is scholars of the same religion, in the same country, proposing different 
applications of the same underlying principle to the same set of facts. In fact, 
there are four classical schools of Islamic thought that will be touched on 
throughout this chapter—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’, and Hanbali, the latter being the 
official school of the state. While the legislature adopts the principles and 
interpretations of the Hanbali school in drafting Saudi laws, the courts are not 
obligated to follow the Hanbali approach. Indeed, they have discretion to apply 
any of the schools of thought to the facts, so long as their reasoning is based on 
																																																						
656 Mark Wakim, ‘Public Policy Concerns Regarding Enforcement of Foreign International Arbitral 
Awards in the Middle East’ (2008) 21 New York International Law Review 1, 3. 
657 H. M. Khan, ‘Note, Nothing Is Written: Fundamentalism, Revivalism, Reformism and the Fate of 
Islamic Law’, (2002) 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 273, 277 (who draws an analogy between Islamic law and other 
forms of uncodified law, including Roman civil law and English common law). 
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Shariah principles. This creates an inherent tension between the legislature and 
the courts, with the latter not enforcing the law in such a way that will 
necessarily uphold the legal provisions’ intent. 
 
This lack of uniformity in approach and significant gap between legislation and 
enforcement is further compounded in arbitration practice. On one hand there is 
the New Arbitration Law, based on the Hanbali approach, that is intended to 
govern and guide parties, foreign and domestic, on complying with Shariah 
principles during the arbitral process. However, when it comes to the 
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award, the parties are, in reality, are 
vulnerable to the subjective judgments of the judge overseeing their 
enforcement request, which may or may not comport with the Hanbali 
approach. This can result in awards being set aside based on lesser-known 
interpretations of Shariah provisions, which inevitably frustrates the parties and 
makes navigating arbitrations connect to Saudi Arabia uniquely difficult. This 
chapter explores how these differing legislative interpretations arose and how 
they function in practice to better understand the implications that these 
disparities have when it comes to the enforcement of arbitral awards. 
 
5.2 Why Are There Challenges with Interpreting Saudi Legislation? 
 
Interpretation of the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna’h stem primarily from Islamic 
Fiqh (jurisprudence).658 The Arabic Fiqh means ‘deep understanding’ or ‘full 
comprehension;’659 it refers to the body of Islamic law that scholars extract from 
detailed Islamic sources, which they study in accordance with the principles of 
Islamic jurisprudence, and the process of gaining knowledge of Islam through 
legal jurisprudence.660 
 
Despite this extensive study, Islamic jurisprudential challenges continue to 
persist. These challenges arise primarily with regard to the understanding and 
application of Shariah law when there is no clear precedent or reference in the 
Holy Qur’an or Sunna’h on the proper application of Fiqh in addressing the 
																																																						
658 Duderija (n 16) 393-437. 
659 Mohammed (n 278) 95-110. 
660 Shaharuddin (n 70) 292-304. 
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particular matter.661 Thus, it is necessary to analyse the role of the Islamic 
schools of thought in interpreting Saudi legislation to comprehend the various 
approaches that may be taken to resolve the same issue. Most Islamic experts 
believe that Fiqh constitutes ‘the Canon Law of Islam and the common law of 
the whole Islamic world’, yet this canon itself contains contradictory opinions 
depending on the school of thought deciding the issue.662 
 
5.2.1 The Role of Islamic Schools of Thought 
 
The Islamic schools of thought663 include the Hanafi,664 Maliki,665 Shafi’I,666 and 
Hanbali667 schools and they play an important role in the formation of legislation 
as they guide the drafters in ensuring Shariah compliance. The Islamic Schools 
also contribute their views and interpretations of the Holy Qur’an and Prophet’s 
Sunna’h, collectively known as Islamic jurisprudence, to the continued 
development of Fiqh.668 The object and scope of Fiqh is to define the procedural 
principles of Shariah law. Fiqh has a very wide scope of application in many 
spheres, namely legal, religious, social, political, administrative, business, and 
																																																						
661 Aljloud (n 70) 85-98; see also WB Hallaq, ‘Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiyas’, in 
Law and Legal Theory in Classical and Medieval Islam (Ashgate Variorum, 1994) 286-306; YY Haddad 
& BF Stowasser (eds), Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity (AltaMira Press, 2004). 
662 Baamir (n 18) 7. 
663 Why were the Islamic schools established? Wynbrabdt attempted to answer this in his work, stating 
‘The first Muslim schools, or traditions, of law were established in Mesopotamia and Syria before the end 
of the Umayyad dynasty in 750. During the Umayyad reign, early laws were established under Arab 
Islamic governors by qadis who melded accepted local traditions and rules with their own opinion and 
Qur’anic principles on an ad hoc basis. Governors were appointed by the caliph, and they in turn 
appointed the qadis’, See J Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia (2nd edn, Facts on File, 2010) 88. 
664 Wynbrandt mentions how the Hanifa School was founded. He remarks, ‘the chief advocate of this 
view was al Numan ibn Thabit, also known as Abu Hanifa (d.767). A merchant and grandson of a Persian 
slave who lived in Kufa and Baghdad, he was Islam’s first and most influential legal scholar and founder 
of the largest and most tolerant school of Islamic law’. See Ibid 89. 
665 Wynbrandt mentions how the Maliki School was founded. His remark is that ‘the Maliki School was 
founded by Malik ibn Anas (ca. 715-795), a practicing qadi. The Maliki School placed its emphasis on the 
Hadith as an interpretive tool’. See Ibid. 
666 Wynbrandt mentions how the Shaf’i School was founded. He noted, ‘Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i 
(767-820) founded the school that bears his name. A member of Arabia’s powerful Qur’aysh tribe born in 
Gaza, al-Shafi’i studied under Malik in Medina’. Ibid 89. 
667 Wynbrandt mentions how the Hanbali School was founded. He points outs that ‘Another student of 
Malik founded the fourth of the recognized adherence to a literal interpretation of schools of Islamic law. 
Ahmad ibn Hanbali (780-855) took a more conservative view than Malik, espousing unwavering the 
Hadith’. Ibid 90. 
668 Baamir asserts that, ‘Fiqh literally means “deep understanding”; terminologically, Fiqh is the process 
of deducing and applying Shari’a principles and injunctions in real or hypothetical cases or situations’. 
See Baamir (n 18) 8; see also J Schacht, ‘Pre-Islamic Background and Early Development of 
Jurisprudence’, in WB Hallaq & LI Conrad (eds) The Formation of Islamic Law (Ashgate Variorum, 
2004) 29-58. 
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personal life.669 This reflects the notion that Shariah principles permeate all 
aspects of Islamic daily life. 
 
One must be mindful of the differences between interpretation of Shariah law 
and Fiqh.670 For example, if an international commercial party is subject to an 
injunction by the courts interpreting the provisions of Shariah law, then that 
injunction is not amendable or negotiable under Shariah law.671 On the other 
hand, if an international commercial party obtained an injunction by the Shariah 
courts interpreting the provisions of Fiqh based on a particular school of 
thought, then it is flexible and amendable in accordance with the circumstances 
and fact of the case.672 Much like American or English common law 
jurisprudence that focus on equity within the context of a particular dispute, the 
circumstances of the particular situation and the party’s customs and practices 
would be considered by the court, unless those interpretations contradicted the 
provisions of Shariah.673 
 
In this regard, it is also necessary to understand the scope of Hadith, which are 
the practices and teachings of Islam by the Prophet Muhammad (also known as 
Sunna’h) to interpret the scope and meaning of Shariah principles.674 For 
example, Goldziher675 relies on the Hadith as interpreted by Ibn Taymiya to 
ascertain that ‘deeds are judged according to intentions; each man’s accounts 
are drawn up according to his intentions’.676 Goldziher urges that interpretation 
of Shariah law should prevail over the interpretation of Fiqh.677 He does so 
because he draws on the preaching’s of the Hadith, which states, ‘God says: 
Come, meet me with your intentions, not with your deeds’.678 
 
																																																						
669 MM Dodeen, ‘Formation of Contract under the Islamic Majallah and UNIDROIT Principles of 2010’ 
(2016) 30(3) ALQ 262-77. 
670 Aljloud (n 70) 85-98. 
671 Mohammed (n 2) 95-110. 
672 Ibrahim (n 262). 
673 Baamir (n 18) 8. 
674 I Goldziher, ‘Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law’, Princeton University Press, 1981, 42. 
675 Ignaz Goldziher was a Hungarian scholar considered the founder of modern Islamic studies in Europe. 
676 Goldziher (n 644) 42. 
677 Ibid. 
678 Ibid. 
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In reality, during the early ninth century, there was no clear difference679 in the 
technique680 of interpretation of Hadith among Islamic scholars because the 
Hadith was practised and recited orally.681 Yet, Mohammad Al-Bukhari, scholar 
and student of the Hanbali School, attempted to simplify this issue through a 
collection of evidence of the Hadith from the Prophet Muhammad’s 
companions, followers, and believers.682 
 
Ibn Al-Hajjaj succeeded Al-Bukhari in gathering all the evidence of the 
Hadith.683 This enabled Islamic scholars to better understand the scope of the 
Hadith in interpreting the Holy Qur’an.684 In this way, the development of the 
Hadith by the theocratic kings and local scholars created contradictions in 
interpreting the Shariah.685 Eventually, there were two groups of people with two 
different opinions and interpretations on the Hadith.686 One group was known as 
Ahl ‘ar-ra’y (Ahl al-Dirayah,) which was rationalist and modernist in their 
approach, whereas the second group, known as Ahl ar-hadith (Ahl ar-Riwayah), 
mostly disagreed with the Ahl al-Dirayah interpretation.687 This clash of 
viewpoints contributed to the creation of great confusion among Muslims.688 
 
At the same time, the Islamic Schools adopted more rigorous689 forms of 
methodology.690 They classified Fiqh as a science and divided it into two 
categories. The first, ‘Ijma’, meant a group of scholars from all four Islamic 
schools agreeing on a common consensus, whether at a domestic or an 
																																																						
679 Ibid 43. 
680 Siddqui (n 76). 
681 Schacht (n 638) 29-58. 
682 HJ Liebesny, The Law of the Near & Middle East Readings, Cases, & Materials (State University of 
New York, 1975). 
683 Ibrahim (n 262). 
684 For further reading on the role of hadith in interpretation of the Shariah law, see JAC Brown, Islamic 
History and Civilization of al-Bukhari and Muslim: The Formation and Function of the Sunni Hadith 
Canon (Brill Academic Publishers, 2007) 47-98. 
685 Goldziher (n 644) 47; see also Ibrahim (n 262). 
686 Siddiqui (n 76) 18. 
687 Liebesny (n 652). 
688 Siddiqui (n 76) 18. 
689 Schumpeter argues that ‘a Science is any kind of knowledge that has been the object of conscious 
efforts to improve it, such efforts produce habits of mind – methods or ‘techniques’ – and a command of 
facts unearthed by these techniques which are beyond the range of the mental habits and the factual 
knowledge of everyday life. Hence we may also adopt the practically equivalent definition: a science is 
any field of knowledge that has developed specialized techniques of fact-finding and of interpretation or 
inference (analysis)’. JA Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (Routledge, 1997) 7. 
690 Goldziher (n 644) 44. 
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ecumenical level.691 The second, or ‘Qiyas’, referred to the process of analytical 
reasoning by a group of scholars based on the primary sources of Shariah—the 
Holy Qur’an and Sunna’h.692 These two categories, Ijma and Qiyas, are 
considered secondary sources of legal interpretation. 
 
A third form, Ijtihad,693 is also regarded as a secondary source. Under Ijtihad, 
individual, independent scholars started expressing their views and 
interpretations of Shariah law.694 This in turn led to further confusion among the 
Shariah courts in considering the interpretations of Shariah law, because each 
Ijtihad scholar gave a different interpretation in relation to legal issues.695 In a 
sharp rebuke of this confusion from the eleventh century onward, the Shariah 
courts have stopped considering the Ijtihad scholars’ interpretations.696 
 
In short, it appears that issues of recasting the disciplines of Muslim thinkers in 
interpretation of Fiqh are classified into two camps: one is the modernist thinker 
who advocates for intellectual, cultural, philosophical and ontological 
approaches similar to Western thought,697 while the other are the conservative 
thinkers who rely on elements of traditionalist thought to address problems from 
the context of occidental philosophy.698 
 
It is important to observe here that the idea of Fiqh is to provide general, 
specific or absolutely qualified indications, commands or principles in the 
interpretation of the Holy Qur’anic text and Sunna’h.699 When a scholar studies 
the principles of the Holy Qur’anic text or Sunna’h, he should conclude his rules 
of interpretation with internal and external evidence, which would help the 
scholar of Fiqh to determine the ruling on a certain matter when the principles of 
																																																						
691 Schacht (n 638) 29-58. 
692 Baamir (n 18) 9. 
693 Here are several different opinions on the term Ijtihad. For example, a section of Sunni ‘ulama' 
believes that ‘ijtihad means making effort and endeavor in order to achieve presumption (zann) regarding 
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694 WB Hallaq, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?’, in Law and Legal Theory in Classical and Medieval 
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Fiqh are applied to a particular fact to discover the contextual meaning.700 This 
would advance the goal of a clearer understanding of the differing viewpoints 
espoused. 
 
Legal interpretation has been a matter of great controversy for many centuries 
and, for that reason, the issue of legal interpretation has continued to be 
discussed by great scholars, academics and experts.701 It has been argued that 
issues of interpretation have arisen because of the difference of legal sub-
disciplines developed by lawyers and judges to investigate the contextual 
																																																						
700 Ibid. 
701 For example, Yasutomo et al point out that the issue of legal Interpretation occurred in 18th-century 
Europe, when judges developed the concept of public reason to adjudicate the case. They emphasise that 
this, however, might be problematic. When the judges developed ‘finding reasonable solutions through 
legal interpretation, reading reason into the law was mainly a pre-18th century practice. In contrast, what 
developed in the 18th century was the replacement of reason by authority’. Yasutomo et al also draw on 
Hobbes theory to say ‘authority, not reason, made the law. The power of absolutist kings controlled the 
judiciary, and directed them to follow the wishes of the sovereign; the concept of authority was this firmly 
rooted in this century, and the scope for judicial interpretation became increasingly narrower’ See M 
Yasutomo, M Stolleis & JL Halperin, Interpretation of Law in the Age of Enlightenment, From the Rule 
of the King to the Rule of Law (Springer, 2011) viii. Similarly, Smith draws on the philosophy of Hobbes 
to simplify the scope of interpretation. He outlines that ‘good and evil are terms of individual imposition; 
by tacit agreement one may say they are left to a personal interpretation; there is no common rule of good 
and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves’ WG Pogson Smith, Hobbes’s Leviathan, 
reprinted from the edition of 1651 (Oxford University Press, 1909) xv. Furthermore, Stolleis outlines that 
‘all texts are ambiguous, be they divine commandments or human norms; simple directions or instruction 
manuals’. He further states that ‘modern law can be seen as a product of an evolving parliamentarianism, 
and the legislature, which can enact the law’. See M Stolleis, ‘Judicial Interpretation in Transition from 
the Ancient Regime to Constitutionalism’, in M Yasutomo, M Stolleis & JL Halperin, Interpretation of 
Law in the Age of Enlightenment, From the Rule of the King to the Rule of Law (Springer, 2011) 3, 7. 
Interestingly, Pollock observes that the combination of the laws of nature and laws of man still have a 
resemblance and criticism within the field of action to which they apply. He posits that ‘constancy, 
compared with the partial and uncertain obedience given to human ordinances, has in all times presented 
itself to men as the perfect fulfilment in another region of that which the lawgiver can only strive to attain. 
By laws we can, more or less, make men behave in particular ways; the constraints of express enactment 
or customary rules are sufficient to some extent, but not altogether, to determine their acts and 
forbearance. But the powers of nature always behave in the same ways, and this readily suggests to our 
mind a constraint which is always present and always efficient’. F Pollock, ‘Laws of Nature and Laws of 
Man’, in F Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics (London MacMillan & Co, 1882) 43. It is also 
noted that Bottomley and Bronitt hold that the scope of the interpretation of legal context is to achieve 
pre-determined results in social and economic arenas. Their idea was that ‘laws, once enacted, are thus 
regarded as somehow independent of their political and social contexts. This is sometimes reinforced in 
legal education, which tends to focus on teaching the legal rules (their meaning and scope) and overlooks 
the context of their enforcement’. They also point out that the issue of interpretation of legal texts lies in 
defining the legislative rules as it might have quite different effects in reality. See S Bottomley & S 
Bronitt, Law in Context (4th edn, The Federation Press, 2012) 329. On this point, Fiss notes that legal 
interpretation ‘is a dynamic interaction between reader and text, and meaning the product of that 
interaction. It is an activity that affords a proper recognition of both the subjective and objective 
dimensions of human experience; and for that reason, has emerged in recent decades as an attractive 
method for studying all social activity’. See OM Fiss, ‘Objectivity and Interpretation’, in JL Coleman 
(ed), Constitutional Law and its Interpretation, Vol 3 (Garland Publishing) 433. 
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meaning of the substantive law.702 However, the development of legal rules for 
interpretation at different stages would lead to variations in interpreting the legal 
texts, which would in turn affect the way in which jurisprudential contributions 
are developed and this is inconsistent with the study of Islamic jurisprudence.703 
 
It is also suggested that the interpretation issues of legal texts be confronted 
and, where possible, resolved because this failure to harmonize Saudi legal 
texts with international law inhibits international trade.704 This means the 
uniformity of the new Saudi laws must be harmonised with the idiosyncrasies of 
individual Islamic judges interpreting and applying Shariah.705 This, of course, 
leaves unanswered the question whether a single uniform set of rules and 
principles would aid in achieving a more effective and efficient Saudi arbitral 
regime.  
 
In moving toward a clarity of understanding through consistent interpretation, 
the issue of legal interpretation initially arises from the highly theoretical 
approach taken by so called ‘ivory tower’ scholars who do not sit in the trenches 
of modern day international trade.706 For example, Ramic claims that ‘a scholar 
concerned with the interpretation of text has the responsibility of uncovering all 
its possible meanings, and of employing every method of interpretation that is 
linguistically acceptable’.707 
 
Principles and doctrines approached in this fashion, while appropriate for 
scholastic study, provide little or nothing to the practical reasoning and analysis 
of the facts of a modern day international arbitral dispute, in which the parties 
simply want to determine their contractual and legal rights and move on.708 
Unlike substantive law enacted by the state, such as the law of property, labour 
law, welfare law or civil rights law, which consists of sets of applicable rules to 
																																																						
702 P Wahlgren, The Purpose and Usefulness of Jurisprudence (Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian 
Law, 2010) 507. 
703 Ibid 507. 
704 Gaillard (n 218). 
705 Ibid. 
706 A Shaharuddin, ‘The Bay ‘al-Inah Controversy in Malaysian Islamic Banking’ (2012) 26(4) ALQ 499-
511. 
707 Ramic (n 669) 3. 
708 S Guest, Ronald Dworkin (3rd edn, Stanford University Press, 2013). 
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determine the facts of the case, Shariah theory is beyond the interest or 
understanding of the normal, everyday trader.709 
 
Indeed, some scholars suggest that the purpose of the law and legislative 
regimes is to guide men’s conduct toward one another by defining what is off 
limits and thus not permitted.710 In this view, Pollock says that ‘laws are not 
statements of what will happen: they are statements of what does not 
happen’.711 If a law cannot be understood, or if it has many different 
interpretations, the ordinary citizen or businessman cannot find the guidance he 
requires to act responsibly in the field of commerce.712 Accordingly, it is the 
judge’s duty to give effect to the intention of law-makers by interpreting the 
legislative instruments to given them clarity to all who must know them.713 This 
act of clarity also serves to advance the state’s exercise of its sovereignty by 
specifying the exact meaning of legal instruments with which its citizens and 
foreign actors must comply.714 
 
Bell and Engle draw on the writings of Bennion715 to further address the subject 
matter of statutory interpretation.716 They explain that the handling of legislative 
texts by judges is essentially analytical and interpretive; judges are the only 
persons constitutionally empowered to interpret such text authoritatively.717  
																																																						
709 R Calnan, Principles of Contractual Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 2013). In contrast, 
Pollock relies on Holland’s writings to say that ‘the State’s being the fountain of legal right does not 
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Courts’. See F Pollock, ‘The Nature of Jurisprudence, Considered in Relation to Some Recent 
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710 Ibid 45. 
711 Ibid 48. 
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714 Lord Norton of Louth, ‘Parliament and Legislative Scrutiny: An Overview of Issues in the Legislative 
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In this instance, a challenge arises when Muslim and non-Muslim authors are 
somewhat selective in their treatment of the relevant topics concerning the 
interpretation of Fiqh in English, with the effect that certain subjects are ignored 
in discussions in their work.718 It appears that some of these topics require rules 
of interpretation because of technicalities drawing on the use of Arabic 
terminology.719 In other words, meaning can be lost in translation. 
 
One explanation for these translation issues is that the rules of the Islamic Fiqh 
are derived from the Holy Qur’an and Sunna’h with a body of principles and 
methods that apply to the subject matter.720 These methods of interpretation are 
of primary concern to the Islamic Fiqh because of the lack of uniformity 
practised by Muslim scholars in developing the Islamic Fiqh.721 
 
Some scholars argue that the Islamic Fiqh is simply a methodology of law, but 
this argument is incomplete.722 The methodology of Fiqh must be fluid. It must 
‘remain open to further adaption and refinement in order to respond to changing 
needs of society and civilisation’.723 Hence, the question might be posed as to 
whether the Islamic Schools have any influence on the current Saudi legislation. 
 
The answer to this question is yes. Though the Saudi legislature does not 
operate in the same manner as the secular governments in Western countries, 
the Saudi legislature must adhere to the principles of Shariah.724 In practice, of 
course the situation is rather more complex. This is because Saudi Arabia 
follows the Hanbali School when enacting legislation, whilst Shariah scholars 
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and judges from different Muslim countries do not have a uniform approach to 
interpretation.725 
 
For example, some Muslim states follow the work of the Shafi’i School, 
accepting and following directly the work of ash-Shafi’i.726 The Shafi’i school of 
thought was headed by Imam Muhammad ibn Idris Al-shafi’i who lived from 
150H.727 Born in Hijaz, Egypt at the time of the Fatimid Dynasty his teachings 
were taught and given wide acceptance at Al-azhar University.728 However, 
Salah Al-Din Al-ayyubi disagreed violently with his views, banning it in Al-azhar 
and resurrecting the other madhahib including that of Imam Shafi’i, who was 
killed in Egypt in 198H.729 
 
By contrast, the followers of the Hanbali School are conservative when it comes 
to accepting the work of the Hanbali School, because they reject the idea of 
human reason in the development of Islamic Fiqh.730 It was later observed that 
the Hanbalis accepted the validity of Qiyas.731 Many of the disagreements 
stemming from this acceptance resulted in armed confrontations, killings and 
violence. 
 
Despite this troubled history, the late King Fadh bin Abdulaziz of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia issued royal decrees to modernise the Saudi legislation, such as 
the Basic Law of Governance, the Provincial Councils’ law and the Majlis Ash-
Shura law.732 This was done purposefully, to ensure that the Shura council 
could cope with the rapid developments the country had experienced in recent 
years in all sectors.733 
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The Consultative Assembly of the Shura Council was given a vital role in 
enacting the Saudi legislation in which Islamic experts and scholars advised the 
Saudi government on the application of Shariah.734 However, one should note 
that the consultative assembly cannot pass or enforce laws, as that right that is 
reserved exclusively for the King of Saudi Arabia. It is thus necessary to ask: 
what is the purpose of challenging and analysing the differing interpretations of 
the pertinent legal text relating to international arbitration law? 
 
5.2.2 Analysing and Challenging Differing Interpretations of the Legal Text 
of Shariah as Applied to Saudi Arbitration Law 
 
Before analysing the challenges experienced in interpreting the legal text of 
Shariah as applied to Saudi Arbitration Law, it is essential to understand the 
purpose of focusing on these interpretations in the first place.735 The 
interpretation of legal texts ‘embodies a necessary inference which 
accompanies the meaning, and this represents the principal theme and purpose 
of the text’.736 
 
The purpose of providing a correct interpretation of a legal text is to ascertain 
the contextual meaning of the language of the text so that a reasonable person 
would understand the meaning of the text and identify any ambiguity as to its 
true meaning and content.737 In other words, contextual meaning of the law 
should be understood without increasing or decreasing its meaning because it 
is not an intended meaning but rather an indication of text’s meaning.738 For 
example, it has been suggested that legal principles need to be stressed in the 
interpretation and construction of legal text to determine the contextual legal 
meaning because every individual act passed by a law-giver is incomplete 
law.739 
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Conversely, the enforcement of legal principles and rules does not always 
involve in fact arguments, and rarely involves a rigorous journey to ascertain the 
contextual legal meaning of the text.740 Day to day trade contracts and 
international trade are much more practical. Of course, it is inevitable that 
lawyers, arbitrators and judges have and will continue to have different 
disciplinary perspectives, each embracing different definitions and different 
approaches to interpretation based on their own particular disciplinary 
assumptions and methodologies.741 This is simply the way in which life, trade 
and legal practice functions. For example, Bottomley and Bronitt claim that ‘the 
rules are made by those with experience and expertise in the field and, so it is 
assumed, compliance with the rules is therefore more likely’.742 This is a fair 
assessment because rules can be changed and updated easily as setting forth 
minimal standards of conduct for professionals operating in the pertinent legal 
arena.743 Indeed, Stone asserts that the process of legal reasoning or legal rules 
should not be concealed by its pretence,744 stating ‘the legal rules are never 
clear it cannot be said that the legal process is the application of known rules to 
divers facts … the rules change as the rules are applied’.745 
 
Notwithstanding his somewhat unique view, it has been argued that a lawyer 
has an ethical obligation to ascertain the subject matter and interpret the 
legislation.746 For example, Wendel says that ‘the content of legal entitlements 
cannot simply be read directly from legal texts. Rather, the content of many 
legal entitlements can be discerned only with some effort and with the use of 
judgement’.747 Of course, when there is a lacunae in the legislation, this 
uncertainty creates opportunities for abuse by a clever lawyer who might 
manipulate the interpretation of law into meanings that do not actually exist in 
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the case at hand.748 This can lead to practical problems because of the lack of 
uniformity in interpreting the legislation and the unpredictability in the outcome 
of commercial transactions, both domestic and international.749 
 
5.2.2.1 Lack of Uniformity 
 
Shariah suffers from a wide diversity of interpretation, from one Islamic court to 
the next, and from one Islamic country to the next. Some scholars argue that 
‘[c]omplexities and difficulties arise in part from the very fact that the law is 
embodied in authoritative written form and not in oral tradition or the precedents 
of courts’.750 
 
It is difficult to find the precise points of distinction that give individuality and 
character to the legal context of written legislation.751 Many legal texts are 
unclear in their contextual meaning, and this lack of certainty often requires 
judicial interpretations.752 Here it appears that the rise of the parliamentary 
system in modern states has served to simplify the process of legislation by 
employing the principles of judicial review to adjudicate and resolve problems in 
legal interpretation with finality—the judicial decision provides the final word that 
all must thereafter follow.753 
 
Conversely, it appears that all states have systems of law to interpret the 
substantive context of the written law.754 This is generally known as legal 
jurisprudence. Yet, there is a controversy on the scope and nature of 
jurisprudence in interpreting the legislation.755 This is because the subject 
matter involved and issues of jurisprudence in interpreting law are of two central 
																																																						
748 Ibid. 
749 An-Na’im (n 269). 
750 TFT Plucknett, Statutes & Their Interpretation in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century (Cambridge 
University Press, 1922) xiv. 
751 Ibid. 
752 Ibid. 
753 Ibid. 
754 Penner (n 696). 
755 In a thoughtful discussion, Perry posits that ‘jurisprudence gives rise to special methodological 
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strands—the philosophy of law, on the one hand, and legal theory on the 
other.756 The distinction between the two can be defined as follows: 
 
[L]egal philosophy proposes and considers theories of law, 
theories about the very thing that the law is, whereas legal theory 
proposes and considers theories about the law, theories, which 
reveal, interrogate, and refine our various beliefs about law.757 
 
Concept and belief of course can and do differ in the minds of different 
interpreters.758 For example, the philosopher of law would look to the concept of 
law to understand issues in the law and build a theory to show how the law can 
be seen as a form of communal and practical reasoning.759 Whereas, by 
contrast, a legal theorist would look to conceptual analysis to understand the 
law to reveal new truths about law and to integrate present beliefs about the 
law.760 It appears that the philosophy of law is thus the construction of a theory 
of the nature of morality, not a theory of law, in which the law is used as a 
model for understanding morality.761 
 
In this respect, it has been argued that law is just a tool employed by a society 
to attain certain goals.762 Certainly in some respects this is true. If so, perhaps 
scholarship on the law should be considered like rules because the concepts 
and doctrines of law are created by the non-law concepts and social doctrines 
of the society.763  
 
Now, what is the nature of the Saudi legislation? As has been previously 
discussed, Saudi legislation is based on the principles of the Holy Qur’an and 
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Sunna’h (Shariah law). It was also noted that in the Muslim concept, the 
Shariah is quite simply a law.764 
 
Given this premise, it is fair to say that the principles of Fiqh are essential to 
understanding the legal philosophy of Islam, because the source of Shariah is 
treated as sacred law and exclusive in the sense of a rule of law. 765 Keeping 
this in mind, the role of the domestic courts in the application of interpretation is 
one of the most of highly debated issues in contemporary international legal 
doctrine.766 For example, Aust outlines the issue of lack of uniformity that lies at 
the heart of applying international law by domestic courts with respect to 
determination and interpretation.767 The idea is that different legal cultures and 
forms of education necessarily impact the way international lawyers and 
domestic courts reason on questions of international law.768 Domestic courts are 
merely actors who translate requirements from international law into domestic 
terminology. In this view, the law should be interpreted in a manner to bring 
uniformity first, then it must progress to reflecting the needs and demands of 
contemporary society.769 
 
Some scholars suggest that lack of uniformity occurs when lawyers and courts 
fail to adopt generally accepted rules of interpretation, even when uniform rules 
of interpretation are very much in the self-interest of domestic courts when 
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applied to the international rules of interpretation.770 For example, Pollock 
observes:  
 
[A]s the man of science has to predict what will happen under new 
conditions from what is known to have happened under more or 
less similar conditions, so the man of law must predict the decision 
of a new case from what is known to have been decided in more 
or less similar cases.771 
 
It can be seen, therefore, that rules of interpretation should be conceived as a 
precise guideline from which eminent lawyers and judges should make their 
inductions from general propositions to express their opinions.772 That being the 
case, the judge must understand the statutory text in the usual spirit of the 
subject matter of the legislation, although the intention of Parliament is 
important in determining the meaning of a statutory text contained in one or 
more documents.773 
 
Some, however, find it difficult to accept this argument, because the role of 
judge is not to determine the intention of legislative body but rather the meaning 
of its enactment (though American judges are called upon to interpret legislative 
intent routinely, as part of American jurisprudence).774  
 
Regardless of legislative intent issues of lack of uniformity still arise when the 
lawyers and judges only apply the rules of interpretations to determine the 
contextual and literal meaning of a law.775 Still, different people with different 
backgrounds and from different schools of thought interpret the same law—the 
same language—differently.776 A restricted interpretation might defeat the scope 
of the literal wording of the statute, thereby advancing one agenda or policy 
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objective, whereas a broad interpretation might aid to extend the law, according 
to its mens or ‘ratio’, thereby advancing another agenda or policy objective. In 
Western jurisprudence, such differences are taught in law school and occur in 
reported court decisions every day.777 
 
Similarly, some argue that the principles and teachings of the Islamic Schools 
further differ from each other because of political and economic events.778 The 
problem posed here is of a different order than differing interpretations of 
Shariah as applied to legislation or contracts.779 But to understand how political 
and economic events can shape general principles of law of jurisprudence, it is 
necessary to first clarify the methodology of interpretation adopted by the four 
Islamic Schools.780 
 
Rahim discusses the methodologies adopted by the four Islamic Schools in their 
process of interpreting the sources of Shariah law to develop Islamic 
jurisprudence.781 As he does with each, he examines the teachings of Imam 
Abu-hanifah, who founded the Hanifa School.782 Abu-hanifa acquired 
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remarkable powers of reasoning and a clear understanding of the source of the 
Holy Qur’an and Sunna’h.783 Abu-hanifah teachings depended less on the 
source of Shariah law in reaching legal conclusions compared to other jurists 
because some of the jurists were upholders of the source of Shariah law, 
whereas others were upholders of private opinion.784 Abu-hanifah’s principles, 
by contrast, were confined within a narrow focus on the source of Shariah from 
which a rule of law might be legitimately deduced.785 
 
In the case of the Malik School, it appears the teachings of Malik were based 
more upon the source of Shariah and ‘the usages of the Prophet and the 
precedents established by his Companions’.786 It has been argued that the 
usages and customs practised at Madina have had great influence in 
understanding the source of Shariah law, because they must have been 
transmitted from the time of the Prophet Mohammed.787 
 
Interestingly, Muhammad ibn Idris Al-shafi’i, founder of the Shafi’i School, 
adopted the methodologies of both Hanifa and Maliki in his teachings, when 
considering the use of the source of Shariah and the analogy of jurists.788 He 
allowed accorded greater respect to individual jurists’ opinions to create a more 
liberal outlook in the interpretation of the sources of Shariah law.789 His idea 
was to create a balance between strict judgements and the moderation of 
views, drawing on the preaching of Prophet as validation: ‘My people will never 
agree in an error’.790  
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However, the teachings of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, founder of the Hanbali 
School, appear to be more learned in the sources of Shariah than in the 
analogy of law.791 Hanbal adhered rigidly to the source of Shariah in his 
teachings and allowed a narrow margin to the doctrines of analogy and other 
jurists’ opinion.792 It is also noted that during the time of Hanbal, the age of 
independent jurists (Ijtihad) came to an end, and the work that has been done 
since then in developing the laws and legal science has been mainly 
supplementary.793 
 
Further, it has been argued the scope of analogy is an exercise in jurisprudence 
(Fiqh).794 For example, Hoover draws on the philosophy of Ibn Taymiyya to say 
that: 
 
[B]asic religious and ethical truths are also known by reason. 
Reason knows that the Creator must be the sole object of worship 
and that nothing may be associated with Him. Reason also knows 
which human actions are good (Hasan) and which are bad 
(Qabih). This is because good and bad reduce to the difference 
between suitability, pleasure, profit and benefit for the agent on 
one hand and unsuitability, incompatibility, pain, harm and 
detriment on the other.795 
 
The wider point to be noted here is that tradition and rational arguments would 
marginalise the role of analogy.796 
 
Returning the above discussed issue of legal interpretation of legislative acts or 
instruments, it has been persuasively argued that the scholars who carry out an 
investigation to obtain isharat al-nass (alluded meaning) of the context have 
different levels of understanding and ability.797 When scholars rely on the rulings 
derived from the alluded meanings, it establishes a correlation with the explicit 
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meaning.798 The correlation between the explicit and alluded meaning would 
become apparent only when the deeper opinions of an independent scholar 
(Ijtihad) are considered because understanding alluded meaning can 
sometimes be achieved quickly, whereas understanding explicit meaning needs 
deeper and more critical opinions of scholars.799 That is not in the nature or 
intention of alluded meaning to convey the meaning of the text; rather, it is used 
to supplement meanings of the words, but not necessarily intended to relay 
them.800 
 
Conversely, scholars suggest that the controversy over the reinterpretation of 
legal rules by scholars and ijtihad is simply an elaboration of legal rules of a 
certain status.801 For instance, arguably the establishment of the four Islamic 
Schools made it no longer possible for the ijtihad to perform its function.802 This 
is so, because were then required operate within the standards of one of the 
four Schools when expressing their views and opinions.803 
 
This historical phenomenon then evolved into a problem of uncertainty in 
interpreting the Shariah, because scholars and modern legislative bodies mostly 
ignored methodologies practiced by traditional scholars to interpret the source 
of the Shariah.804 Instead, they chose whichever law from any of the four 
schools went in the direction they wanted to go.805 It is important to bear in mind 
that ‘as man has developed his needs and his facilities for meeting his needs, 
the rules become more numerous and more complicated’,806 all whilst still 
serving his perceived needs. 
 
In fact, this lack of uniformity leads to challenges for international contracting 
parties and arbitrators, as well as practitioners interpreting the Islamic 
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jurisprudence and Saudi legislation in international arbitration.807 In this sense, 
Saeed recommends having uniformity between Shariah and Islamic public 
policy concerns: 
 
[M]uslims must develop institutions that are unquestionably 
Islamic and in opposition to the practices and values being 
imposed by the West – that Shariah should be brought into the 
public sphere in a significant way, influencing the political, 
economic, social, cultural, intellectual, and financial life of 
Muslims.808 
 
Of course, language has a significant influence on the abilities of the actors to 
understand, interpret and apply the law, from the vantage point of their own 
social and cultural backgrounds.809 How then does language become an issue 
in interpreting the Saudi legislation? 
 
As previously discussed in this Chapter, the conservative Hanbali School is the 
official school of Saudi Arabia. It provides the doctrines and principles that must 
be used in properly interpreting Saudi legislation. In this connection, it is 
important remind readers that the role of law in the Saudi society differs from 
																																																						
807 For example, As-Sadr advocates that the form of ijtihad has become the cause of disagreement among 
the jurists because it creates obscurity and confusion. He even points out the word ijtihad has been used to 
express the idea of a process of derivation, which amounts to lack of uniformity in interpreting the 
Shariah law. See As-Sadr (n 272) 47. Similarly, Mustafa outlines that the practice of Taqlid means 
following the views of someone whose opinion was not it considered a proof, and this might be a reason 
for uncertainty in interpreting Shariah law. He points out that the practice of taqlid was used in an attempt 
to solidify religious law and prevent it from interfered with political authority. This, however, might be 
problematic. It would prevent an ordinary Muslim, who wishes to seek for some clarification in legal 
loopholes from the various schools of law. Instead, the doctrine of taqlid institutionalism would compel 
an ordinary Muslim to obtain legal rulings from a particular school of law. Mustafa assets that ‘the rise of 
taqlid was a result of the desire of the scholarly class to limit the discretionary powers of legal officials at 
the bottom of the legal hierarchy, by obliging them to adhere to a particular school of law. Yet other 
argues that the emergence of a regime of taqlid was an inevitable result of the pressures that push all legal 
systems towards greater institutionalisation’. This idea of institutionalisation was protested by some 
members of the Islamic Schools; for example, in Saudi Arabia, ‘the anti-taqlid stance of the majority of 
the Hanbali religious elite, there have been calls from some members of that elite for a set of codified 
laws that all judges would be obliged to follow’. See AR Mustafa, On Taqlid, Ibn al Qayyim’s Critique of 
Authority in Islamic Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 6-7. 
808 A Saeed, ‘Sharia and Finance’, in Peters & Bearman(n 18) 249. 
809 For example, Venzke asserts, ‘for the language of international law this means not to look at the 
sources of the law but at its practice in search of what the law is. The common narrative of international 
lawmaking tells quite to the contrary, however, that international legal norms are based on the consent of 
those subject to them-in international law it has for long been rather clear that those subjects of the legal 
order are unitary states’. See I Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law, On Semantic 
Change and Normative Twists (Oxford University Press, 2012) 1; Buhring-Uhle (n 2). 
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that which is familiar to Westerners.810 As previously discussed, unlike secular-
based Western law, the legal theories behind Saudi law faithfully adhere to the 
belief that Islamic law serves, and is the expression of, God’s will.811 
 
Again, as opposed to Western legal regimes where religion and state are 
separated constitutionally, in Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia Islamic law 
‘provides its adherents with the knowledge of their duties so that they might 
more properly conduct this life and prepare for the next, and enforces God’s will 
that one do what is morally proper and refrain from doing what is morally 
wrong’.812 Indeed, the sources of Shariah law preach that God would not permit 
his believers to do wrong in the first place.813 
 
But aside from theory there is, some would say, the reality of daily life. Modern 
Islamic scholars or theorists from the liberal Islamic Schools put theory aside 
and express concern more with settling the day-to-day disputes of their 
followers than plunging into the depths of esoteric Islamic theory.814 Their 
approach is not acceptable to the conservative Hanbali School, thus creating a 
rift in viewpoints and approaches.815 
 
Conversely, Halim draws on the works of al-nawawi816 to point out the 
challenges of achievement of authenticating historic hadith (jurisprudence) 
reports as respects legal work and interpretation.817 He critically recounts the 
habit of the ancient jurists (al-mutaqaddimum) to remain silent regarding the 
hadith,818 and then progressively formulates their approach as follows: 
 
[T]hey quoted in their works, without indicating from whom the 
hadith is narrated, and without specifying whether the hadith they 
																																																						
810 Venzke (n 781) 6. 
811 Ibid 1. 
812 Ibid 6. 
813 Feldman (n 20). 
814 Brand (n 139) 4. 
815 As-Sadr (n 272). 
816 Yahya b. Sharaf al-Nawawi, a great scholar in the Shafi’i School of Law. For thoughtful analysis of his 
work, see FA Halim, Legal Authority in Premodern Islam, Yahya b. Sharaf al-Nawawi in the Shafi’i 
School of Law (Routledge, 2015). 
817 Ibid. 
818 Ibid. 
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used was sound or weak, except for a few, despite the fact that 
they were known as hadith scholars, because it was sufficient for 
them to refer to the books that they knew (i.e. the book of Fiqh or 
hadith collections), to the point where people no longer paid 
attention to what is in the book.819 
 
This lack of attention, or blind acceptance leaves modern actors uncertain of the 
reliability of ancient interpretations in identifying which hadith was strong and 
which were weak.820 This can be observed in Hanbal’s masa’il collections about 
the quality of the hadith whenever there was disagreement over a legal 
position.821 It appears therefore that the contribution offered by the Islamic 
Schools was and is to accommodate the need of Muslims to anchor law in 
certain authority.822 At least in this way, legal certainty is constructed and legal 
judgment established from its divine sources.823  
 
5.3 The Relevance of Sharia Perspectives on Arbitration 
 
This section will attempt to bridge the divide between the interpretation of 
legislative instrument and intent, as applied to new arbitration law and public 
policy defences, and the domain of private law and principles. In general, 
Shariah sets forth a number of principles on contract and enforcement, 
including rules requiring mutual consent, capacity, agreed upon terms and 
conditions and agreed upon price or benefit between both parties.824 
Consensus and fair contractual terms are foundational concepts in Islamic 
theories of contract law and construction. Under Islamic Shariah, moreover, a 
contract is only valid if devoid of ‘Muhrram’ (an issue forbidden under Shariah 
law).825 Exemplars of Muhrram, or clauses not permitted by Shariah, include 
																																																						
819 Ibid 38. 
820 Ibid. 
821 Ibid. 
822 It is notable in the work of Ignaz Goldziher that ‘old Arabic mentality which Muhammed felt such a 
powerful call to influence are being made more readily available to us through current philological work; 
but they do not give satisfactory information about religious matters’. See SM Stern & H Dabashi (ed), 
Ignaz Goldziher Muslim Studies (Transaction Publishers, 2006) 12. 
823 Halim (n 788) 40-41. 
824 J. Otto, Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim 
Countries in Past and Present (The University of Chicago Press 2010) 167.  
825 Quran, 4:29. 
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riba (usury)826 and gharar (speculation, deception or excessive risk)827. 
Contracts that contain facid or fayed (are unfairly one-sided, or obstructionist in 
nature) clauses may also provide grounds for invalidating a contract.828  
 
The constitutive elements of private law doctrines of Islamic law and 
jurisprudence are wide-ranging and complex, and accordingly fall beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is worth highlighting some key features of 
Islamic arbitration law. The validity of arbitration is well established in Islamic 
history and recognised under the four sources of the Shariah, namely the 
Qu’ran, Sunnah, Idjma’ (consensus of opinion) and Qiyas (reasoning by 
analogy).829  
 
The Qu’ran states the following: ‘But no, by your Lord, they can have no Faith, 
until they make you (O Muhammad SAW) judge in all disputes between them, 
and find in themselves no resistance against your decisions, and accept (them) 
with full submission’.830 Notwithstanding the authority and recognition afforded 
to it under the hierarchy of Islamic sources, many scholars continue to dispute 
the very concept of arbitration, with the binding effect and finality of arbitral 
awards a point of contention among various schools of Islamic thought.  
 
For some jurists, arbitration is best understood as a non-binding form of dispute 
resolution.831 In line with this juristic perspective, a decision rendered by the 
arbitrator is neither final nor binding on the parties, and does not have the 
authority or weight of a court judgement. This is a highly significant area of 
controversy among Islamic jurists, since it implies that an arbitrator’s decision 
does not have final jurisdiction to settle disputes, absent the parties’ consent.832 
In this sense, Islamic law upholds the principle of party autonomy. Yet, one can 
																																																						
826 Holy Quran verses: 2:275-280, 3:130, 4:161, and 30:39. 
827 Holy Quran verse (al-Baqarah 2:188): ‘And do not eat up your property among yourselves for 
vanities’. Or Sunnah ‘Sell not what is not with you’. http://www.islamic-finance.com/item160_f.htm.  
828 AKhalid Medallah ‘A Review of Projects and Construction Law Practice in Saudi Arabia’ (2015) 8 J. 
of Pol. & Law, 1. 
829 A. H. El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 
p.16. 
830 H. M. Fathy, ‘Arbitration According to Islamic Law (Sharia)’ (2000) 1 Arab Arb. J. at p. 31. 
831 A. H. El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999),) 
at p.16. 
832 A. H. El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 
p.24. 
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also see how this might present challenges at the level of enforcement of 
domestic or foreign awards, by the mere fact that an arbitrator does not have an 
inherent jurisdiction over the dispute and arbitration agreements can be revoked 
or overturned. Scholars who support this view will often invoke the following 
verse from the Qu’ran: ‘If you fear a breach between them twain (the man and 
his wife), appoint (two) arbitrators, one from his family and the other from her's; 
if they both wish for peace, Allâh will cause their reconciliation. Indeed, Allâh is 
Ever All Knower, Well Acquainted with all things’.833 Jurists in the Islamic world 
have increasingly disregarded the above position as obsolete and ill founded.834 
 
It is increasingly accepted, among all schools, that an arbitration agreement that 
parties should be bound by the decision of the arbitrator(s), thereby approving a 
conception of arbitration which is closer to its modern form. In this view, an 
arbitrator has authority not only to resolve a dispute; this authority also 
empowers him to issue awards that bind both parties. In support of this claim, 
jurists will cite the following Quranic verse: ‘Verily! Allâh commands that you 
should render back the trusts to those, to whom they are due; and that when 
you judge between men, you judge with justice’.835 Indeed, authorities on 
Islamic models of arbitration have stated that that respect and recognition for 
arbitral awards is not only compatible with Islamic Shariah, but in fact required 
by it. In justification of this view, scholars directly apply verses of the Qu’ran that 
demand parties abide by their contractual undertakings in good faith and ‘…fulfil 
every agreement, for every engagement…’836  
 
It is interesting to note that this interpretative controversy stems from the 
different meanings attributed to the Arabic word for arbitration or ‘Hakam’, which 
can be translated to have the broader meaning of empowering an authorised 
person to settle disputes among parties and to dispose of rights, or a narrower 
definition which places the arbitrator in a more conciliatory role aimed at 
enabling parties to reach a mutually amicable decision.837 
																																																						
833 The Holy Qu’ran: 4: 35. 
834 A. Razak Al-Sanhury, Masader Al-Haq, Vol. 1, (Cairo: Dar Al-Nahza Al-Arbia, 1968) at p. 80. 
835 The Holy Qu’ran: 4:58. 
836 A. Al-Mawardi, Adab al-Qadi, (Cairo: Saadah Publication 1327H) at p.383. 
837 M. I. Abul-Enein, ‘Liberal Trends in Islamic Law (Shari a) on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes’ (2000) 
2 J. Arab Arb. at p. 2. 
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For the proponents of the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, arbitration is 
closer in character to conciliation than it is to a binding award. It should be 
emphasised, however, that Hanafi scholars accept that a disputing party cannot 
avoid its obligation to comply with the award since an agreement to resort to 
arbitration binds the parties in the same ways as any other contract. More 
importantly, Hanafi scholars will emphasise the duty of disputing parties to 
uphold and enforce the terms of any agreement they have entered into, in good 
faith. Going further still, advocates of the Shafi school recognise arbitration as 
legal practice, with binding effects, irrespective of whether the decision has 
been heard by a judge in the forum of dispute.838 
 
Nonetheless, jurists of the Shafi school also consider the arbitrators to have 
less decisional autonomy and authority than judges, without notable 
consequences for our understanding of Islamic conceptions of the (final) 
authority of local courts in the enforcement of awards, domestic or foreign. 
Indeed, the Shafi school appears to suggest that a court who revokes or annuls 
an award issued by an arbitrator acts within its lawful powers, as defined by 
Shariah.839 Strikingly, it is the Hanbali school, the school of Islamic law that is 
unofficially adopted as the constitutional foundation of the Saudi legal system, 
which has advanced a concept of arbitration that more closely conforms to 
modern international practice. Pursuant to the Hanbali school, an award or 
decision rendered by an arbitrator is assumed to have the same binding force 
and effect as a court judgment.840  
 
Consequently, an award issued by an arbitrator must be adhered to by both 
parties, subject only to the requirement of mutual consent of both parties to 
arbitration. A further condition imposed by the Hanbali school is that the 
arbitrator possess the religious expertise and qualifications as those required of 
																																																						
838 S Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: A Study in Sharia and Statute Law, 
(London: Graham & Tortman, 1984), at p. 22. 
839 Ibid. 
840Z Alqurashi, ‘Arbitration Under the Islamic Sharia’, available at http://www.nigerianlawguru.com 
<accessed 1st October 2017> p 3-4. 
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judges.841 It should be noted that the final school of Islamic jurisprudence, the 
Maliki school, has developed the most pro-arbitration position. The Malikis, for 
instance, posit that an arbitrator can be chosen by one party to the dispute, 
even without the consent of the other party. The reasoning employed by the 
Maliki jurists is that a dispute can only be settled with the mutual trust and good 
faith of both parties. The counter-party should therefore seek to enter into 
arbitration arrangements in good conscience to resolve their disputes.842 In 
contrast with the other schools discussed above, the Malikis school stresses 
that any award should be upheld and enforced in good faith, and should not be 
revoked after the commencement of the arbitration proceedings.843 
 
One issue yet to be addressed, but central to this subject matter of this thesis, is 
whether certain clauses, including arbitration clauses themselves, are valid 
under mainstream juristic interpretations of Shariah. Under the doctrinal 
analysis of the existing schools, the decision to refer to future disputes is 
viewed, by classic scholars, to infringe the Islamic injunction on uncertainty and 
future clauses in contracts. The Islamic tradition has developed its own 
conception of the freedom of contract principle, which deviates significantly from 
its mainstream definition and usages. In the Islamic tradition, parties have 
autonomy to determine the terms of their contract, providing these do not violate 
God’s commands. This rule extends to the inclusion any clauses incorporating 
interest or riba.  
 
The inclusion of arbitration clauses in contracts did not present a significant 
challenge in early Islam, for the simple fact that commercial realities of the time 
did not lend themselves to the widespread use of such provisions. In today’s 
commercial environment, Islamic scholars find themselves grappling with an 
increasingly advanced and mobile economy.844 Foreign parties who wish to do 
business in Saudi Arabia will often include interest-based or arbitration clauses 
in their contracts, and the relevant legal system will have to adapt to such 
																																																						
841 A. H. El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 
at 19. 
842 Samir Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: A Study in Sharia and Statute Law, 
(London: Graham & Tortman, 1984), at 21. 
843 Abdul Razak Al-Sanhury, Masader Al-Haq, Vol. 1, (Cairo: Dar Al-Nahza Al-Arbia, 1968) at p. 80. 
844 J Hussein, Islam: Its Law and Society’ (2nd edition, Australia, Federation Press,2004) pp. 178. 
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regularities or otherwise risk being imprisoned by rigid fidelity to certain 
interpretative traditions.845 Yet, the answer to this ‘gap’ between classic 
principles of Islamic Shariah and contemporary commercial realities may be 
found within the religion itself. As alluded to above, some principles of Islamic 
law, such as the good faith enforcement of contractual undertakings, ought to 
be respected and enforced as mandatory law. Other legal principles can be 
revised and adapted to account for new economic and social realities, as 
required by the interpretative principle of ijtihad, described above.  
 
It is here that we can draw a connection between theoretical perspectives on 
the interpretation of public or statutory acts of law-making, discussed above, 
and the development of a Shariah compliant private law, in Saudi Arabia and in 
the Islamic world more generally. Indeed, Islamic law is no different from any 
other legal system in that it must adapt to meet the needs and demands of 
Islamic societies, or any party whose rights are diminished because of inflexible 
or dogmatic application of existing laws. There is a misconception that Shariah 
is unyielding and static, but the Islamic schools do not have a monopoly on its 
development or interpretation. Indeed, Muslims are bound only by the Qu’ran, 
Sunnah, and to a lesser extent the Idjma’ and Qiyas (analogy).846  
 
Islamic principles of contract law emphasize good faith,847 honour and equity in 
the enforcement of private agreements,848 and require that parties honour their 
debts and do not impose an unfair financial burden on the other party.849 In an 
authenticated hadith, the Prophet Mohamed states, ‘Believers should honour 
																																																						
845 l-Fayad Abraham, ‘Administrative Contract: The Public Theory And Its Application In The Kuwaiti 
And Comparative Law’,(1Kuwait: Al-Fallah Press, 1981) pp 4-5. 
846 A. H. El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 
p.15. 
847 The Quran prescribes believers ‘not to devour your assets among yourselves in vanity, except in 
trading by your consent’. 
848 In this regard, the Prophet Mohammed has said, ‘la darar wala dirar fi alslam,’ the translation of 
which is that the law should not oblige or enforce individuals to endure harm, injustice or unfair loss. 
Surrah narrated by Ibn Majah Hadith No 341. 
849 Under Islamic principle of contract law, a judge that applies Islamic contract principles is empowered 
to modify or adapt the parties’ obligations in a manner that balances between the rights and interests of 
both parties. Verses of Quran aver that Allah does not wish to place undue burdens on parties to a 
contract, and seeks to relieve them of excessive physical or economic hardships. The below verses of the 
Quran can be cited in the above regard. Allah intends ever facility for you; He does not want to put to 
difficulties Quran 2:185. On no soul does Allah place a burden greater than it can bear, Quran 2:286. 
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their engagements…’.850 A plain reading of the Prophet’s message would 
suggest that arbitration agreements are no different from other agreements, and 
consequently binding on both parties in accordance with their own free and 
valid will. Viewed in this light, one can argue that arbitration clauses, and the 
awards that result from them, are necessary elements of a contract, and should 
be enforced, thus giving effect to the will and intent of both parties. Indeed, in 
the context of international contracts, arbitration clauses are consistent with the 
Islamic idea of swift justice in the benefit of both parties. There appears to be no 
obvious reason why the effective enforcement of arbitration clauses, and 
resulting awards, should be deemed in contradiction to public policy, since the 
realisation of these aims do not violate God’s commands.851  
 
It should be noted, finally, that the Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali Schools accept as 
valid the decision by a non-Muslim party to nominate a non-Islamic legal system 
as the applicable law of the arbitration.852 The authority of this position is made 
evident by the fact that a growing number of Islamic countries have become 
party to the New York Convention and thereby implicitly accept the validity of 
delocalised arbitration agreements. While the above discussion suggests that 
the trend in Islamic debate is to embrace a more open attitude to non-localised 
arbitration, the Saudi position is that an award issued by a non-Islamic legal 
system is valid only if the rules to be applied to the contract do not clearly 
infringe on the express provisions of Qu’ran or Sunna.853 This remains a 
sticking point and the basis on which local courts may elect to refuse 
recognition of a foreign award issued on the basis of a non-Islamic law. But 
what does it mean to speak of Islamic public policy?  
 
The only guidance we have is that all aspects of legislative law, and indeed all 
private contracts, should respect the spirit and text of the Qu’ran and Sunnah. 
Two ideals come into conflict: the first is that all individuals must honour their 
																																																						
850 Sunan Ibn Majah Hadith No 341. 
851 Under Islamic law, every lawful contract must be fulfilled and performed in good faith. This principle 
is supported by the following verse from the Holy Quran: ‘Oh you who believe, observe covenants’. For a 
historical record see Al-Tabari, Tafsir VI, 33 (1905–12); Al-Qurtubi, Al-jami’li Ahkam Aq-Qurania VI, 
33 (1935). 
852 A Razak Al-Sanhury, Masader Al-Haq, (Dar Al-Nahza Al-Arbia, 1968) at p. 80. 
853 H S Shaaban, ‘Commercial Transaction in the Middle East: What Law Governs?, (1999) 31 Law and 
Policy in International Business 157, 158. 
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obligations under contract, but in doing so they must also refrain from entering 
into agreements which are forbidden by Islam. The remaining sections will 
consider how these two principles or ideals can be reconciled from within the 
Saudi legal system. 
 
5.4 The Role of Shariah Law in Interpreting Saudi Legislation 
 
Saudi legal thinking and interpretation of legislation are essentially influenced by 
the source of Shariah, as it constitutes the Saudi equivalent of the U.S. 
Constitution: supreme over all laws and all actions in society.854 However, as 
has been previously discussed, Islamic legal theories as a whole never directly 
interfere in the processes of the court system.855 Instead, legal theories are 
simply a powerful structure of the judicial system and independent from any 
state regulations.856 
 
Shariah allows individual jurists and theorists to determine for themselves what 
is good and what is bad behaviour, by applying their wisdom and knowledge of 
Islamic religious values.857 Within this ambit, some scholars suggest that the 
Holy Qur’an and Sunna’h, as primary sources of the Islamic tradition, are 
uniformly recognised and implemented by peripheral Muslims groups in 
political, legal, social and other realms thus discounting any worry that its 
application would be problematic.858 
 
																																																						
854 For example, Hallaq asserts, ‘the theological postulate that sustained most legal theories, of Ash’arite 
inspiration, states that man’s intellectual capabilities are thought to be insufficient to determine the 
rationale behind God’s revelation. God’s wisdom, deeply embedded in His Shari’a, is simply 
incomprehensible for humans. Thus, the rationales of rules in the revealed texts were to be sought solely 
in the inner structures of these texts: only what God chose to declare explicitly to be the ratio legis of a 
case was to be taken thus, and what He decided merely to allude to was to be subjected to an interpretive 
enquiry that was deemed to result in a probable judgment. But nothing more was to be attributed to God’s 
motives and rationale’. See Hallaq (n 37) 207; see also Ahdab & El-Ahdab (n 253) 610. 
855 Feldman (n 20). 
856 A Iqbal, Diplomacy in Islam, An Essay on the Art of Negotiation as Conceived and Developed by the 
Prophet of Islam (Institution of Islamic Culture, 1965). 
857 For example, Khadduri also assessed that ‘it is the framework of Islam itself. For although religion 
describes what the ideal life should be, the law indicated the right road to follow (indeed the term shari’a 
bears this meaning) in order to arrive at the ideal life’. See M Khadduri, Islamic Jurisprudence Shafi’is 
Risala, Translated with an Introduction, Notes, and Appendices (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961) 3. 
858 A Duderija, Constructing a Religiously Ideal “Believer” and “Woman” in Islam, Neo-Traditional 
Salafi and Progressive Muslims’ Methods of Interpretation (Palgrace Macmillan, 2011). 
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Against this background, it seems that the sources of Shariah fulfil an important 
role in interpreting Saudi legislation. Initially, Shariah is dominated in the Islamic 
tradition by law and religion, thus historically tying them together.859 As a result, 
in Islamic society there is no separation of religion and law compared to other, 
particularly Western, societies and nations because a majority of Islamic 
jurisprudence works are concerned with the sources of Shariah, and because 
the practical basis for Shariah was developed early in the Islamic caliphate.860 
That is why was Shariah exerts a great influence in the domestic laws of many 
Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and other Islamic states.861 
In many Muslim countries, great belief and faith is placed in Islamic tradition as 
a source of law and legislation, unlike Western countries where the state and 
religion are separate, with a constitutional emphasis on freedom of religion and 
protection of individual rights.862 
 
Interestingly, the source of Shariah was frozen in the time of Prophet 
Mohammed and the first caliphs.863 The ‘jurists felt obligated to cite the works of 
earlier scholars to justify their own interpretations, the possibility of formulating 
novel legal interpretations limited’.864 It seems that the legal concepts and 
theories developed during that period have remained unchanged in the modern 
Islamic World.865 
 
This, of course can be problematic. Regardless of the timeless precepts 
espoused by Shariah, the world is hardly the same as it was at the time of the 
Prophet, whose edicts guide not only the practical law but moral, social 
behaviour.866 At the time, reflecting the simplicity of the era, most of the legal 
concepts were drawn very narrowly. Especially as regards legislation, they did 
																																																						
859 Black, Esmaeili & Hosen (n 25). 
860 See S Siyar, The Islamic Law of Nations (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966); see also Black, Esmaeili & 
Hosen (n 25) 67-68. 
861 As Shabana assessed ‘following the legal reforms that were undertaken in the majority Muslim nation-
states, the status of custom as a source of law has been consolidated. Most of these reforms have listed 
custom as one of the main sources of law, even in some cases before Shariah itself. The majority of these 
legal reforms were inspired by modern Western legal codes and they echoed the theoretical paradigms 
that sharped these Western legal codes’. Shabana (n 13) 1. 
862 Black, Esmaeili & Hosen (n 25) 70-71. 
863 See Shabana (n 13). 
864 BA Ergene, ‘Qanun and Sharia’, in Peters & Bearman (n 18) 111. 
865 Ibid 109. 
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not provide much guidance; nor did they offer easily implemented prescriptions 
for government administration.867 
 
This undoubtedly created challenges for modern jurists and scholars to develop 
Islamic jurisprudence to interpret the regulations, keeping in mind that ‘political 
leaders do not possess any legislative authority but are responsible solely for 
enforcing the divine will as reflected in jurisprudential principles’.868 In this 
context, it is important to mention that there exists significant disagreement 
amongst traditional and modern scholars on the nature of the relationship 
between Shariah law and foreign law.869 
 
With respect to this disagreement it appears that modern Islamic regulations (for 
example, Saudi legislation) are composed of two main elements, Shariah and 
foreign law.870 On the one hand the Holy Qur’an and Sunna’h are mandatory in 
the application of Shariah and are treated as an indivisible component of Saudi 
legislation.871 On the other, modern scholars want to interpret and apply modern 
regulations to facilitate domestic and international trade in a modern world of 
many religions and political regimes.872 
 
The traditional and modern views thus come into conflict. Modern views 
sensitive to the needs of non-Muslims and Western legal structures are 
generally not tolerated by traditionalist Muslim scholars and theorists, especially 
those following the teachings of the more traditional and literal perspective 
endorsed by the Hanbali School.873 That school stresses the sanctity of 
obligations incurred towards a Harbi (non-Muslim) regardless of the place and 
source of obligations on the Muslim party.874 
 
																																																						
867 Ergene (n 806) 111. 
868 Ibid 109. 
869 Ibid. 
870 Saleh (n 253) 397-99. 
871 Ibid. 
872 For example, As-Sadr sketches the nature of Islamic jurisprudence did not emerge until the fourth 
century. He mentions that ‘jurisprudence was the threshold between law and theology, which was often 
called usul ab-din, the “roots of religion” just as jurisprudence was “the roots of law”.’ Therefore, this 
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Given that the Hanbali School is the official view in Saudi Arabia, it has wisely 
been suggested that international contracting parties and lawyers need to 
understand the role of Shariah in interpreting Saudi legislation.875 Regardless of 
international conventional provisions, Saudi legislation has been developed 
alongside and with strong influences from the provisions of Shariah.876 Its 
provisions will thus directly impact interpretation, application and enforcement of 
the new Saudi Arbitration Act, as regards both domestic and international 
arbitral proceedings and awards. 
 
5.5 Effect of Differing Interpretations on Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
 
Once an arbitral award is rendered, that award still must be recognized by the 
courts to be enforced. For awards that are enforced in Saudi Arabia, the courts 
are required to confirm that ‘there is nothing to prevent [the award’s] execution 
legally’.877 In this context, the word legally is translated from the Arabic word 
shar’an, which literally means ‘according to the Shariah’.878 In making this 
determination, there is nothing in the rules or regulations that limit the judiciary’s 
scope of review or impose any standards that it must apply. Further, there is no 
requirement that the judiciary even apply the interpretations of a particular 
school of thought in making its determination. As a result, the judge has the 
discretion to evaluate the award’s compliance with Shariah principles through 
whatever interpretation of the law he sees fit. If could be the interpretation he 
personally subscribes to or the one that best addresses the facts of the case, 
but there are no parameters imposed. In practice, this creates a significant 
degree of uncertainty given that the primary reason for the refusal to enforce an 
arbitral award is on the basis of public policy when the award runs afoul of 
Shariah law. 
 
However, despite this lack of interpretive requirements, in practice, the Hanbali 
school is the only madhhab consulted by the Saudi courts.879 This makes the 
issue of interpretation more theoretical than practical, but what Saudi Arabia 
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should be concerned about is the stigma that such uncertainty can create for 
those outside of the state who are trying to contend with the implications of 
Shariah law. Further, while this focus on the Hanbali school is the observation 
of scholars, the lack of reported case law in Saudi Arabia makes this fact 
difficult to confirm. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
It is essential to understand the purpose of interpreting of legal texts rather than 
simply disagreeing with legal principles. As has been discussed in this chapter, 
the four Islamic views represent different schools of thought. Their disciplines 
and methodologies often diverge as to the proper interpretation of Shariah with 
regard to new subject matter, capacity and public policy. 
 
For example, regarding the New Saudi Arbitration Law, Chapter 3 of this thesis 
discussed and analysed controversial Saudi arbitral procedure, such as the 
manner of appointment of arbitrators and the nature of arbitral disputes, among 
other things.880 This presents challenges for international contracting parties 
and arbitrators who are required to interpret the Saudi legislations in the context 
of international arbitration. 
 
The majority of Muslim jurists from the Hanafi, Maliki and Shafi’i Schools appear 
to be liberal in interpretations of the sources of Shariah with regard to new 
subject matter.881 This favours adoption of modern commercial arbitral methods. 
On the other hand, Muslim jurists from the Hanbali School—the official Saudi 
School—are conservative in their interpretation of the source of Shariah 
considering the Holy Qur’an and Sunna’h to be the only primary sources of 
Shariah.882 Compounding this the controversy is the Hanbali School’s 
application Ijma (consensus) and Qiyas (legal reason) as the sources of 
Shariah.883 Strong criticism by non-Hanbalis is levelled at this approach 
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because Ijma and Qiyas were developed after the death of Prophet 
Mohammed, thus diminishing its value in their eyes.884 
 
This chapter demonstrates that there is a lack of clear understanding and 
consensus in modern Islamic thought about the concurrent roles of modern 
legislation like the new Saudi Arbitration Act 2012, and Shariah. With more and 
more scholars, jurists and actors entering the stage to speak on Islam, the 
implications of new subject matter being considered uniformly in the Islamic 
legal system are problematic.885 
 
Challenges exist for jurists, international contracting parties and arbitrators as to 
the proper interpretation and application of the Saudi regulations, particularly in 
the international arbitration arena, where so many different social, political and 
legal views converge. For this reason, it would be extremely beneficial and 
convenient to for all of them to come together to develop a set of clear, uniform 
ethical principles to which Islamic Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) should adhere to 
interpret the provisions of Saudi legislation without prejudice to the divine 
sanctity of Shariah or the important commercial interests of foreign actors and 
non-Muslims.886 In the end, in an Islamic nation such as Saudi Arabia, neither 
the legislative bodies nor court can invent justice; justice can only be discovered 
by application of the underlying divine sources—the Holy Qur’an and 
Sunna’h.887 
 
It must be firmly remembered that the features of Islam are not only about 
religion or moral ethics to be followed by the Muslims, but also about a legal 
system that is needed by Muslim rulers and nations in their administration 
justice to achieve the will of God.888 When the Holy Qur’an is silent on any new 
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subject matter or the resolution of a legal issue made unclear under the 
teachings of the Sunna’h, Muslim rulers or state government may draw on 
customary law or enact new laws to address the ‘gaps’.889 This provides an 
opening where international commercial laws, norms and guidelines can 
legitimately take root within a Muslim country and in particular Saudi Arabia. 
These differing interpretations can result in disparate outcomes depending on 
the particular beliefs of the presiding judge. 
 
In the above light, one can conclude that the Saudi government needs to 
consider these discretionary powers, which are vested under the provision of 
Shariah to develop its Islamic jurisprudence and bring in into the modern age.890 
Doing so, while also honouring Shariah will enable Saudi legislation and jurists 
to provide an effective and efficient arbitral regime for international contracting 
parties to resolve their commercial disputes through predictable recognition and 
enforcement of international arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The following chapter turns the discussion to the range of international 
conventions and treaties that have shaped Saudi arbitration practices with 
regard to recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, in particular the 1958 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
known popularly as the New York Convention.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS IN SAUDI 
ARABIA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding sections have outlined the arbitration award enforcement 
framework within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for both domestic and foreign 
arbitral awards. While each arbitration proceeding may be subject to different 
procedural and substantive laws, the enforcement of awards in Saudi Arabia all 
take place in front of the Saudi courts that are governed by Saudi Arabia’s 
domestic laws, the international instruments the Kingdom has adopted, and, 
above all else, an application of Shariah law to ensure award compliance. 
 
As can be seen in the preceding chapters, there are fundamental issues that 
arise from the inherent conflict between the exercise of party autonomy and the 
imposition of Shariah law as a means of de facto merit review during the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. As previous chapters have 
discussed the interaction between Shariah law and the arbitral process at 
length, this chapter aims to situate this discussion with the contemporary 
debates within the broader arbitration landscape. 
 
Ultimately, the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards by the courts in 
Saudi Arabia are impacted by the interaction of four legal forces, both domestic 
and international: (1) the New Saudi Arbitration Law; (2) international 
conventions and treaties to which Saudi Arabia has become a party, such as 
the New York Convention; (3) interpretation of the foregoing by the Saudi 
enforcement courts; and (5) the application of Shariah law for assessing an 
awards compliance with Saudi public policy. This section will first explore these 
issues within the context of enforcing domestic arbitral awards, then examine 
the influence of international instruments on the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards, and finally will consider these enforcement issues within the broader 
context of arbitration policy. 
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6.2 Recognition and Enforcement of Domestic Arbitral Awards 
 
Each country has their own nuances that must be accounted for during 
arbitration proceedings taking place within the country and attempts to enforce 
the resulting award within its borders. For Saudi Arabia, this is the country’s 
basis on Shariah law and its impact on the development and issuance of the 
New Saudi Arbitration Law in 2012.  
 
6.2.1 Respecting the Finality of Arbitral Awards 
 
As detailed in Chapter 3, an award issued by the arbitral tribunal is final and the 
award is not subject to appeal or review on the merits by any other entity. The 
only limited form of appeal for an arbitral award in a domestic Saudi arbitration 
falls under the challenge provisions of the New Arbitration Law. One of the 
primary criticisms of Saudi Arbitration Law of 1983 was that it was ambiguous 
with regard to which courts were competent to hear arbitral award challenges 
and on what bases such challenges could be made.891 Additionally, there were 
concerns over the extent to which the court could engage in a review of the 
merits when deciding these challenges.892 To address these concerns, the New 
Saudi Arbitration Law included a chapter specifically addressing a parties’ ability 
to challenge the validity of an arbitral award. 893 The articles contained in this 
chapter specify the limited grounds on which an award can be challenged and 
the process for determining the competent court to hear the challenge.894 
However, the Saudi legislature has made clear that any expansion of these 
provisions will not be permitted and they cannot be used as a method for 
bypassing the finality of an arbitral award.895  
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6.2.2 Enforcing a Domestic Award 
 
Once an award is final and is not otherwise challenged pursuant to the 
provisions of the New Saudi Arbitration Law, the prevailing party can then seek 
to enforce the award before the Kingdom’s courts. This section first considers 
the enforcement of domestic awards as this is the foundation upon which the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is built. 
 
6.2.2.1 Extent of Judicial Review during Arbitral Award Enforcement 
 
Under the New Arbitration Law, the courts’ role is much more limited than the 
broad supervision accorded to the judiciary under the 1983 law.896 Under the 
1983 law, the parties would often experience delays in award enforcement due 
to the courts becoming overly involved in the merits of the disputes as opposed 
to simply performing its execution functions.897 To remedy this involvement and 
further refine the courts’ supporting role for enforcing arbitral awards, the 2012 
law emphasised the res judicata nature of the arbitral award898 and the 
enforcing court’s lack of jurisdiction to consider the merits of the dispute.899 
Further, the law provided that all that is necessary for the court to enforce the 
award is receipt by the court of all necessary documents to enforce the award900 
and confirmation that award does not violate the rules of Shariah law and public 
policy.901  
 
6.2.2.2 Promulgation of the Saudi Enforcement Law 
 
In addition to the changes under the New Saudi Arbitration Law, the Saudi 
Enforcement Law also comes into play in enforcing arbitral awards.902 This was 
yet another effort to streamline enforcement processes, not only for arbitral 
awards, but for the execution of all judgments rendered within the Kingdom. 
Article 9(2) of the Enforcement law specifically states that arbitral awards along 
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with their enforcement orders are to be enforced in accordance with the Law of 
Arbitration.903 Under the Enforcement Law, the enforcement circuit courts are 
created that specifically focus on the enforcement of judgments and awards. 
The enforcement circuit forms part of the general court as defined under Article 
19 of the Saudi Judicial Law, and consolidates enforcement measures to a 
particular circuit, as opposed to the broad discretion of the Board of Grievances 
and other competent courts. While Saudi Arabia is yet to have a specialised 
arbitration court as some scholars have suggested,904 the enforcement courts 
are certainly a step in the right direction to ensuring that decisions are rendered 
in a timely manner by the enforcement judges and in accordance with the New 
Arbitration Law. 
 
6.2.3.3 Equation of Shariah Law to Public Policy 
 
One difficulty that the New Arbitration Law’s provisions present is an equation in 
the eyes of the law of Shariah and public policy. Specifically, Article 55(2)(b) 
states that the enforcing court must verify that ‘[t]he award does not violate the 
provisions of Shariah and public policy in the Kingdom. If the award is divisible, 
an order for execution of the part not containing the violation may be issued’.905 
This is reflective of the Islamic respect for the inviolability of Shariah law; it is so 
intrinsically intertwined with their laws and systems that it cannot be violated by 
the courts in enforcing an award even if they did not make the determination. 
The impact of Shariah and public policy on both domestic and foreign awards 
will be addressed in a following section on the common enforcement 
challenges. 
 
6.3 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
 
Whereas the enforcement of domestic arbitral awards is governed by the New 
Saudi Arbitration Law, the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards by the Saudi courts stems from the Kingdom’s adoption of international 
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convention obligations and their integration into the domestic legal and judiciary 
systems. This section explores how foreign arbitral awards are enforced within 
the Kingdom and identifies the grounds on which an award could be set aside. 
 
6.3.1 The Influence of International Conventions  
 
When a country adopts or becomes a signatory to an international convention, 
their domestic arbitration framework must be revisited to ensure compliance 
with the country’s obligations under these international instruments.906 As 
previously mentioned, the development of international conventions and 
agreements have helped refine the environment of international arbitration and 
secured its position as often the most suitable dispute resolution mechanism in 
the international commercial community.907 When it comes to the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards, the purpose of such international 
conventions is to create a set of uniform standards among the member states to 
provide the contracting parties with confidence that the resolution of their 
dispute will be enforceable without the intervention (or at least excessive 
intervention) of the member’s state courts.908 However, it would be remiss not to 
note that there are differences that come into play with how member states 
implement these instruments and fulfil their obligations, and these differences 
must be analysed to better understand the foreign arbitral award enforcement 
landscape. 
 
Some scholars argue that member state courts have eschewed a more formal 
approach to treaty interpretation in respect of recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards, in favour a more policy-orientated or teleological 
approach. In this view, member states’ courts tend to favour national legislative 
provisions over the objectives of the various international conventions, thus 
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undermining uniformity and predictability.909 From this perspective, member 
states’ arbitration regulations might then allow the unsuccessful arbitral party to 
challenge the arbitral award before the enforcing court on grounds outside of 
and not recognised by the international arbitral scheme.910 This adds a layer of 
complexity in adopting international conventions by the member states, a 
complexity that will be further analysed in this chapter. 
 
Though international instruments have certain influence on domestic arbitration 
legislation, ultimately the mandate of national/domestic arbitration remains very 
much a creature of the member states and of their particular legal systems.911 
The reason for this is that an international instrument, such as the New York 
Convention, does not dictate how member states should deal with arbitration, 
no doubt out of deference to national sovereignty.912 Instead, it simply lays 
down the ground rules for setting aside or refusing to honour arbitral awards by 
the member states’ courts.913 As a result, member states enjoy considerable 
latitude in how these exceptions will be applied, thus potentially undermining 
predictable, effective recognition and enforcement of international arbitral 
awards in member states.914 In this regard, Slaughter and White observe that 
‘states can be part of the international legal system to the degree they chose to 
remain apart, asserting their own sovereignty and eschewing international 
involvement’.915 
 
However, the international legal system must be able to influence the domestic 
state political policies and objectives to be effective in applying the international 
legal rules that influence and shape domestic legislation.916 Within this context, 
it is clear that however a state deals with its own policies and objectives will 
impact the efficacy of international rules and conventions designed to foster 
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international trade.917 The encroachment of member states’ courts ‘on 
international arbitration can be ignored abroad and therefore be ineffective, and 
on occasion may even lead to liability under international law for their state… 
[as such] they might become more amenable to abide by the more generally 
accepted standards in their treatment of arbitration’.918 Further, ‘each state is 
sovereign, independent, and on the same level of equality with the others. Each 
is free to act internationally and subject to the same duties’.919 
 
The laws of nature declare every independent state free and independent of 
others; in this sense, a nation is free to deal with others in whatever it sees fit, 
just as it is also free to determine what is actually binding on it in its mutual 
dealings with foreign citizens and international commercial parties.920 Of course, 
how a particular power manages its sovereignty, and whether and to what 
extent it recognises international law and conventions, will greatly impact its 
success in the international trade arena.921 
 
Toward this end, it appears that provisional gaps must be bridged over the 
course of time by the evolution of state practice and the future of treaty 
making.922 As a consequence, ‘the substantive international law would evolve in 
line with the actual practices of states, which after all is ultimately the source of 
the whole of international law’. 923 However, practically speaking the burden of 
proof lies on the claimant to establish his case within the penumbra of the 
extant national rule of law in order to be entitled for relief, with a judge deciding 
whether the claimant has proved his case or not.924 This is where problems can 
arise for foreign investors and international parties.925 A legal system is 
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something different than a dispute resolution mechanism, as the legal system is 
vested with the power and duty to discover and create substantive principles of 
justice that apply effectively across a spectrum of social life.926  
 
The matter of influence of international conventions on domestic legislation 
cannot be considered fully resolved, as there remains doubt about the validity of 
international conventions in many of the member states’ legal system.927 As a 
result, there is little uniformity in incorporating international law into municipal 
legal systems. In fact, the application of international law by national courts 
always turns on the particular and peculiar decisions made with the respective 
domestic legal systems, which can widely vary.928 
 
With these general observations in mind, one can effectively analyse the 
influence and impact of the New York Convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of international arbitral awards within the member states legal 
systems and the Saudi Arabian legal system in particular. 
 
6.3.1.1 The New York Convention  
 
It appears that the lack of a uniform interpretation of the New York Convention 
by member states has undermined the object and purpose of the Convention. In 
this context, it is argued that ‘the unification of interpretation by means of the 
comparative case law method is unable to bridge the gap between the diverging 
interpretations or to fill a lacuna of the Convention… [such that] … the question 
of a revision in the form of a Protocol will be considered’.929 This leaves 
unanswered the question of whether the protocol would create a pathway for 
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the application of the New York Convention as a means for effective recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards in the member states. 
 
Given the radical differences between member states in terms of moral, 
political, economic, and religious beliefs, all of which impact the adoption of 
international conventions in the respective legal systems, the answer to the 
foregoing question requires a careful and accurate reading of the New York 
Convention. 930 For instance, it has been argued that the norms of international 
law are valid for all states, but are not binding unless they fulfil the conditions 
under which they claim to be binding.931 Difficulties inherent in the problem of 
drawing a line between the material spheres of validity of international law and 
that of national law are not easy to reconcile between states.932 On one hand, a 
matter might properly be regulated by international law if it is similarly regulated 
by a rule of customary or international conventional law.933 On the other hand, 
national law alone could regulate a matter even though it contradicts 
international protocol.934 
 
In seeking reconciliation, a good place to start as a general proposition is that 
every member state has a legal obligation to respect the norms of other 
member states.935 Recognising this, certain member states have managed to 
enact specific legislation addressing the implementation of the New York 
Convention, to clarify or complement the convention as the courts refer to the 
rules based on the enabling legislation.936 For example, with regard to the 
interplay between international convention and English law, Lowe claims, 
‘treaties cannot create rights or duties in English law unless they are given 
effect by statute’.937 The same is true for attempting to implement the provisions 
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of international conventions within the Shariah and civil based legal system of 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
It may be suitable to observe here that individuals seek international rules to 
shield or protect themselves against unwanted or unpredictable actions by the 
member state.938 National courts are generally mandated to uphold domestic 
legal order, not the rule of customary international law.939 Thus, it would be 
paradoxical and profoundly unsatisfactory for international lawyers to assume 
that international conventions will override the constitutions, statutes and public 
policy of any particular state just because convention rules create needed 
uniformity and predictability in the international arena.940 
 
That being said, it appears wise for member states to allow traders the freedom 
to nurture autonomous business relationships outside the boundaries of their 
own respective country.941 For them to do this effectively, commercial traders 
feel ‘the need for a dispute resolution system detached from national courts, 
and therefore capable of providing the litigants with the highest possible degree 
of neutrality and understanding of the specific issues’.942 In this regard, it could 
even be argued that the essence of arbitration and arbitration agreements in 
international commercial transactions should not be concerned as much with 
reduced expenses or cost-savings, but rather, with determining critical issues 
arising in the international commercial context.  
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Given the foregoing, it is necessary to encourage the member states to resort to 
an arbitration framework with the purpose of harmonising and unifying the law 
of international trade, as stipulated in international instruments.943 For example, 
the New York Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law were formed to bring 
international trade modernisation and harmonisation of rules on international 
business dispute resolution, particularly for the effective recognition and 
enforcement of international and domestic arbitral awards by member states, 
without any discrimination against the arbitral parties. The following sections 
consider how Saudi Arabia has implemented the provisions of these 
international instruments within the structure of its domestic arbitration 
framework. 
 
6.3.2 Refusal to Recognise and Enforce Foreign Arbitral Awards under the 
New York Convention 
 
The concept of refusal of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
is not a novel concept within the Saudi system.944 In fact, many judicial systems 
around the world struggle with the grounds on which enforcement can be 
refused. International contracting parties have long debated and experienced 
the challenges in securing enforcement of their arbitral awards by national 
courts given their different interpretations of their obligations under the 
conventions.945 While the existing literature has explored the bases on which 
arbitral awards are enforceable under the Shariah system of governance, 
relatively little discussion has been devoted to the grounds on which 
																																																						
943 R Falk, ‘Implementing International Law-The Role of Domestic Courts: Some Reflections on the 
United States Experience’, in M Brus, S Muller & S. Wiemers (eds), The United Nations Decade of 
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67-76. 
944 Woolf asserts that the New York Convention, 1958, has managed to strike a balance between 
international arbitration and the protection of the legal principles of the Member States. However, the 
Convention also imposes a certain general obligation for the Member States to safeguard their basic 
principles of the legal system for which they are sought. See Wolff (n 205) 9. 
945 For example, Berg stresses that the significance of the New York Convention for international 
commercial arbitration would be achievable only when the Member States courts interpret uniformly. He 
further suggests that it would be achievable by the unification of judicial interpretation by means of the 
comparative case law method. His idea was that ‘this approach has as objective to formulate one possibly 
acceptable interpretation on the basis of a comparison of the court decisions given in respect of the 
Convention, which interpretation could be followed by the courts in the Contracting States’. However, he 
maintains the uniform interpretation of the Convention would be achievable only by the revision in the 
form of a Protocol. See Berg (n 871) 2. 
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enforcement of final arbitral award may be refused by the courts under the 
current Saudi Arbitration Law.946  
 
When it comes to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the New Saudi 
Arbitration Law does not delineate any specific grounds on which a court can 
refuse enforcement of an award issued in accordance with the applicable law of 
another state or by an arbitral tribunal located abroad.947 However, the law does 
mandate that the arbitral award should not contradict the Shariah.948 This lack 
of clarity as to the scope and content of Shariah rules, and the extent to which 
these rules can establish grounds for the non-enforcement of non-compliant 
arbitral awards, is suggestive of a wider problem.949 
 
As has been discussed previously, the application of the domestic laws of the 
member states can defeat the uniform treatment of international arbitral awards, 
as there is no harmonised worldwide interpretation.950 In every case of an 
international award, the winning party must undergo challenges in the losing 
party’s national court proceedings to obtain recognition and enforcement of its 
arbitral award in the country in which the award must be fulfilled.951 This issue is 
an important one in the context of the New York Convention because the very 
objective of New York Convention is to provide effective and efficient 
international arbitral procedures, particularly for recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards in member states. 
 
As a preliminary matter, it has been argued that the New York Convention is 
itself uncertain and lacks uniform administration of jurisdictional activity. This in 
turn further leads to controversy among international commercial parties, 
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lawyers and arbitrators as to the proper application of the Convention. Thus, it 
becomes imperative that international contracting parties and lawyers analyse 
the attitude of the jurisdiction in which the arbitral award will be enforced toward 
the problem at hand.952 
 
Ideally, the text of the Convention would be uniformly determined and applied 
by the member states’ courts.953 However, this is not the practical reality. 
Turning to Saudi Arabia in particular, the Saudi courts exert legal exemptions 
under the Convention allowing them to refuse to recognise and enforce certain 
foreign arbitral awards. These exemptions include the following: (1) the lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the invalidity of the arbitration agreement or 
provisions contained therein to resolve the dispute by arbitration; and (3) the 
public policy issues found in an international arbitral award not grounded in 
Saudi law or Shariah law, which is of most importance to current inquiry. Let us 
consider this third exemption in greater detail. 
 
6.3.2.1 Exemption for Awards the Violate Public Policy 
 
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention provides that: 
 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recognition and 
enforcement is sought finds that: 
…  
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to 
the public policy of that country.954 
 
 
This is the most important, yet difficult to define, exemption for refusing to 
recognise and enforce a foreign arbitral award. This safe harbour provision 
permits member states to challenge or refuse to enforce arbitral awards on the 
basis that the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to that 
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country’s ‘public policy’.955 It is not difficult to see how such a provision could 
defeat the treaty’s very objective.956 Broadly formulated, this safe harbour 
clause lacks determinate contours, leaving it up to states to decide what laws or 
issues fall under the rubric of ‘public policy’ and the threshold at which such 
issues are deemed sufficiently serious in scope or nature to permit a challenge 
against an award.957 This, in turn, may provide grounds for a local court to 
reopen a dispute for review on the merits, leading to the potential annulment of 
the award or, in the worst case scenario, a nullification of the underlying 
contract.958 It is not difficult to see how such a provision may further destabilise 
the legitimate expectations of private parties or imbue the state with unilateral 
power to decide which awards they will enforce, which they will not, and on 
what grounds.959 As was mentioned above, this becomes particularly 
problematic in Islamic states like Saudi Arabia in which Shariah law is deemed 
to rise to the level of public policy. Thus, any award that is to be enforced in 
Saudi Arabia must comply not only with the laws governing the contract and 
rendering of the arbitral award, but also Shariah law.  
 
A matter which is left ambiguous under the existing provisions of the New York 
Convention occurs when the laws utilised to make determinations under the 
arbitration agreement are at odds with the provisions of a member state’s law, 
such as the implication of Shariah. This conflict can call into question the 
arbitrability of certain agreements in Saudi law. By way of example, under 
Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention, the capacity of parties to decide the 
validity, execution and operation of arbitration should be determined according 
to ‘the law applicable to them’.960 However, the New York Convention fails to 
specify the applicable law.961 While the arbitrators will ultimately make the 
determination of applicable law during the arbitration proceedings, Saudi Arabia 
may elect to apply Shariah at the enforcement stage when determining the 
capacity of parties, or more importantly the grounds for incapacity. The effect 
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may be the determination of incapacity at odds with the methods and laws 
applied in non-Islamic jurisdictions.962 
 
When it comes to the enforcement of arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia, nearly all 
exemptions come back to roots in Shariah principles and public policy; however, 
it is the public policy exemption that provides the Kingdom’s courts with the 
explicit authority to invoke Shariah as a stand-alone ground for refusing to 
recognise and enforce an arbitral award. 
 
The controversial views of international contracting parties, lawyers, arbitrators 
and judges are often widely debated by the member states courts in regards to 
the notion that public policy can constitute a ground for refusal of recognition 
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.963 It is reasoned that the concept of 
public policy is of principal concern for the member states’ courts when 
evaluating whether the arbitral award at issue involves the violation or fulfilment 
of important public values, as opposed to unimportant or transitory ones.964 
However, from the Saudi perspective, there is no question that Shariah 
compliance is a non-violable public value. 
 
There appears to be a general consensus that the concept of public policy is 
grounded in the root of law, which takes shape when the state authority starts to 
use models and methods from the political economy that have been applied to 
international relations.965 To support this view, it is necessary to understand 
how national public policy is set, and how state actions determine that public 
policy.966 It has been suggested that governmental agendas and policies are set 
by actors in the political system in given policy areas.967 These actors, it is 
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argued, fix their attention on the particular problem because of group pressure 
or other expressions of preferences that may gain prominence as an issue.968  
 
It appears that the general framework of public policy is extremely broad in 
scope as to the implementation of any particular proposed policy. At the same 
time, it is also important to bear in mind that the concept of policy is set by the 
government for determination and calculation of facts with the strict logic with 
which policy is to be selected.969 This can again be problematic because there 
is no clear boundary and universal definition of public policy, nor is there likely 
to be one in the foreseeable future.970  
 
It is fair to suggest Article V is the most important provision of the New York 
Convention, as it sets the grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards by the member state’s courts.971 However, this 
position creates challenges for the member state to implement its regulations 
because the concept of public policy is ambiguous and unique to different 
member states.972 
 
Furthermore, the most common ground for refusing to recognise or enforce an 
arbitral award is that the award violates public policy.973 Some scholars suggest 
that the member states defeat the objective of the New York Convention by 
asserting a public policy disqualification because the scope and function of 
public policy is to safeguard the fundamental moral convictions of the forum.974  
 
It is also necessary to distinguish between the concepts of domestic and 
international public policy. On the one hand, domestic public policy draws 
attention to the member state’s policies and agendas pertaining to matters of 
that particular policy, or any action contrary to the fundamental principles of the 
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laws of the country.975 The number of matters considered to fall under public 
policy in international cases is smaller than domestic cases976 and the scope of 
public policy on the international scale is narrower than in the direct application 
of domestic law.977 This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
 
In light of this, one should also then consider what, if any, role the UNCITRAL 
Model Rules on Arbitration have in the recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia. 
 
6.3.3 Implication of UNCITRAL Model Law for Award Enforcement 
 
Most often when discussing the role of UNCITRAL commentators and scholars 
have focused their attention on the harmonisation of national and international 
arbitration law.978 This is because the United Nations established a commission 
whose objective was to propose a model system of laws setting forth uniform 
arbitration regulations. Theoretically, this would provide international contracting 
parties with a reliable system of effective and efficient arbitration enforcement 
procedures without any discrimination between the member states.979 However, 
in practice, member states undermine these objectives by adopting a multiplicity 
of different interpretations and applications of the uniform laws in each of their 
respective legal systems, often arising from nation-specific public policy or 
constitutional and/or religious mandates like those espoused in Shariah.980 
 
Interestingly, UNCITRAL affords little flexibility for the member states to 
customise the Model Law to fit their own needs. The reason such changes are 
discouraged is the perceived need for harmonisation.981 To achieve greater 
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harmonisation, it requires greater cooperation and compliance from the member 
states, and greater sacrifice or modification of their own domestic laws, policies 
and procedures.982 In this regard, some scholars suggest that UNCITRAL’s 
commission should undertake concerted efforts to consider inalienable rights, 
such as sovereignty, of the member states in the development of an acceptable 
uniform international arbitration regime.983 
 
Yet, as stated above, the provisions of New York Convention do not prevent the 
member states from restricting the grounds for refusal of recognition and 
enforcement of international arbitral awards.984 Few member states have 
adopted arbitration regulations providing narrower grounds for refusal of 
recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards.  
 
In this instance, UNCITRAL should address suggestions for a model 
interpretation of the Convention’s provisions or perhaps the adoption of 
guidelines for interpreting domestic laws in the Convention’s language.985 Given 
that UNCITRAL remains silent on the grounds for the refusal of recognition and 
enforcement of international arbitral awards by member states’ courts,986 it has 
been suggested that the member states’ courts and arbitrators follow the 
provisions of the New York Convention for interpreting the legal context for the 
recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards in international 
arbitration as closely as possible.987 
 
Therefore, it is fair to say that the role of UNCITRAL is a welcome, 
complementary development and promises important support for the 
harmonisation of international arbitration law; however, the degree of change in 
practice remains unclear.988 The main challenge faced in international arbitration 
is thus to balance the conflict of interest presented by the public policies of 
differing member states as related to each other and the uniform Conventional 
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laws.989 In this sense, the recent reformation of the arbitration regime in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia clearly appears to be part of a broader and continuing 
reorganisation of Saudi’s judicial system toward this very purpose.990 
 
On its face, the new Saudi arbitration regulations show that the Saudi 
government has made a serious attempt to adopt provisions from both the New 
York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law to more closely align itself with 
international arbitration norms.991 For example, Article 9 of the New Arbitration 
Law stipulates that the contracting parties may include an agreement to 
arbitrate certain disputes prior to the occurrence of the dispute, which was not 
practised under the provisions of Shariah law.992 Further. Article 38 of the New 
Saudi Arbitration Law allows the arbitral parties to choose non-Saudi 
regulations as their applicable law to resolve the subject matter of the 
dispute.993 This is a significant departure from Shariah principles. Yet, despite 
these attempts to integrate international norms into domestic Saudi law, 
enforcement of international arbitral awards must still be in compliance with the 
Shariah law, which for anyone seeking arbitral award enforcement in Saudi 
Arabia is the hobgoblin.994 
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Within this context, Saudi scholars point out that Article 50995 of the Saudi 
Arbitration Act is consistent with New York Convention provisions. However, 
Article 50 invalidates any arbitral award that violates public policy, which in 
Saudi Arabia is set forth in the constitutionally controlling Shariah.996 It is fair to 
say that the New Saudi Arbitration Law has achieved a high degree of 
advancement in line with international tenets of arbitration law, even though 
embedded with Shariah as its source, with the New York Convention and 
UNCITRAL both providing valid structure. 
 
6.3.4 Saudi Arabia’s Position on Recognising and Enforcing Foreign 
Arbitral Awards 
 
The New Saudi Arbitration Law represents a clear legislative mandate by Saudi 
lawmakers to modernise Saudi Arabia’s standards for arbitration and move 
these standards into the modern world of international arbitration.997 This law 
was a bona fide attempt to harmonise the general features of both domestic and 
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international arbitral procedures with the immutable principles articulated by the 
Hanbali school of thought in relation to arbitration proceedings.998 
 
For instance, the Saudi Arbitration Act seems to ‘decrease the courts’ 
supervisory role, leaving the arbitral institution to play such a role depending on 
the content of the arbitral procedure chosen by the parties’.999 In this regard, the 
New Saudi Arbitration Law embodies several arbitration-friendly principles of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, while at the same time seeking to harmonise these 
provisions with the principles of Shariah. The ultimate goal is to liberalise 
arbitration proceedings by allowing more freedom for the arbitral parties to 
choose their own procedures when resolving their international commercial 
disputes.1000 
 
Given the different views of national courts on the recognition and enforcement 
of international arbitral awards, it would behove any party to international 
arbitration to first obtain competent legal advice from an experienced lawyer 
who practices in the particular jurisdiction where the arbitral award will seek to 
be enforced.1001 This is especially important given the varying approaches to 
award enforcement by different member nations or even within the courts of 
member nations.1002 It appears that national arbitration laws in many countries, 
particularly in countries that have become major players in international trade 
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such as Saudi Arabia, still offer room for improvement and thus require careful 
professional insight.1003  
 
That being said, there are still complexities in the Saudi legislation with respect 
to the challenges for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
in the Kingdom, especially as applied by the Saudi enforcement courts.1004 
Thus, the question continues to be how best harmonise the New Saudi 
Arbitration Law together with the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL 
Model Rules with the principles of Shariah.  
 
 
6.4 Ineffectiveness of Saudi Arbitral Reform Efforts for Increased 
Efficiency in the Recognition and Enforcement of Awards 
 
Many praised the New Saudi Arbitration Law as a big step forward toward 
modernising the Saudi arbitration regime and bringing into line with international 
standards, and there were some significant improvements. For instance, the 
New Arbitration Law did away with the prior law’s requirement that the parties 
obtain the consent of the competent court prior to initiating arbitration 
proceedings.1005 The 2012 version completely removed this requirement and, in 
fact, now requires that the courts must decline jurisdiction of a dispute when a 
valid arbitration clause exists.1006 This change represents an example of one of 
the various ways Saudi Arabia revised its arbitration law to be more consistent 
with the UNCITRAL Model Law1007 in its attempt to become a more arbitration-
friendly environment. In the same vein, the New Arbitration Law now also 
permits an arbitral tribunal to decide on its own jurisdiction,1008 another change 
influenced by the UNCITRAL Model Law1009 that was not addressed by the old 
arbitration law. 
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However, despite these positive advancements in Saudi arbitration law, or for 
that matter any law or rules governing the substantive or procedural aspects of 
an arbitral proceedings, are rendered moot to the extent that they conflict with 
Shariah law—and this result is of major concern. Within the international 
arbitration sphere, party autonomy is the pinnacle of the arbitral process, and 
many scholars believe that mandatory domestic rules limiting this autonomy 
should be rejected.1010 In considering the extent to which an arbitral tribunal 
must take into consideration the mandatory rules of a particular jurisdiction, the 
US Supreme Court held that an ‘international arbitral tribunal owes no prior 
allegiance to the legal norms of particular states; hence it has no direct 
obligation to vindicate their statutory dictates’.1011 By incorporating such 
mandatory compliance rules into its enforcement efforts, the KSA is effectively 
restraining party autonomy.1012 Thus, the question becomes how can Saudi 
Arabia reconcile its international treaty obligations with its domestic law? 
 
6.5 Reconciling Treaty Obligations with the Application of Shariah 
Principles 
 
One issue that all Islamic states must face, including Saudi Arabia, is how to 
reconcile their international treaty obligations, such as those imposed by the 
New York Convention, with the guiding principles of Shariah that are broadly 
applicable domestically. Under the present circumstances, ideally the New York 
Convention should govern the enforcement of international arbitral awards with 
refusals and exemptions on Shariah grounds being the exception and not the 
rule. However, in practice Shariah often prevails under the Kingdom’s broad 
reading of ‘public policy’ as implicated in the exemptions contained in Article V 
of the New York Convention. The result has been a notable level of confusion 
among parties as to what an outcome will be when attempting to enforce their 
awards within the Saudi court system. 
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To gauge parties’ perceptions as to which would prevail when Shariah and the 
New York Convention come into conflict, 53.13% thought the New York 
Convention would prevail, while 46.88% believed that Shariah would determine 
the outcome.1013 Of the survey respondents, only two correctly commented that 
ideally there should be no conflict between the two.1014 Here it is important to 
point out that different GCC countries take varying approaches to their 
integration of Shariah into their legal systems. For instance, in Kuwait, Shariah 
is considered as one source of legislation, but not the main source.1015 As such, 
it faced significantly less difficulty in reconciling its treaty obligations under the 
New York Convention with its domestic laws and adoption of Shariah in 
principles. Roy explains that the primary reason that Kuwait was able to 
minimise its conflicts was because ‘Kuwait’s general rule of civil procedure was 
to recognize international arbitration agreements and to subordinate the Kuwaiti 
legal system to the rules of the arbitration tribunal’.1016  
 
However, Saudi Arabia has taken a much different approach. Within the 
Kingdom, the sources of Shariah law—the Quran and Sunnah—are prescribed 
by the Basic Law of Governance as the constitution of Saudi Arabia.1017 The 
Shariah is the main source of legislation in the Kingdom and the government’s 
position is that the Shariah is equivalent to the Kingdom’s public policy. Thus, 
the Saudi government subordinates international arbitral awards to the Shariah 
in practice, by ensuring the compliance of the arbitral proceedings and the 
contents of the award before recognising or enforcing the award within the 
Kingdom. Specifically, when looking at recognition and enforcement 
proceedings, there is no distinction between domestic or foreign/international 
awards or parties;1018 all awards are subject to compliance with Shariah ‘as 
																																																						
1013 Almutawa (n 110) app II. 
1014 Ibid. 
1015 Ibid 61. 
1016 Kristin Roy, ‘The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy 
Defense to Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?’ (1995) 18 Fordham International 
Law Journal 920, 963. 
1017 Basic Law of Governance, art 1. 
1018 Baamir (n 18) 77 (‘Islamic law pays no attention to states, borders and other concepts such as 
nationality and domicile…’.). 
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enforced in Saudi Arabia’.1019 This position has not changed with the passage of 
the New Arbitration Law. 
 
This focus on subjecting foreign awards to the same compliance scrutiny of 
domestic arbitral awards raises the important question of how the Kingdom is 
defining ‘public policy’ for the purposes of its obligations under the New York 
Convention. There are two ways to approach this analysis. The first is 
considering Saudi Arabia’s compliance with its treaty obligations from a legal 
perspective, while the second looks at the inherent tension between domestic 
and international public policy and which should be applied.  
 
6.5.1 Legal Requirements for Fulfilling Treaty Obligations  
 
There are a number of sources of obligation that one can consult that would 
require Saudi Arabia to comply with its treaty obligations in good faith. Part of 
that good faith means attempting to act in accord with the spirit and intent of the 
treaty, not to use inherent vagaries to its advantage and allow its domestic law 
to remain supreme. 
 
First, one can look to the principles of the Shariah itself. Consider the following 
passage from the Quran, ‘O ye who believe! fulfil (all) obligations’.1020 Often 
used to support the contention that all Muslim must uphold their contractual 
obligations, this would also be applicable to a Shariah based government. As 
such, the government is responsible for meeting its obligations under all treaties 
and international contracts of which it becomes a part. Similarly, one can also 
look to general principles of international law to support the Kingdom’s 
obligations as a signatory. For instance, the principle of pacta sunt servanda is 
similar to the principle of the Quran in that all agreements must be kept.1021 
Furthermore, as a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Saudi 
Arabia also has a requirement to interpret the treaty and perform its obligations 
																																																						
1019 Salah Deeb, ‘Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ in Essam Al-Tamimi, The Practitioner’s Guide to 
Arbitration in the Middle East and North Africa (JurisNet 2009) 195. 
1020 Quran, Al-Ma’ida 5:1. 
1021 Anton Maurer, The Public Policy Exception under the New York Convention (JurisNet 2012) 6. 
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in good faith,1022 taking into consideration ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’.1023  
 
Thus, Saudi Arabia has an obligation to interpret the treaty language and 
perform its obligations in a manner consistent with the intent of the treaty, not to 
perpetuate its own rule of law or agenda. Where this becomes difficult to parse 
is in the definition of public policy, which is considered more fully below. 
 
6.5.2 Defining Public Policy  
 
It has been recognised that there are in effect two different types of public policy 
practiced by nations—domestic public policy and international public policy. As 
explored in previous chapters, public policy comes into play as an exemption to 
the New York Convention upon which the Kingdom can refuse to recognise and 
enforce an international arbitral award.1024 This is also mirrored in the language 
of the New Arbitration Law, rendering Saudi arbitral awards subject to the same 
limitation.1025 The difference is that the New Arbitration Law specifically 
mentions Shariah compliance in its provision on public policy, whereas the term 
is left relatively undefined by the New York Convention.1026 The text specifically 
allows a country to refuse to recognise or enforce an arbitral award that is 
‘contrary to the public policy of that country’.1027 Without any additional context 
or interpretive information, it is easy to see how this can become the basis for 
subjective uses and controversy in the enforcement realm. As some scholars 
have keenly noted, ‘[t]his clause has the effect of relegating the ultimate 
decision on the efficacy of the Convention to the good faith of the Contracting 
States…Basically, the judge may refuse recognition and enforcement if he finds 
that it would be contrary to the public policy of his country’.1028 
																																																						
1022 United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 31(3)(c), 23 May 1969, Treaty Series, 
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1023 Ibid. 
1024 New York Convention, art V(b)(2). 
1025 Saudi Arbitration Law 2012, art 50.  
1026 Mark Wakim, ‘Public Policy Concerns Regarding Enforcement of Foreign International Arbitral 
Awards in the Middle East’ (2008) 21 New York International Law Review 1, 50 (‘The interpretation of 
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1027 New York Convention, art V(b)(2). 
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One should also not that there is a stark difference between the intentions of the 
public policy provisions of domestic legislations and the New York Convention. 
The public policy provision of the New York Convention is permissive, rather 
than mandatory. Compliance is not a condition that must be met for an award to 
be enforced, but rather it serves as the basis to refuse to enforce an award 
when doing so would be contrary to the country’s public policy.1029 Conversely, 
the language contained in domestic legislation, such as the New Saudi 
Arbitration law, sets for public policy and Shariah compliance as a condition that 
must be met before an award can be enforced.1030 The latter is a more 
expansive provision than that of the Convention and is contrary to custom to 
interpret the Convention’s exemptions narrowly.1031 It is a careful balance to be 
struck by the courts that they do not conflate the intended purposes of the two 
provisions; each award must be considered in light of the regime under which it 
is being enforced. 
 
However, to the extent that public policy is implicated, there remains the 
question of how public policy should be defined. While public policy is widely 
recognised to vary dramatically from country to country, Shariah adds an 
additional layer of complexity as an interpretive system that can result in 
differences from court to court or even judge to judge within the Kingdom.1032 It 
has been established that Saudi Arabia takes public policy a step further than 
most Western countries and equates it with Shariah principles.1033 Thus, any 
attempt to enforce an award in Saudi Arabia is in effect subject to three layers 
of public policy. The first is the provision in the Saudi domestic legislation that 
requires public policy compliance as a condition to enforcement under the 
traditional notions of good morals and protecting the public order. The second is 
the implication of Shariah’s broad scope and various interpretations to the 
award and the underlying arbitration proceedings. Finally, the third is the 
																																																						
1029 New York Convention, art V(2). 
1030 Saudi Arbitration Law 2012, art 50. 
1031 Almutawa (n 110) 116. 
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applicability of the public policy exemption under the New York Convention. 
This creates an interpretative nightmare for a party unfamiliar with the Saudi 
system, leading to an often ineffective and inefficient for enforcing an arbitral 
award. 
 
Returning to the dichotomy of domestic versus international public policy, many 
countries have made a distinction to public policy as applied within its borders 
and the public policy that is to be applied when dealing with matters of foreign 
relations.1034 Arbitration scholars have gone as far to say that domestic public 
policy is the internal policy that relates to the enforcement of domestic arbitral 
awards, whereas public policy for the enforcement of international awards 
pursuant to Article (V)(2)(b) of the New York Convention should only consider 
the ‘international public policy of the [enforcing] jurisdiction’, as opposed to its 
conception of domestic public policy.1035  
 
In this context, a country’s international public policy represents the parallel 
standards it holds those outside its borders to, when interacting with the 
country’s legal system. The motivation for having an international public policy 
is to increase foreign relations, be viewed as friendlier to arbitration, and fairly 
evaluate those awards that have little to do with the domestic legislative system 
beyond gaining satisfaction through a judicial order. In fact, Levi-Tawill notes 
that ‘the courts of most nations have chosen not to use their domestic public 
policies to refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award, and will 
enforce the arbitral award as long as it is not contrary to international public 
policy’.1036 Yet, Saudi Arabia has not subscribed to this approach. It continues to 
subject both foreign and domestic parties and awards to the same Shariah 
compliance standards. As such, an important step for the Kingdom on its path 
to modernisation would be to consider to what extent differentiating between 
domestic and international public policy could improve its efficiency in enforcing 
arbitral awards the perceptions of those outside the Kingdom on engaging with 
																																																						
1034 Troy Harris, ‘The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards under 
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the Saudi legal system. One possible method for addressing this issue would be 
the adoption of some degree of legal pluralism in the Kingdom with regard to 
international arbitration. As will be discussed in further detail in the following 
chapter, legal pluralism essentially occurs when a legal system, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, creates two different conceptual legal 
frameworks for contrasting aspects1037—in this case it would be the 
enforcement of domestic versus foreign arbitral awards. 
 
In addition to the need to define public policy, to the extent the public policy 
implicates Shariah, there is an inherent impetus of good faith embodied in the 
Shariah principles that cannot be ignored in their application. In this regard, if 
Shariah is to be applied as public policy, the application of Shariah should not 
be arbitrary and left simply to the discretion of whichever enforcement judge is 
presiding over a case; indeed, its application should be based on a clear and 
determinate policy. Clarity in the application of Shariah principles would 
eliminate the tendency to engage in shrouded use of public policy to avoid 
international treaty obligations. Such consistency and predictability in 
application would also prevent parties from engaging in enforcement forum 
shopping as explained in the follow section. 
 
 
6.5.3 Encouraging Enforcement Forum Shopping 
 
As companies continue to globalise, it becomes increasingly likely that they will 
hold assets in different enforcement jurisdictions. If Saudi Arabia continues to 
boldly refuse to enforce arbitral awards on public policy grounds for lack of 
Shariah compliance, particularly when interpretational issues are at hand, this 
will likely encourage enforcement forum shopping by foreign parties seeking to 
enforce arbitral awards. Such forum shopping is made possible by the more 
favourable right provision under Article VII of the New York Convention.1038 
Article VII of the New York Convention can be implicated when a non-domestic 
arbitral award rendered within an Islamic country, such as Saudi Arabia, is 
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refused enforcement in that country under Article V(2)(b). This provision allows 
for a subsequent attempt to enforce the arbitral award in another country in 
which the Shariah laws are more favourable and would find the arbitral award to 
be enforceable. It should be noted that there is not a global consensus on how 
the most favourable right provision can be applied, and the argument here is 
speculative rather than empirical, but it is something that the Kingdom should 
take into consideration as it attempts to modernise into an arbitration-friendly 
jurisdiction.1039 
 
6.6 A Lacking Judiciary System 
 
In addition to the legislative conflicts that arise between Saudi domestic laws 
and international instruments, Saudi Arabia also faces struggles within its 
judiciary system when it comes to the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. 
 
First, the structure of the Saudi domestic courts for handling recognition and 
enforcement proceedings is not conducive to efficiency. The Saudi judiciary 
bifurcates the process for obtaining recognition and enforcement to different 
benches. An arbitral award must first be recognised by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. Once the award is recognised, a sixty-day period commences within 
which the respondent can challenge the enforcement of the award. Once that 
period has passed, the enforcement judge then has full authority to enforce the 
award with the weight of a final judgment.  
 
This two-step process creates a significant barrier between the rendering of the 
arbitral award and its ultimate enforcement—recognition. Under the 
Enforcement Law enacted in 2013, recognition and enforcement were 
consolidated to both being handled by enforcement judges. Article 11 of the 
new law places significant restrictions on the circumstances within which an 
enforcement judge can recognise an arbitral award. First, the enforcement 
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judge must confirm that the award must be from a jurisdiction with reciprocity. 
Then the judge must verify the following: that no local court has jurisdiction over 
the dispute, and the foreign tribunal issuing the award had jurisdiction according 
to its own conflict of law rules; that litigants were duly summoned, properly 
represented, and defended themselves; that the award is final as to the law of 
the issuer; that the award does not contradict another award, judgment, or order 
issued on the same subject from a judicial authority within a competent 
jurisdiction in the Kingdom; and that the award does not contradict the 
Kingdom’s public policy of Shariah.1040 This recognition stage is where Saudi 
court most often engage in additional judicial review beyond what is normally 
deemed acceptable for awards with the status of res judicata. 
 
The issue of judicial review by Saudi courts within the context of recognising 
and enforcing arbitral awards has been a persistent issue within the Kingdom. 
Under the Old Arbitral Law, the parties could broadly challenge an arbitral 
award before the competent court.1041 This often resulted in the domestic courts 
engaging in a merits review of a case and overturning the award.1042 This issue 
was one that the New Law specifically attempted to address by restricting the 
grounds for setting aside an arbitral award to a specific set of circumstances, 
which were primarily derived from those outlined in the New York 
Convention.1043 However, when piecing together the provisions of New 
Arbitration Law, the Enforcement Law, and the public policy exertions under the 
New York Convention, the implication of Shariah as public policy open awards 
to significant review by the enforcement courts. 
 
Furthermore, when it comes to foreign awards, the Enforcement Law has 
significant gaps in some instances and overlapping jurisdiction in other 
instances that pose a constant challenge to parties and the courts. First, one 
can argue that under Article 11, any treaties that provide for reciprocal 
recognition would take precedence over the domestic laws of Saudi Arabia. In 
the event that no treaty is applicable, one would then turn to the verification 
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factors listed above.1044 However, this scholarly approach is contradictory to the 
conjunctive nature of the two provisions upon a plain language reading. 
Specifically, Article 11 provides that enforcement is made on the basis of 
reciprocity and the verification factors. 
 
In turning to an examination of the verification factors more specifically, one 
could argue that they require that the Saudi courts have no jurisdiction over the 
subject matter for an award to be enforced.1045 However, if one were to read this 
factor in such a manner, then the Saudi courts could ultimately not enforce any 
foreign award arising from a dispute in which the Saudi courts could have had 
jurisdiction. Arguably, this is remedied by the courts being required to respect 
the parties’ exercise of autonomy in entering into an arbitration agreement, 
effectively removing the case from the jurisdiction of the courts and into that of 
the arbitral tribunal. The ambiguity in the Enforcement Law’s language, and its 
incomplete integration of the New York Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law 
principles, creates inconsistency in application and confusion among both 
enforcement judges and parties that could be reconciled by addressing the 
issue of foreign award enforcement under the Convention more directly. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
As demonstrated in this chapter, the recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia is impacted by the interaction of the 
Saudi Arbitration Law, the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
the decisions made by Saudi courts applying Hanbali interpretation, and the 
Shariah. 
 
Article V of the New York Convention has clearly set out certain exclusive 
grounds on which the member states can refuse to recognise and enforce 
international arbitral awards. Though jurisdictional exclusions like improper 
subject matter, incapacity and invalidity tend to be construed narrowly and 
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consistently there remains the exception of public policy.1046 However, Saudi 
Arabia has taken a distinctively broad approach to public policy, contending that 
any aspect of the arbitration agreement, proceedings, or award that is in 
contravention to Shariah principles is therefore against the Kingdom’s public 
policy. This is further compounded by the reality that even different courts within 
Saudi Arabia may interpret Shariah differently, particularly as applied to the 
New York Convention and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 
Public policy is, in a way, in the eyes of the beholder, in this case the particular 
Shariah judge or court. It is vague and broad, if the desire exists, can be used to 
invalidate or refuse to enforce virtually any award that seems out of line with 
Shariah.  
 
However, as far as the attitude of Saudi government is concerned, it appears 
that the government has made tremendous strides in reforming its arbitration 
framework. It is certainly fair to say that the New Saudi Arbitration Law has 
improved considerably its arbitration practices and procedures. Saudi Arabia is 
on the path toward endorsing a modern arbitration framework for effective and 
efficient international arbitration, notwithstanding that some Saudi arbitration 
procedures diverge from the New York Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law, 
especially where Shariah is concerned. It is these divergences that may 
continue to present challenges for international contracting parties to obtain 
predictable recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards in Saudi 
Arabia. The following section will explore how further progress can be made 
toward reconciling these laws. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to understand the role of Shariah in the 
recognition and enforcement of both domestic and foreign arbitral awards and 
to appreciate the challenges it creates for commercial contracting parties.1047 As 
Saudi Arabia attempts to modernise its arbitration regime through becoming a 
party to prevailing international arbitral conventions and promulgating a new 
arbitration law, it continues to struggle with its intrinsic historic Shariah roots. 
This thesis’s contribution to the research in this field has been to explore the 
impact that Shariah continues to have on the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards despite the reformations taking place within the Kingdom. This 
research has demonstrated that while Saudi Arabia has made significant 
progress in bringing elements of international arbitral trends into its domestic 
arbitration regime that there is still room for improvement within the Saudi 
arbitration laws to achieve the effective and efficient enforcement of the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards within the Kingdom.1048  
 
As ascertained through an exploration of the literature, much controversy exists 
over the Saudi arbitration system with regard to the rules that govern the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, particularly foreign arbitral 
awards.1049 However, there is little comprehensive reporting of arbitration 
enforcement efforts in Saudi Arabia.1050 As a result of the lack of publicly 
available statistics on enforcement efforts and the relative paucity of current 
post-arbitration law reform literature, this study has largely focused on the 
merits and demerits of the Saudi Arbitration Law’s award recognition and 
enforcement system.1051 
 
																																																						
1047 See Chapter 2. 
1048 Ibid. 
1049 See Chapters 1-2. 
1050 See Chapter 2. 
1051 Ibid. 
	216	
	
Notwithstanding the above stated methodological challenges, this thesis 
concludes that arbitration remains an underutilised method of dispute resolution 
in Saudi Arabia as a result of the potential challenges relating to the 
enforcement of arbitral awards.1052 The New Saudi Arbitration Law promised to 
modernise the Saudi arbitration system, bringing much needed certainty around 
the rules applied to award enforcement in Saudi Arabia—and to a certain 
degree it has been moderately successful.1053 Among the most innovative of its 
reforms, the New Arbitration Law’s provisions are more harmonised with 
international norms and best practices derived from its adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and becoming a party to the New York Convention.1054 
Additionally, the revised law attempts to limit the Saudi domestic courts’ purview 
to review arbitral awards, on which the old law was silent, and the principle of 
party autonomy is, for the first time, given formal recognition under Saudi 
law.1055 However, this autonomy remains tempered by the broad provision of 
the New Arbitration Law that requires the enforcement courts to verify that an 
arbitral award is consistent with Shariah and Saudi public policy prior to 
enforcement.1056 
 
7.2 Summary of the Research 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis outlined the aims and objectives of this research, 
primarily to investigate the impact of Shariah law on the recognition and 
enforcement of both domestic and foreign arbitral awards.  
 
Chapter 2 examined the Saudi legal framework and the sources of its 
legislation. It explored the two fundamental aspects of the Saudi legal system: 
the recent modernisation of the Saudi arbitration framework and the challenges 
confronted by commercial contracting parties with obtaining recognition and 
enforcement of their arbitral awards by the Saudi enforcement courts.1057 This 
chapter sought to analyse the extent of the Saudi arbitration framework’s 
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effectiveness and efficiency in enforcing arbitral awards and whether further 
improvements to this regime should be made. 
 
This chapter was inspired in part by the successes and failures of Saudi 
Arabia’s domestic arbitral reform and the adoption of the New York Convention 
within the context of Saudi Arabia’s national arbitration framework. At the 
outset, it seems that some of the essential legal requirements of Shariah law 
might not support a legal regime that regularly recognised and enforced both 
domestic and international commercial arbitral awards as international awards 
were not the result of proceedings governed by a Shariah system. As Chapter 2 
sought to document and assess, foreign commercial parties still face a number 
of uncertainties with getting their awards recognised and enforced within the 
Kingdom.1058 Further, the New Saudi Arbitration Law does not directly address 
issues of entirely foreign arbitrations and does not definitely resolve important 
questions around the finality and enforcement of arbitrations involving Saudi 
parties but that are, nonetheless, administered under foreign arbitration 
rules.1059 The Saudi government has long remained a difficult jurisdiction in 
which to enforce foreign awards and it is not yet clear whether the new Saudi 
arbitration regulations mark a departure point in the Saudi government’s attitude 
to delocalised arbitration. 
 
The future of recognition and enforcement efforts within the Kingdom will 
depend significantly on how the courts interpret the text of the implementing 
rules. In practice, a foreign party seeking to enforce an arbitral award against a 
party domiciled in Saudi Arabia may face significant barriers. From the 
standpoint of the foreign party, the principal limitation of arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia is the application of mandatory norms of Shariah, in view of the Islamic 
foundation of Saudi Arabia’s legal constitution. For example, Article 1 of the 
Basic Law of Governance stipulates that the Holy Qur’an is the constitution of 
the country, and the Holy Qur’an and Sunna’h are the sources of Saudi 
legislation.1060 In the absence of codified and consistently applied norms of 
Shariah, the Saudi legal system may seem, to onlookers at least, to offer a 
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discretionary model of justice in which the courts play a highly interventionist 
role that conflicts with the underlying purposes and principles of a modern 
system of arbitration, namely party autonomy, finality and sanctity of 
contract.1061 Saudi judicial bodies, for instance, are in practice afforded wide 
discretion to reopen an award and review its merits if there is a question as to 
the awards Shariah compliance.1062 This was one of the key issues that the 
arbitral community hoped would be resolved by the New Arbitration Law, but is 
one that continues to linger given the broad applicability of Shariah as a form of 
Saudi public policy.1063 
 
Chapter 3 then shifted focus from the structural aspects of the Saudi arbitration 
framework to the practical aspects of arbitral award enforcement. One primary 
takeaway from this analysis is that all parties, domestic and foreign, 
contemplating arbitration as a means of resolving their disputes with a Saudi 
national or needing to enforce an award within the Kingdom should be 
cognisant of scope and application of Shariah in the arbitral context. Beyond 
this, the parties should also seek to gain a fuller understanding of the formal 
and substantive contractual and policy elements of Saudi Arabia’s Shariah-
governed legal system, as the courts will evaluate arbitral awards to see 
whether they were rendered consistent with Shariah principles.1064 For instance, 
a party that will need to enforce their awards in Saudi Arabia must keep in mind 
that the enforcement courts continue to exercise broad review power through 
the ability to verify Shariah compliance. A competent court is not only 
empowered to scrutinise arbitration agreements to ensure that that these meet 
formal requirements of the New Arbitration Law, such as with regard to 
admissibility, capacity and eligibility requirements, it may also decide on its own 
motion to set aside the award on the grounds that it contravenes the provisions 
of Islamic Shariah or Saudi Arabia’s public policy.1065 
 
The central focus of Chapter 3 was the need for greater clarity and 
understanding of how public policy issues represented through Shariah 
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applicability may have bearing on arbitrations administered under foreign or 
host state ‘choice of law’ clauses in Saudi Arabia.1066 In view of the broader 
debates on forum shopping and the wider developments in international 
investment law, Chapter 3 identified the ways in which arbitration clauses may 
be voided or rendered ineffective under existing Shariah-based Saudi 
regulations.1067 To combat these challenges, foreign contractors engaging in 
arbitration must maintain a working understanding of Shariah and its potential 
impact when drafting a workable arbitration clause for contracts that at some 
point may be subject to recognition and enforcements Saudi law. Thoroughness 
and specificity in the drafting of arbitration clauses may reduce the risk of an 
award being set aside.  
 
Further, this chapter also explored how an attempt to circumvent Shariah by 
invoking foreign arbitral rules or laws often prove futile.1068 While the exercise of 
autonomy in choosing the procedural and substantive laws and rules applicable 
to the proceedings may generate a favourable award, that award means little if 
it is unable to be enforced. During arbitral award enforcement proceedings in 
Saudi Arabia, there is little to stop the enforcement court from reopening the 
award, or examining the underlying contract, to assess its compliance with 
Shariah law, regardless of the inclusion of contractual forum selection clause, 
stabilisation clauses or other references to delocalised institutional arbitration 
rules. Chapter 3 argues that the rights of foreign contractors are most secure 
when the governing law of the contract is Saudi law as its domestic law already 
accounts for the nuances of Shariah.  
 
Building on the arbitration framework basics delineated in Chapters 2 and 3, 
Chapter 4 then critically examines the role of Shariah in the various stages and 
aspects of arbitration proceedings with the goal of highlighting the plethora of 
instances where a deviation from Shariah principles could result in the failure of 
Saudi courts to recognize or enforce an arbitral award. This analysis recognises 
that foreign contractors and investors are, perhaps understandably, reluctant to 
choose Saudi law as the law of the contract and dispute resolution as a result of 
																																																						
1066 See Chapter 3, 
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their lack of familiarity with Shariah principles; however, it is crucial that they 
take Shariah applicability into consideration as it becomes an issue at the 
enforcement stage.1069  
 
The reticence toward Shariah often stems from an unfamiliarity with its 
principles as well an emphasis on the areas in which it deviates from 
established Western commercial practices. In many instances, parties will look 
to opt out of a legal system based on traditions and principles that are 
substantially different from their own.1070 Those unfamiliar with Islamic legal 
systems may also raises concerns as to the certainty, predictability and fairness 
of Saudi arbitration processes.1071 The larger problem is that the Saudi 
arbitration system currently lacks a settled body of legal principles—contractual 
and regulatory—that can be effectively applied to resolve arbitral disputes.1072 
This is a result of both the developing nature of the Saudi arbitration framework 
and the interpretational nature of Shariah practice. 
 
The mutual antipathy between Islamic legal systems and international 
arbitration regimes has a long and turbulent history. The apparent conflicts 
between Islamic and Western models of arbitration were first placed into 
contention in the Aramco arbitration case.1073 As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the 
Aramco dispute in particular provides the historical background against which 
Saudi Arabia adopted its law banning governmental ministers from entering into 
arbitration agreements, a policy that has survived the reforms of the New 
Arbitration Law.1074 Once based on a crude mercantilism, Islamic legal systems 
had now taken on many features of advanced capitalistic states. Now exporters 
and not just importers of capital investment in the new globalised economy, 
Saudi Arabia ratified major international conventions and treaties, specifically 
the New York Convention, as did several other Islamic countries. Saudi Arabia, 
along with other commercial hubs, most notably Dubai, have signalled their 
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1073 See Chapter 3. 
1074 See Ibid. 
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intention to continue along this path, chiefly through enactment of arbitration 
friendly national legislation.1075 
 
Situated against this background, Chapter 4 considered the role of foreign 
arbitration in the treatment of commercial contracts under Saudi domestic 
arbitration law. From these premises, Chapter 4 concluded that Saudi Arabia 
may yet be a long way from fully embracing either the principles of international 
law or the Westernised system of international arbitration.1076 Yet, this moment 
in history may also provide the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with an impetus for 
reform.  
 
Chapter 5 attempted to demystify Islamic law and emphasise the positive 
aspects of the Islamic model of arbitration, which often are not as divorced from 
traditional principles as one may first think. It is often falsely assumed that 
Islamic legal systems are rudimentary in character and therefore lack effective 
contract laws1077 and this chapter sought to challenge this characterisation. As 
denoted in the primary texts of Islam, contracts are considered sacred. The 
Quran is explicit on the matter: ‘O ye who believe! Fulfil your undertakings’.1078 
Such is the primacy afforded to the good faith execution of a contract that in the 
priority of obligations assumed by the practicing Muslim, only devotion to God 
ranks higher than the fulfilment and satisfaction of obligations owed pursuant to 
a binding agreement.1079 Moreover, no distinction is made between public and 
private contracts or between international treaties or domestic contracts. All are 
pacts entered are witnessed by Allah and must be observed as an exercise of 
religious duty.  
																																																						
1075 See M Balen, ‘Using the DIFC’s Off-Shore Jurisdiction to Enforce Arbitration Awards in On-Shore 
Dubai’ (2016) 82(3) Arbitration 233, 233-38; see also AY Baamir & Ilias Bantekas, ‘Saudi Law as Lex 
arbitri: Evaluation of Saudi Arbitration Law and Judicial Practice’ (2009) 25 Journal of International 
Arbitration 239; G Blanke, ‘Ruling of Dubai Court of First Instance Calls into Question UAE Courts’ 
Recent Acquis on International Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards’ (2015) 29(1) ALQ 56-75; S 
Kantaria, ‘The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the UAE and DIFC Courts’ (2014) 28(2) ALQ 193-
204. 
1076 Baamir (n 18) 91 ‘Arbitration loses its objective of settling disputes if arbitral awards lack 
enforceability.’ In a survey, respondents view judges in the GCC as being unfamiliar and ill-equipped to 
deal with international agreements, and especially so with regard to ICSID Conventions (3.78 out of 10) 
which has had very little history in the GCC states. The respondents also rated the judges’ familiarity with 
the New York Convention (5.86 out of 10) and the judges’ familiarity with the UNCITRAL Model Law 
(4.97 out of 10). 
1077 See Chapter 5. 
1078 Mohammed (n 278) 98. 
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One distinguishing feature of Shariah lies in the informal nature of its 
development, which has evolved principally through processes of 
experimentation and jurisprudential debate in place of a codified or systematic 
theory of private law and autonomy.1080 In this respect, Islamic canon law bears 
a certain degree of resemblance to the contract laws of common law 
jurisdictions. Under Shariah, the Islamic scholars interpret the Shariah principles 
and apply them as factual situations arise. Further, the principles of freedom 
and sanctity of contract occupy a privileged position in both legal systems, albeit 
applied and interpreted in different ways. Additionally, Islamic law systems 
adopt the same basic definitions or governing criteria as common law systems 
in determining whether a contract has been formed, specifically with respect to 
capacity, consideration, and offer and acceptance. 
 
Chapter 6 then united the analyses delineated in the previous chapters to 
assess the challenges for recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in 
Saudi Arabia. This chapter examined the notable aspects of the domestic 
enforcement regime upon which any attempts to recognise and enforce foreign 
arbitral awards are based. This chapter then turned to an exploration of the 
challenges presented for enforcing foreign arbitral awards. Within this scope, 
consideration was first given to the influence of international instruments, such 
as the New York Convention, on the Saudi arbitration regime. Despite the ‘pull’ 
toward procedural harmonisation of national laws to leading international 
arbitration regimes, the jurisprudential foundation of arbitration law remains, to a 
large extent, national. This chapter further explored the application of Article V 
of the New York Convention and the exemptions that Saudi Arabia can invoke 
and define through its national arbitration laws to refuse to recognize or 
enforcement of international arbitral awards. For example, the most common 
grounds for invalidating international arbitral awards are: incapability of the 
subject matter of the dispute to be resolved in arbitration; invalidity of the 
underlying arbitration agreement; and arbitral awards that are contrary to the 
public policy of the enforcing state. It also noted that there is no proper 
interpretation of the term public policy in the national legislation and that in 
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Saudi Arabia, Shariah law is equated to public policy. It appears that the 
enforcing courts within the Kingdom interpret these grounds for refusal very 
broadly, not hesitating to exercise their power to ensure Shariah compliance.1081 
 
The tension between international enforcement principles and Saudi Arabia’s 
rooting in Shariah tradition lies at heart of the Saudi Arabian arbitration 
framework, itself a reflection of the 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law’s competing, 
aims—its obligations under international law to uphold, recognize, and enforce 
awards absent a valid justification for refusing to do, and the formal demand for 
Shariah compliant laws.1082 This chapter further considered the many and 
varied ways in which the conflicts of law, values and rights play out in the 
context of the Saudi legal system, arguing in favour of national arbitration laws 
that reconcile the demand for effectiveness and legitimacy. Otherwise put, the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s newly reformed arbitration 
regime will largely depend on the extent to which it is viewed as achieving a 
more just and stable balance between the public policy prerogatives of the 
sovereign state and the rights and legitimate expectations of private persons 
who are made subject to its law.1083 
 
To further illustrate its attempt at a harmonised approach, this chapter also 
assessed the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules as related to 
the New Saudi Arbitration Law. Despite attempts to implement UNCITRAL 
provisions, some provisions of the Saudi Arbitration Law are divergent from 
those of UNCITRAL. For example, the Saudi government has constitutional 
obligations as stipulated in the Basic Law of Governance that all Saudi 
regulations should be derived from the source of Holy Quran and Sunnah.1084 
This illustrates that there are still gaps that need to be reconciled for Saudi 
Arabia to become fully aligned with the overarching trends in international 
arbitration and establish an efficient and modern arbitration framework for 
																																																						
1081 See Chapter 6. 
1082 Peter W Wilson & Graham Douglas, Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm (1994) 201. 
1083 For a critical analysis, see Gus Van Harten, ‘The Public Private Distinction in the International 
Arbitration of Individual Claims against the State’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 371. 
1084 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
<http://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/aboutKingDom/SaudiGovernment/Pages
/BasicSystemOfGovernance35297.aspx> assessed on 6 October 2016. 
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domestic and international arbitration. Yet, this author remains hopeful that 
Saudi Arabia may yet become a regional centre for arbitration in the coming 
decades. As other regional powers compete for foreign investment, Saudi 
Arabia, like other GCC countries, has strong economic incentives to develop 
laws and procedures which are more investor friendly, and less rooted in its 
cultural and religious traditions.1085 
 
However, this thesis argues that Islamic law and business friendly arbitration 
need not been seen as mutually exclusive. By first drawing on interpretative 
theories of law, the thesis argues for a constructive ‘best light’ interpretation of 
Shariah law in the face of the increasing complexities of modern commercial 
practice, toward the further advancement of a ‘gap-less’ and coherent system of 
Saudi law, rooted in principles of justice and rule of law, as opposed to being 
governed primarily by religious principles.1086 
 
Finally, the thesis concludes that conflicts between laws and legal system 
present an exciting opportunity for mutual learning and accommodation 
between Islamic and non-Islamic legal systems and models of contract 
construction and dispute resolution.1087 By extension, this thesis has argued that 
Shariah principles need not be seen as an impediment to doing business in 
Saudi Arabia, but, rather that Islamic arbitration law is ripe for innovation, and 
has garnered respect for the emphasis it places on risk mitigation, fairness and 
equitable distribution of benefits and obligations in the conclusion of contracts. 
 
In light of the above, this thesis makes the following recommendations for 
further developing the Saudi arbitration regime with regard to the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards within the Kingdom.  
 
7.3 Recommendations 
 
As demonstrated by the preceding chapters, religion and culture, as well as 
international norms, have a significant effect on the arbitral award enforcement 
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process. This study has carefully examined the impact of Shariah on the 
enforcement of arbitral awards and the particular challenges its implication 
presents for foreign parties attempting to enforce their arbitral awards before the 
Kingdom’s courts. Specifically, the core focus of this work is reconciling Shariah 
to Saudi public policy and what this means for Saudi judges when recognising 
and enforcing arbitral awards. The ambiguity of the principle of public policy 
under the New York Convention, and among the various players in the 
international arbitral sphere, has permitted Saudi Arabia’s enforcement courts to 
far exceed the normal discretion accorded to national courts when enforcing 
arbitral awards.1088 This expansion of the definition of public policy beyond that 
derived from international norms allows enforcement judges to substantively 
review arbitral awards for Shariah compliance on the basis of an exemption to 
the recognition and enforcement framework to which the KSA has subscribed. 
In order to curb the impact of Shariah, the following recommendations propose 
ways in which Saudi Arabia can further develop its arbitral enforcement regime 
to achieve the efficient and effective enforcement of arbitral awards.  
 
7.3.1 Embrace Legal Pluralism 
 
One approach for reconciling the conflicts inherent between Shariah and the 
enforcement of international commercial arbitral awards under the New York 
Convention would be to complete introducing the idea of a dualistic legal 
system. Engaging in this type of legal pluralism creates a situation in which the 
population observes more than one body of law.1089 These scenarios most often 
arise in contemporary societies when the legal system currently in place cannot 
effectively manage the interrelations with other legal systems when cultural 
boundaries are crossed.1090 Further, as Hooker explains, legal pluralism can 
naturally result from a particular society’s attempt at modernization.  
 
																																																						
1088 Abdulaziz Mohammed A Bin Zaid, ‘The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Commercial 
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Multiple obligation arises in those state which have voluntarily 
adopted Western laws with the motive of modernizing 
themselves… A legal plurality here arises quite simply because 
the original is by no means displaced in whole or in part by the 
introduced law… The result is a conflict of principle which is 
settled in a number of different ways or, more often than not, left 
unsolved.1091 
 
This is the position in which Saudi Arabia currently finds itself. It has adopted 
international and conventions and norms to attempt to modernise its approach 
to prevailing arbitral practice and award enforcement, yet its domestic laws and 
structure still maintain incompatible ties with its Shariah roots. Marar aptly notes 
that this is what in effect happens when Saudi Arabia ‘borrows’ legal concepts 
from developed countries that do not share the same legal system without 
revising or adapting its existing laws.1092  
 
However, by engaging intentionally in a degree of legal pluralism, Saudi Arabia 
could develop a dualistic, parallel approach to arbitral award enforcement that 
would account for domestic arbitrations consistent with the prevailing Shariah 
provisions alongside a more secular and legal principle-based system that 
would apply to foreign awards. As Marar notes in his research, the Saudi 
Arabian government has begun to undertake this process in some respects with 
regard to financial transactions.1093 Under such an approach, Shariah maintains 
its place as the primary source of law in Saudi Arabia, while the government 
simultaneously permits a Western-based commercial law system familiar to 
most foreign parties to operate in conjunction with the existing Islamic laws.1094 
 
Implementing such as dualistic legal system that relies on concepts of legal 
pluralism would be no easy task. In fact, as Marar notes ‘the Saudi legal system 
is in need of ‘legal surgery’ and re-engineering of the legal architecture’.1095 And 
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to some extent, the recent legislative and judicial reform efforts taken by the 
Saudi government demonstrates its agreement; however, the way in which such 
reforms have been undertaken in a piecemeal manner are not necessarily 
effective for a lasting and harmonised legal framework. This is issue is not 
limited to the realm of arbitration law and is indicative of the broader challenges 
facing the Saudi legal system. To rectify this issue would require an overhaul of 
the existing arbitration regime. Ideally this would start with the development of a 
specialised Shura Council committee on arbitration as discussed in the 
following section that could examine Saudi Arabia’s domestic approach to 
arbitration, both domestic and foreign, in light of the limitations imposed by the 
Shariah framework and these Kingdom’s obligations under its international 
instruments. Then, only after considering the larger picture of these issues that 
often go overlooked from a nation-centred approach, can a new law be drafted 
that will account for the enforcement needs of both foreign and domestic parties 
before the Saudi enforcement courts. 
 
7.3.2 Create an Arbitration-Specific Shura Council 
 
One area in which Saudi Arabia struggles relates to the interpretational 
challenges faced by Shariah and the simultaneous attempts to reconcile 
Shariah law with legislative provisions. To assist with the legislative process, the 
Shura Council was created as the formal advisory entity within the Saudi 
government.1096 The Shura Council is empowered to draft and propose laws to 
the King and to interpret laws that have already been issued.1097 To further 
assist with the development and interpretation of the Kingdom’s laws, the Shura 
Council was initially divided into eight specialised committees, which has 
increased to its present thirteen committees.1098 The topics for these specialised 
committees currently include: Islamic, Judicial Affairs; Social, Family, and Youth 
Affairs; Economic Affairs and Energy; Security Affairs; Educational and 
Scientific Research Affairs and many others.1099 
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As can be inferred, these committees correlate with the primary issues facing 
the Kingdom’s development and reformed over the last ninety years. These 
committees serve an invaluable purpose by being able to hone in on a particular 
area of specialty and provide thoughtful and reasoned guidance on how the 
Kingdom should handle its legislative affairs and how to best achieve its goals 
through legislative promulgations and interpretations. In light of the 
contemporary reform efforts taking place within the arbitration regime and the 
Kingdom’s focus on changing the world’s perception of it to an arbitration 
friendly nation, the Kingdom should consider that creation of a specialised 
Shura Council committee on arbitration and alternative dispute resolution. The 
committee could guide the King with further refining the Kingdom’s arbitration 
laws by assisting with identifying challenges for both foreign and domestic 
parties at the legislative stage and proposing language that would bridge the 
existing gaps and be specific enough to address these concerns. This 
committee would also be unique in that it would need to liaise with other 
committees, such as the Islamic, Judicial Affairs Committee and the Foreign 
Affairs Committee to effectively address matters such as international award 
enforcement and the integration of treaty obligations. 
 
7.3.3 Create a Specialised Arbitral Enforcement Court 
 
While the relegation of enforcement matters to a specialised enforcement circuit 
was a significant advancement in streamlining the recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral awards, this could be further improved through the creation 
arbitration-specific enforcement court As Pouget has argued, highly specialised 
courts have been significantly more effective in handling commercial arbitral 
awards when compared to general judicial enforcement proceedings in a 
number of jurisdictions1100 and, as a result, this has become a growing trend.1101 
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Creating a specialised arbitral enforcement court that only hears arbitral issues 
would further the Saudi government’s attempts to enhance the efficiency of the 
Kingdom’s judicial system and ensure certainty of the overall legal system.1102 
Having a specific court dedicated to arbitral enforcement would result in a small 
pool of expert judges, familiar with arbitration practice and commercial dealings, 
as well as versed in the applicability of Shariah law to arbitral award 
enforcement, to hear recognition and enforcement cases within the Kingdom. 
The use of specialist judges would ensure that cases are being interpreted in 
line with the prevailing principles of arbitration and with a respect for party 
autonomy. Additionally, having a limited pool of specialist judges would also 
increase consistency in recognition and enforcement decisions, leading to a 
greater predictability for parties seeking satisfaction of their arbitral awards. 
 
7.3.4 Encourage Consistency in Judicial Enforcement Proceedings 
 
As illustrated in Chapter 5, there are various interpretations of Shariah law as 
well as what constitutes public policy that would merit setting aside an arbitral 
award. For the Saudi arbitral enforcement regime to be efficient and inspire the 
confidence of those engaging with the system, there must be increased 
consistency in enforcement proceeding practice. This section considers some of 
the ways in which consistency could be introduced into the current regime. That 
being said, these recommendations would work best in conjunction with the 
development of the Shura Council committee and specialised enforcement 
court suggested above. 
 
7.3.4.1 Clarify Legislative Terminology 
 
Consistency in enforcement proceedings first starts with a certain degree of 
precision in legislative terminology. The arbitration laws must be carefully and 
intentionally drafted using clear and unambiguous language to avoid 
ambiguities in the meanings and applications of these terms or interpretative 
gaps during recognition and enforcement efforts. The rationale behind this focus 
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on clarity is that when these gaps arise the Saudi courts’ tendency is to fill these 
gaps using principles of Shariah law and principles of public policy, introducing 
additional elements that could result in the refusal of an award, which could 
have otherwise been avoided had the language not been open to subjective 
interpretation. Further, clarity in legislative terminology will also result in 
increased confidence by parties that will need to ultimately enforce their arbitral 
awards within the Kingdom. When the governing laws are not a source of 
ambiguity, they can be certain their arbitration clauses, claims, and proceedings 
are structured in such a way that any grounds for challenge or refusal can be 
minimised to the extent possible. 
 
7.3.4.2 Clarify the Laws Applicable to Enforcement 
 
When it comes to the enforcement of domestic arbitral awards, there is no 
question that the Saudi domestic arbitration laws apply to the enforcement 
proceedings. But is this the case with foreign arbitral awards? Arguably, all 
awards being enforced within the Kingdom are subject to Saudi law; however, 
there is also a strong argument that foreign awards should be enforced only 
within the scope of the international instruments to which Saudi Arabia has 
subscribed, like the New York Convention. Thus, it would behove the Kingdom 
to expressly clarify what law sets out the conditions for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. One scholar suggests excluding foreign 
awards from the purview of domestic law and including a provision within the 
Kingdom’s domestic law that states ‘[t]he conditions to the enforcement of a 
domestic arbitral award shall not apply to a foreign or international arbitral 
award’.1103 A survey conducted by the same scholar confirmed that the majority 
of respondent’s agreed with this provision and that it accurately described the 
ideal scenario for the interaction between the domestic arbitration law and the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.1104 
 
7.3.4.3 Limit the Scope of Judicial Review 
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Another distinct aspect of Saudi enforcement proceedings that needs to be 
addressed is the relatively unfettered ability for the enforcement courts to review 
an arbitral award on the basis that they must verify that an award is consistent 
with Shariah as a matter of domestic public policy. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
there is a notable difference between domestic law which requires verification of 
Shariah compliance versus the language of international conventions, like the 
New York Convention, that views public policy evaluation as a permissive grant 
of authority to be used judiciously. 
 
As it currently stands, the courts apply the domestic Shariah compliance 
standard to all arbitral award enforcement proceedings under the umbrella of 
public policy analysis. An important part of limiting the scope of this judicial 
review will be to reconceptualise what constitutes public policy for the purposes 
of enforcing a domestic or foreign arbitral award. This would ideally be achieved 
through implementing a dualistic legal system as discussed above and refining 
the Kingdom’s conception of public policy that is discussed below. 
 
Once the relative standards are implemented for domestic and foreign arbitral 
awards respectively, the language of the Arbitration Law should be revised to 
reflect this dichotomous structure and guide judges in making recognition and 
enforcement determinations. 
 
 
7.4 Recategorise Prohibited Award Elements into Permissible Forms 
 
The most often cited ground for the refusal to recognise or enforce an arbitral 
award on public policy grounds is that contents of the award violates principles 
of Shariah law and that it would thus be against the Kingdom’s public policy to 
enforce the arbitral award. One way to avoid an award being refused on the 
grounds of Shariah violations would be careful crafting of the award to delineate 
its elements in a way that is compliant with the Shariah as opposed to against it. 
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Consider for instance the issue of interest, which is one of the most common 
award elements that violate Shariah when granted by the arbitral tribunal to the 
prevailing party. The Quran prohibits all kinds of interest,1105 but does not 
provide specific reasons for the basis of this prohibition. To understand how a 
recharacterisation could overcome this prohibition it is important to understand 
the basis for why interest is prohibited. Beyond the proscriptions of the Quran, 
Gotanda explains that Muslims believe that interest encourages the 
accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few, thereby diminishing an individual’s 
concern for his fellow man, creates a financial gain without a corresponding risk 
of potential loss; and is selfish in that it is an accumulation of wealth at the 
expense of another as opposed to through one’s own hard work.1106 
 
However, unlike awards of interest that are prohibited, the Saudi courts have 
acknowledged a legal right to claim and recover damages under Shariah law 
when the damages arise from a breach of the underlying contract including lost 
profits.1107 When an arbitrator issues an arbitral award that includes interest, 
one can argue that the award is not intended to be an accumulation of 
additional wealth for the prevailing party, but rather as a compensation for 
damages suffered as a result of the breach.1108 However, it should be noted that 
the ability to award and enforce such damages is limited under Saudi law when 
compared to Western common law or civil legal systems. Specifically, Shariah 
only permits restoring a party to the position it was in before the breach of the 
contract occurred and not to the position that party would have occupied if both 
parties had performed their obligations under the contract. In the latter instance, 
this would be a speculative award, which is unenforceable under Shariah 
law.1109 
 
When recategorising interest as an alternative form of compensation to a party 
as a result of a contract breach, the arbitral tribunal has a number of options. 
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First, lost profits can be reconceptualised as compensation for missed 
opportunities.1110 Unlike lost profits that are compensation for events that did not 
yet occur and constitute possible future damage, compensation for missed 
opportunities can represent non-speculative, definite future damage caused by 
the breach of contract. This present damage arises because of the obligations 
to the breaching party, preventing the non-breaching party from being able to 
profit from pursuing other opportunities. As such, this compensation would be 
obligatory rather than representing an unrealized probability.1111 Such an 
approach would be consistent with those taken the Saudi courts in interpreting 
damages awards.1112 
 
Second, the arbitrators could also make the argument that the additional 
compensation added to the award is compensation for the time value of money 
or inflation compensation.1113 Shariah scholars have contended that the Shariah 
permits compensation for the time value of money in commercial contracts, but 
not for loans.1114 Given that most commercial arbitrations result from contractual 
disputes, it would seem that this approach could be a viable option for 
consideration by the tribunal. What becomes difficult when undertaking this 
analysis is determining how to justifiably calculate the damages amount. As 
Khan notes, ‘[t]here is…nothing against realizing the time value of money as 
long as it is not claimed as a predetermined value’.1115 Thus, a contract cannot 
have a set interest rate that it is seeking to enforce by the tribunal; instead, as a 
precursor to characterising an additional sum as inflation compensation, there 
must not be a contractually agreed interest rate and, as some argue, the 
amount of total compensation to be paid under the contract is also not 
contractually agreed.1116 However, this walks a fine line as without these terms 
a contract more easily can be ruled speculative absent a specific means for 
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determining the price to be paid at a later date, such as the then existing fair 
market value.1117 
 
Finally, to the extent a breach of contract arises from the non-payment of a 
party, interest calculated as part of the damages could be characterised as 
compensation for the debtor’s delay in repaying his debts. In Islamic law, a 
party cannot delay of payments on a debt or obligation for no reason.1118 If a 
party fails to pay their contractual obligations without cause or stops paying their 
obligations due to being embroiled in the arbitration of a contractual dispute, it 
arguably would be permissible for the arbitral tribunal to award the prevailing 
party additional compensation for the debtor’s procrastination in making his 
payments.1119 This basis for additional compensation is derived from the 
Prophet’s hadith that states, ‘procrastination (delay) in paying debts by a wealthy 
man is injustice’.1120 Thus, to the extent that a party that is able to make 
payments does not, the non-breaching party would be rightfully entitled to 
damages.  
 
The idea of recharacterising impermissible elements of an arbitral award in a 
way that complies with Shariah and Islamic public policy extends beyond the 
concept of riba. For instance, there may be means for reconciling other issues 
such as gharar (uncertainty) and Jahallah (the unknown) that would preserve 
the underlying contract, the arbitral proceedings, and the resulting award when 
viewed through a lens of preserving competing and more pressing Shariah 
concerns. However, this area has not been studied at length and would serve 
as an interesting point of discussion for how to harmonise Shariah practice with 
international commercial norms in light of contemporary international trade 
practices. 
 
																																																						
1117 Board of Grievances Decision No 29/1401 (1981). Holding that ‘due to a defendant’s failure to allow 
the contractor to initiate the required work, the plaintiff would be compensated for the increase in the 
market value of materials due to inflation…An increase in the market value of materials and wages would 
have been avoided if the defendant had performed the contractual obligation, as intended at the signing of 
the contract’. (emphasis added). 
1118 Jason J Kilborn, ‘Foundations of Forgiveness in Islamic Bankruptcy Law: Sources, Methodology, 
Diversity’ (2011) 85 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 323, 344. 
1119 AlEisa (n 109) 190. 
1120 Hadith 3:486, Al Bukari. 
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7.3.5 Develop a Refined Conception of Public Policy 
 
This study has demonstrated that the Saudi approach places Shariah 
compliance as a paramount consideration for public policy analysis under both 
the domestic arbitration law and for the purposes of exemption under the New 
York Convention. However, as explored in Chapter 6, there is an ongoing 
debate over whether Shariah should in fact rise to the level of public policy and, 
more generally, how public policy should be defined in various circumstances. 
 
In considering how Shariah fits into a public policy analysis, Ayad makes an 
interesting point that despite the aim of Shariah to preserve public policy, there 
are circumstances in which Shariah and the Kingdom’s public policy could come 
into conflict.1121 This no doubt creates a risk for parties involved in arbitrations 
needing enforcement in Saudi Arabia how and to what extent the courts will 
seek to implicate public policy and/or Shariah principles. Instead of forcing 
parties into the assumption that under all circumstances Shariah constitutes the 
Kingdom’s public policy for the purposes of award enforcement, the Saudi 
government should delineate the extent to which Shariah is in fact distinct from 
public policy and the circumstances under which Shariah conflicts with public 
policy and will not be enforced. This would require a rethinking by judges of the 
implicit hierarchy applied to cases which begins with a Shariah analysis, 
followed by legislative regulation, custom, then equity.1122  
 
To remedy this supremacy of Shariah in all circumstances, the link between 
inherent link between public policy and Shariah should be reconsidered. Instead 
of using Shariah in place of public policy considerations, an analysis should be 
made of what underlying principles of Shariah law rise to the level of public 
policy as the term is used in the broader arbitration landscape. These principles 
should then be identified as public policy grounds for the refusal to recognise or 
enforce an arbitral award without reference to Shariah law. This would provide 
increased predictability for parties and judges during enforcement proceedings 
																																																						
1121 Mary B Ayad, ‘The Case of Pacta Sunt Ser Vanda vs Ordre Public: The Use of Ijthad to Achieve 
Higher Award Enforcement’ (2009) 6 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 93. 
1122 Ibid. 
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while also upholding the intended narrow application of the public policy 
exemption contained in international instruments.  
 
Further, regardless of how Saudi Arabia handles the link between Shariah and 
public policy, the Kingdom should contemplate defining both its domestic and 
international public policy. As discussed above, this would be a measure of 
legal pluralism in which the public policy analysis for international awards would 
be based on the Kingdom’s determination of what matters are of utmost 
concern specifically within the award enforcement context when foreign parties 
are involved. This would not prevent the Kingdom from continuing to mandate 
Shariah compliance for all domestic arbitral awards. Al-Fadhel notes that a 
number of arbitration countries have adopted such an approach of having 
international public policy that applies to international arbitrations to further a 
country’s goals of being perceived as arbitration friendly and attracting foreign 
investment.1123 Saudi Arabia would be keen to give due consideration to this 
approach.  
 
7.5 Contribution of this Study 
 
This study has made a unique and impactful contribution to the field of arbitral 
award recognition and enforcement in Saudi Arabia. Specifically, it has 
addressed how the modernisation efforts of the Saudi arbitration regime have 
not yet resolved the concerns of Shariah’s in the enforcement of arbitral awards, 
specifically international arbitral awards.  
 
Through its doctrinal and empirical analyses, this study has identified the main 
challenges for parties in enforcing arbitral awards within the Kingdom both 
under the domestic Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012 and international agreements, 
such as the New York Convention. This work has critically explored how the 
Saudi courts are able to use the ambiguity surrounding ‘public policy’ to apply 
Shariah to all enforcement proceedings, opening up the ability for the 
enforcement court to review both the award and underlying case from a merit 
based perspective. 
																																																						
1123 Al-Fadhel (n 14) 255. 
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Further, this thesis also provided significant attention to the role that Islamic 
schools of thought have in defining public policy—in practice the application of 
Shariah—and the challenges that stem from an interpretative system. These 
challenges are further compounded when attempting to reconcile Saudi 
Arabia’s treaty obligations with its domestic practices. In light of these 
challenges, this thesis provided actionable recommendations that the Kingdom 
could implement in both the short and long term to further develop its arbitral 
regime and be a more appealing jurisdiction in the international arbitral sphere. 
 
7.6 Areas for Further Research 
 
The goal of this thesis was to bring attention to the issues inherent with the 
application of Shariah principles with regard to the recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral awards and to propose solutions that the Kingdom could pursue to 
help remedy these concerns. However, given the constraints of this thesis, 
many topics were only briefly discussed and would prove to be prime grounds 
for further research and development. 
 
First, additional research should be done into the concept of legal pluralism as it 
would apply to arbitration within the Kingdom. Arguably, some measure of this 
may already be inherent within the arbitration framework, and if the Kingdom is 
to intentionally embrace such a duality it will be crucial for there to be an 
assessment of the current status and what an idea parallel system for 
enforcement would look like going forward. This would entail examining both the 
arbitration-based principles and the conceptions of public policy to be applied in 
the respective domestic and international contexts. 
 
Second, further structural reform analysis should be undertaken to determine 
how specialised arbitral government entities, such as a Shura Council 
committee or enforcement court, could be integrated within the existing Saudi 
legal system. This would include determining how these entities would be 
created, the prerequisites for serving in such an entity, and the rules and 
regulations governing their actions. 
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Third, in light of the need for further clarity in legislative terminology and the 
curtailing of enforcement court review, a doctrinal analysis should be 
undertaken to dissect the provisions of the Saudi Arbitration Law and 
Enforcement Law, as well as the Kingdom’s international obligations, with the 
goal of making legislative proposals for how the laws can be further developed 
to fill these gaps. 
 
Finally, additional research should be done on how the arbitral tribunal itself can 
avoid having its awards set aside on public policy grounds by issuing awards in 
a Shariah compliant manner. This chapter touched on some of the ways that 
riba could be recharacterised and there is certainly room to explore how other 
prohibited elements could be transformed into Shariah compliant damages 
through intent and careful drafting of the arbitral award. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
As this thesis has demonstrated, the issue of enforcing arbitral awards within 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is complex and requires a detailed understand of 
the interplay between Shariah law and the arbitral enforcement regime.1124 For 
parties that are unfamiliar with Shariah foundations, its procedures, or its 
nuances, they may not appreciate the extent to which the Saudi system has 
been largely modernised.1125 However, Saudi Arabia still needs to take action to 
bridge the gaps between its domestic arbitral approach and that of the 
international arbitration sphere wherever possible. Through continued education 
and dialogue, it is this author’s hope that greater synergy can be achieved 
between Saudi and international; arbitral principles. It may not be easy, but it 
can be done. 
 
Indeed, this thesis’s recommendation for the establishment of a Shura Council 
Committee on Arbitration is an affirmative and highly positive step toward the 
development and harmonisation of Islamic jurisprudence as it is related to 
international commerce and trade.1126 By identifying opportunities to harmonise 
																																																						
1124 See Chapters 3-4. 
1125 See Chapter 3. 
1126 See Chapter 5. 
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Saudi Arabia’s Shariah-based approach with international arbitration trends,1127 
these recommendations will constitute positive, affirmative steps towards 
developing a new Saudi arbitration regime that synchronises with international 
arbitration norms, thus benefitting Saudi trade and commerce.1128 
 
Further, by implementing the broader changes to the Kingdom’s conception of 
public policy and the language used in its governing arbitration laws, Saudi 
Arabia’s international arbitration framework can continue to develop and evolve. 
Such advances will be key to changing the perceptions of Saudi Arabia from 
‘traditionally hostile’1129 to arbitration to a country that is arbitration friendly for 
both domestic and foreign parties. 
																																																						
1127 See Chapters 2-3. 
1128 See Chapter 2. 
1129 Wakim (n 968) 1. 
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